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xAbstract of the Dissertation 
Chronic hunger is among the most serious problems in the developing world today. 
When we consider hunger’s devastating effect on the health, welfare, and future 
prospects of the nearly 200 million children (or approximately 800 million people) that 
are chronically hungry, we realize that something has to be done.  
Another serious problem concerns vast inequalities in access to agricultural land—a very 
important source of income and wealth in the developing world. Thus, after more than a 
decade in hibernation, land reform is back on the agenda in many developing countries. 
In the name of justice and rural poverty reduction, countries like Zimbabwe, Brazil, and 
South Africa hope to give the rural poor better access to agricultural land.  
This dissertation investigates the potential for land reform as a means to reduce hunger 
in developing countries. Towards this end, it studies the relationship between land 
concentration and chronic hunger in the total population of 41 countries across the 
developing world. The study aims to establish whether countries with a more egalitarian 
distribution of land enjoy less hunger than countries where land is concentrated in the 
hands of the few. If this is the case, land reform could act as a means for reducing 
hunger.
I rely on an entitlement approach to the study of food insecurity, but see food 
availability as an integrated part of entitlement relations, mainly because of its effect on 
food prices. In particular, I devise a conceptual scheme over the complex relationship 
between land concentration and food insecurity among peasants, landless agricultural
workers and industrial workers. This conceptual scheme builds on a dual economy 
perspective, and looks at the divergent effects of land concentration on the agricultural 
and the industrial sectors of the economy. A simplified model of this conceptual scheme 
is tested on the sample by way of multivariate regression analyses.  
The most important finding of the study is that the effect of land concentration on food 
insecurity depends on the share of the population that relies on agriculture for a living, 
as well as the level of food availability in the country. These variables interact to 
produce very high levels of food insecurity in countries where there is a high level of 
land concentration, where a large share of the population depends on agriculture for a 
living, and where there is a low level of food availability. On the other hand, I find very 
low levels of food insecurity in countries with a high level of land concentration, where 
a low share of the total population depends on agriculture for a living, and where there is 
a high level of food availability. For this reason, I find both the highest and the lowest 
levels of food insecurity where land is concentrated in the hands of the few.
Another important finding of this study is that national food availability is much more 
important in relation to food insecurity than is usually assumed to be the case. For this 
reason the issue of food availability should be integrated more closely into the 
entitlement approach. 
xi
The dissertation (cautiously) concludes that very few countries are able to reduce their 
level of chronic hunger by implementing land reform. For most countries, land reform 
will most likely lead to more hunger. Moreover, by implementing land reform, countries 
(where land reform may help reduce food insecurity) may find themselves trapped in a 
situation with a medium level of food insecurity, from which it will be very hard to 
escape. This trap is a consequence of the low levels of agricultural labor productivity 
(and agricultural surplus available for industrialization) associated with a low level of 
land concentration.

1Introduction
One of the most crucial issues of our time concerns the world’s food insecurity 
problem. Each year, 11 million children under the age of five die from hunger and 
related diseases. Another way to conceptualize this is that on every fifth second, of 
every single day, the world suffers another child’s death due to hunger. If this was 
not bad enough, these deaths are just the tip of the iceberg. In the developing world, 
there are about 200 million children under the age of five that suffer from chronic 
undernutrition. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
estimates that around 800 million people in the developing world are deprived of the 
necessary amount of food to support an active, healthy life. Some progress has been 
made over the past decades, but the problem continues to be overwhelming. The 
number of chronically hungry people in the developing world still constitutes more 
than the combined populations of the United States, Canada, Russia, France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan (FAO 2002a; WFP 2003).  
Hunger affects the lives of these people in many ways. The most obvious 
effect is the agony associated with being hungry day after day. In addition, a lack of 
nourishment causes physical and mental stunting, and an increased susceptibility to 
disease. Worse, these conditions impair a person’s ability to work and deprive him or 
her of the possibility for improving a desperate situation. Because hunger prevents 
the poor from taking advantage of development opportunities, it is both a cause and 
an effect of extreme poverty. Thus, hunger eradication is also a vital step in 
alleviating poverty and inequality (FAO 2003).  
In 1996, participating countries at “The World Food Summit” agreed on a 
declaration to halve world hunger by 2015. At “The World Food Summit, Five Years 
Later” in 2002, it became evident that progress in hunger reduction had been much 
slower than anticipated. Unless the rate of hunger reduction nearly triples in the 
remaining years (until 2015), the goals of the World Food Summit will not be met 
(FAO 2003). Something needs to be done, and done quickly. 
Hunger studies have traditionally explained food insecurity in terms of 
constraints on food production, and the (potential) misbalance between the growth in 
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food production relative to population growth. These studies belong to what has been 
called the food availability approach. Two main camps can be said to reside in this 
food availability approach. The first is a neo-Malthusian camp, which argues that 
hunger persists because there are too many people in the world compared to the 
earth’s food production capacity. For this camp, population control is the only viable 
option for obtaining food security (Ehrlich 1969; Carson 1962; Brown and Kane 
1994; Meadows et al. 1972 and 1991). The second camp argues that technological 
developments can boost food production enough to keep up with population growth 
for decades to come (Boserup 1965; Borlaug and Dowswell 1993; Hoell 1993; Daw 
1994; Bumb 1995; Dyson 1996). The common denominator for both these camps, 
however, is that they believe hunger can be explained, and alleviated, in terms of 
food supply per capita.  
In the 1980s, these explanations for food insecurity lost ground to an 
entitlement approach associated with Amartya Sen. This approach focuses on 
poverty and the access to food. In other words, food insecurity in the availability 
approach is a state of “there not being enough food”; in the entitlement approach, 
food insecurity is a state of “someone not having enough food”. Thus, the entitlement 
approach cuts to the heart of the matter, which is that people do not have access to 
food because they are poor. This focus on access to food leads researchers from this 
approach to search for solutions in the direction of redistributing income and wealth 
(to the poor).  
It is in this context that my contribution is situated. The aim of this thesis is to 
find out if land reform can reduce food insecurity by increasing entitlements to food 
among the poor. The impetus for this investigation is that there is a renewed focus on 
land reform as a poverty-alleviating policy in the developing world. Despite this 
renewed interest, the question of how land reform relates to food insecurity has not 
received much attention.  
Since agriculture is a very important source of income and wealth in 
developing countries, and many of these countries have a highly inegalitarian 
distribution of land, land reform is often seen as an especially relevant policy for 
redistribution. Following successful land reforms in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
in the wake of World War II, the policy received a lot of attention in development 
circles and a new wave of land reforms swept across the developing world. In the 
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decades after 1950, extensive reforms were implemented in many countries in this 
part of the world. For example, in Latin America, countries such as Chile, Peru, the 
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Nicaragua have all tried their 
hand at land reform. On the Asian continent, India and the Philippines have made (at 
least) efforts towards extensive reforms; and in Africa, countries like Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Malawi, Guinea, and Kenya have carried 
out important land reforms. Many other countries across the developing world 
implemented more limited reforms in this period (Bruce 1998a; Adams 1995; Jazairy 
et al. 1992).  
In the 1980s, however, land reform became a casualty of the new, neo-liberal 
development discourse. Although radical groups within the developing world still 
continued their struggle for land reform, the focus of the development discourse 
shifted to general economic growth (and trade). Land reform became 
“unfashionable”; the fruits of economic growth would now trickle-down to the 
poor—even where the control over land was concentrated in the hands of the few.  
Today, land reform has been brought back onto the development agenda by 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations’ Food 
and Agriculture Organization, as well as interest groups within developing countries.
Zimbabwe’s infamous land reform is the most striking manifestation of this renewed 
interest, but (less extensive and thus less renowned) land reforms are also underway 
in countries like South Africa and Brazil. This renewed interest in land reform is 
mostly a result of a growing belief that poverty cannot be alleviated without some 
redistribution of wealth and income (Alexandratos 1995: 318; Tyler et al. 1993: 3). 
In addition, there is a perception that small farms produce more per hectare than 
large farms, and that land reform will not only redistribute wealth and income, but 
also accelerate economic growth.1 Finally, it is difficult to ignore the attractiveness 
of land reform as an issue of fairness or justice. In this light, land reform is driven by 
striking differences in living standards within a country. Pressures for land reform 
will always exist where there are great divides separating the rich landed elite from 
its poverty-stricken (and often landless) peasantry. 
1 This “inverse” relationship has been advocated by, among others, Bharadwaj (1974: 11-31) and 
Berry and Cline (1979). 
CHAPTER 1 
4
Despite the (past and present) focus on land reform as a policy for alleviating 
poverty, the relationship between land reform and food insecurity is largely 
understudied. While there is a large body of literature on land reform as an 
instrument for reducing poverty (in general), very few consider the specific issue of 
food insecurity. The literature on (status quo) land concentration also focuses on 
poverty. While there are studies that focus on the relationship between land 
concentration and access (entitlements) to food (e.g., Jonsson 1993, von Braun et al. 
1992; El-Ghonemy 1990; Thiesenhusen 1995), and a few of these pursue the link in 
empirical analyses—but focus solely on rural food insecurity (e.g., El-Ghonemy 
1990; Amalgir and Arora 1991), nearly all of these studies are within-country case 
studies.
I am aware of only one cross-country study on the relationship between land 
concentration and food insecurity in the total population, and this is a very brief 
analysis in The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2002 (FAO 2002a). This 
analysis of 25 developing countries shows that countries with low levels of land 
concentration have had better success in hunger reduction (during the 1980s and 
1990s) than countries with high levels of land concentration. However, this study 
suffers from some serious shortcomings. In particular, the FAO study is a simple 
bivariate study that does not try to explain how low levels of land concentration 
might reduce food insecurity. Furthermore, the study does not control for other 
possible explanations, and it uses the FAO’s data on undernourishment as an 
indicator for hunger. As I shall elaborate below in Chapter 3, this indicator is 
problematic for use in studies of land concentration in developing countries because 
the prevalence of hunger is, to a varying degree, estimated on the basis of 
information about land concentration.  
Thus, there is a real need for a larger cross-country analysis that digs deeper 
into the dynamics of this relationship. This thesis aims to fill that gap. However, 
there is another gap in the literature on entitlements to food that this thesis seeks to 
fill. Existing studies aimed at increasing the poor’s access to food have a tendency to 
focus myopically on income. In their eagerness to distance themselves from the 
availability approach, these studies overlook the important role that food availability 
plays for food prices, and thereby on the poor’s real income (in terms of food). Thus, 
there is also a need for an analysis that considers concomitantly the income and price 
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sides of indirect entitlements to food. This is the second gap in the literature that this 
thesis seeks to fill. 
In short, I want to find out whether countries with low land concentration 
have less food insecurity. If they do, land reform can be considered as a means for 
reducing food insecurity in countries with high levels of land concentration. While 
most studies on land concentration and reform focus exclusively on the consequences 
for the rural population, I want to investigate the effect on food insecurity in both 
agricultural and industrial populations. The reason for studying the relationship 
between land concentration and food insecurity in the total population is that I expect 
low levels of land concentration to generate low levels of food insecurity among the 
agricultural population, but relatively high levels of food insecurity in the industrial 
population. I expect this because the agricultural and industrial sectors are closely 
linked in developing (country) economies, as industrial growth depends on raw 
materials, food, and capital from the agricultural sector. With low levels of land 
concentration, self-consumption within the agricultural sector tends to be higher, and 
it is likely that the level of food availability (on the market) and the agricultural 
surplus necessary for industrialization will be lower (than if land concentration was 
higher). Thus, while the peasantry may enjoy higher food consumption (under low 
levels of land concentration), industrial workers may face lower incomes and higher 
food prices.  
I conclude that land reform is not a very effective strategy for increasing food 
security in the vast majority of developing countries. For the few countries that might 
benefit from land reform, the reforms may actually trap them in a context with a 
medium level of food security. For the vast majority of countries, however, land 
reform may undermine existing levels of food security. Hence the title of this 
dissertation: Just Hungry? While many countries may be enticed to implement land 
reform in the name of distributional justice, the reforms themselves can increase the 
level of hunger in the country.  
1.1 Method 
While my aim is to assess the effectiveness of land redistribution as a policy for 
reducing food insecurity, I have chosen to study the relationship between food 
security and land distribution—instead of land reform. This is because the 
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concentration of land is the real issue at hand. Land reform is only important because 
it is a method for changing the distribution of land. It is therefore important to study 
how land concentration affects food insecurity. If there is no causal link between low 
levels of land concentration and (relatively) low levels of food insecurity, land 
reform will probably not be an effective policy for reducing food insecurity. (When 
we, in addition, consider the disruptions in productivity that often follow in the 
aftermath of land reform (Brigham 2000), there may be other policies that are better 
suited for reducing food insecurity in developing countries.) Because land reforms 
are difficult to compare across countries, there are strong methodological grounds for 
studying land concentration instead of land reform. Land reforms spring out of 
different agrarian structures; they have very different scopes (in terms of the size of 
the area redistributed and how many people benefit), as well as varying time spans. It 
is also difficult to find data on the extensiveness of the reforms (in reality, as 
compared to intent). At this stage of the investigation, a study of the relationship 
between land distribution and food insecurity will be more informative, and can 
encompass many more countries. However, when I study the relationship between 
land concentration and food insecurity, the rationale for land reform will be an 
implicit part of the analysis. 
The concept of food insecurity encompasses both famine and chronic hunger. 
Famine is a situation characterized by a sudden collapse of the level of food 
consumption for a large segment of the population, leading to abnormally high rates 
of death from starvation (Sen 1981: 39-41). While famine can be understood as a 
temporary decline in access to food, chronic food insecurity is enduring. Chronic 
food insecurity implies a more continuous situation: victims have had (or risk 
having) too little to eat over extended periods, and deterioration in health (or even 
death) may result. Under conditions with chronic food insecurity, countries do not 
experience a stark increase in death rates from hunger. For this reason, famines are 
much more visible than chronic hunger, generating headlines in the world’s press. 
Chronic food insecurity, by contrast, continues largely unnoticed. Some suggest that 
it is easier to eradicate famine than chronic hunger, because the latter is a problem 
that affects many more people and entails difficult social and political dimensions 
(Drèze and Sen 1989: 260-61).  
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Although there may be an evolutionary transition from chronic hunger to 
famine, they are best understood as two distinct phenomena. Both encompass 
starvation, but they imply different magnitudes, time spans, and (most often) 
different policy responses. While famines have a short (sudden) historical time-span, 
chronic hunger is not concentrated in time. And while death may be the final 
outcome of chronic hunger, famines lead to a more rapid deterioration of the victims’ 
health and a stark increase in death rates from starvation. The focus of this thesis is 
on chronic hunger. Henceforth, when I use the terms food security and food 
insecurity they will refer to the chronic state. 
There are three main reasons why I prioritize food insecurity over other 
indicators for poverty. First, food insecurity captures the most marginalized people: 
those who may not survive if their situation deteriorates. Second, there are millions 
of chronically food insecure people in the developing world, and the suffering of 
each and every one of these demands an end to the problem. Third, food security is 
important for combating general poverty and promoting economic growth in 
developing countries, as people who are chronically hungry cannot participate in 
productive work.  
To test the empirical relationships between land concentration, food 
availability, and food insecurity I will undertake a cross-country, multivariate 
regression analysis on 41 developing countries. There are three main benefits from 
using a cross-country approach to this study of food insecurity. First, land 
concentration typically varies more across countries than within them (for example 
from region to region within a country). Second, land distribution and food 
availability variables are mostly observed at the national level. Third, a cross-country 
study can identify general patterns of relationships, and bring attention to causes and 
priorities for action that may be overlooked in single-country case studies.  
 There are two main concerns regarding the cross-country approach in this 
study: the availability and comparability of the data. Since developing countries 
cannot typically spend much of their limited economic resources on gathering data, 
there simply aren’t available data for some of the variables that I would have liked to 
include in the analysis. Furthermore, the data on land concentration, for instance, are 
collected from several different sources, and therefore may not be directly 
comparable. Different sources may use a varying number of categories when they 
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compute their gini coefficients for landholdings. As a result, they may arrive at 
different coefficients for the same pattern of land distribution.  
The remaining variables of this study are internally consistent as they rely on 
the same agencies (e.g., The World Health Organization (WHO), The World Bank, 
or The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)) for all countries, 
but most of these data have been collected by the respective governments and sent to 
the relevant agencies. Thus, these data will also suffer from some degree of 
inconsistency across countries because different methods and standards may have 
been used. Across some variables there may be a compatibility problem in that 
different indicators come from different agencies; this is because they operationalize 
the same general concepts in different ways.  
The indicator for food insecurity (my dependent variable) deserves special 
attention because I capture it by using the prevalence of stunting in children under 
five. There is some controversy about the applicability of this indicator. For this 
reason, I have dedicated Chapter 3 to a discussion of this indicator (and an alternative 
from the FAO), as well as the reasons for (and consequences of) choosing the 
prevalence of stunting. 
I will use an interdisciplinary approach in order to understand as much of the 
phenomenon of food insecurity as possible. I venture into the discipline of 
economics, as much of the relationship between land concentration and food 
insecurity has to do with issues of labor productivity and its links to industrialization, 
as well as food prices in relation to the forces of supply and demand. I borrow from 
the field of “nutrition studies” in my discussion about measurements of food 
insecurity. Finally, I bring with me theories and methods from the discipline of 
political science (more specifically from comparative political economy) in my quest 
for the answer to “who gets what, when and how” in developing countries. Although 
any effort at interdisciplinary study is costly in terms of time and effort, these 
investments are necessary in order to understand how land concentration and food 
availability relate to food insecurity in the developing world. 
 In summary, I will rely on a framework borrowed from the entitlement 
approach. I then incorporate the issue of food availability into this approach and use 
this synthesized framework to study how land concentration affects chronic food 
insecurity in the developing world. By focusing on how land concentration relates to 
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food insecurity in the total population (and not only in the agricultural population), 
by incorporating food availability into the entitlement approach, and by testing the 
relationship in a cross-country, multivariate study, this thesis fills several important 
gaps in the literature on food insecurity and land concentration. 
1.2 Map of the Thesis 
In order to study the relationships presented above, the subsequent chapters will 
cover both theoretical and empirical territory. This section provides a road map for 
that territory, and a synopsis of the contents of each chapter.   
 The design of this thesis may appear somewhat unconventional. Given its 
exploratory nature, I use the first four chapters to provide necessary background 
information on the nature, measure, and existence of food insecurity in the 
developing world.2  This background information is necessary before we can begin to 
address the complicated ways in which land concentration affects food insecurity. 
These relationships are then clarified in (first) a conceptual scheme and (then) a 
testable model. The empirical analysis follows in the latter part of Chapter 6, and in 
Chapter 7. The remainder of this section will expand on the contents of these 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 discusses the two main approaches to the study of food insecurity: 
the food availability approach and the entitlement approach. I argue for the 
advantage of the latter because it focuses on the correct (individual) level of analysis. 
In addition, the entitlement approach guides us to search for the causes of food 
insecurity in the social, economic and political factors that determine people’s access 
(or, in other words, entitlements) to food. Through the vehicle of “entitlement 
mappings”, researchers can study how assets and income translate into (access to) 
food. The availability approach, with its focus on the level of per capita food supply, 
largely ignores these important questions.  
On the basis of this discussion I settle on a definition of food insecurity as 
“inadequate access to enough food for a healthy and productive life.”3 This definition 
stands in contrast to a definition derived from the food availability perspective, 
2 It is commonplace to begin a dissertation with a literature review, which is followed by an explicit 
theoretical formulation, subsequent variable descriptions, and the analysis. 
3 This is the negative form of the World Bank’s (1986) definition of food security. 
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where food insecurity is understood as a food deficit at the country, regional or world 
level.    
 Despite my dismissal of a food availability approach for studying food 
insecurity, I argue that food availability is important for food insecurity—through 
entitlement relations. In particular, food availability can influence people’s access to 
food in that it affects the very price of food. By reviewing the previous literature on 
the entitlements to food, I find that the link between food availability and 
entitlements to food is understudied. Thus, I argue that food availability needs to be 
considered within the entitlement approach because of its influence on people’s 
access to food.  
In the first part of Chapter 3 I discuss how to measure chronic food insecurity 
(the enduring lack of entitlements to food). The two most relevant datasets on food 
insecurity in the developing world are the FAO’s data on the prevalence of 
undernourishment (or, in other words, the access to food) and the WHO’s dataset on 
child malnutrition (i.e., primarily the result of inadequate access to food, but also, to 
a lesser degree, the result of disease). These two datasets are juxtaposed and 
evaluated. Because the FAO’s data on undernourishment are estimated on the basis 
of income distributions and per capita food supply, and because income distribution 
is often calculated from data on land distribution, these data suffer from a 
tautological relationship between land concentration and food supply. For this 
reason, I rely on the WHO’s data (on the prevalence of stunting in children under the 
age of five) as my indicator for food insecurity. In any case, some researchers see 
these data as a more reliable indicator of food insecurity (than the FAO’s data on 
malnourishment). However, the WHO’s data also incorporate an element of disease, 
as stunting may result from both disease and inadequate access to food. The latter 
part of Chapter 3 is spent arguing that these data, nevertheless, can be used as a 
reliable indicator for food insecurity.  
Having defined food insecurity as inadequate access to food, and chosen the 
prevalence of stunting (in children under five) as a satisfactory indicator for its 
prevalence in developing countries, Chapter 4 offers a description of the state of food 
insecurity across developing regions. This description reveals that there are about 
180 million stunted children under the age of five in the developing world today. 
Most of these (about 130 million) can be found in Asia. However, when measured in 
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terms of the percent of the population (under five), Africa replaces Asia’s 
discouraging place at the top of the list (with a prevalence of stunting just above 35 
percent). Chapter 4 also describes the state of land concentration and a few related 
aspects of agrarian structures across the developing world. This part of the chapter 
reveals that land is generally most concentrated in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and that the Near East and North Africa follows suit with lower levels of land 
concentration, tenancy, and landlessness. South East Asia and Africa have about the 
same (relatively) low levels of land concentration, but there is more landlessness and 
tenancy in the former.  
In Chapter 5, I relate land concentration to food insecurity. In particular, I 
merge the largely separate literatures on food insecurity and land concentration, and 
arrive at a conceptual scheme for understanding the relationship between land 
concentration, food availability, agricultural labor productivity and the food 
insecurity of peasants, landless agricultural workers, and industrial workers. This 
discussion has a dual economy perspective. Thus, it focuses on how the linkages 
between the agricultural and industrial sectors of developing economies influence the 
relationship between land concentration and food insecurity. 
Chapter 6 prepares the ground for an empirical test of that conceptual scheme. 
Because of data shortcomings, I cannot test all of the relationships outlined in 
Chapter 5. For this reason, I need to develop a testable model without compromising 
(too much of) the conceptual scheme’s explanatory power. From the review of the 
entitlement approach literature in Chapter 2, I also include a number of control 
variables that may affect food insecurity (in addition to the variables derived from 
the conceptual scheme). In this chapter’s latter part, I study the bivariate 
relationships between food insecurity and the variables that I expect to have a direct 
effect on food insecurity. These analyses show that land concentration is negatively 
correlated with food insecurity. This means that countries with high levels of land 
concentration generally had lower levels of food insecurity.  
Once these bivariate relationships have been tested, the next step is to test the 
independent effects of the variables in a cross-country, multivariate regression 
analysis. This is done in Chapter 7. The results of the multivariate analyses show that 
land concentration influences food insecurity in different ways, according to the 
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share of the population that depends on agriculture for a living and the level of food 
availability.  
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, sketches the policy choices facing 
developing countries in varying contexts. This sketch reveals that land reform can 
only reduce food insecurity in countries where there is a (very) large share of the 
population that depends on agriculture for a living (combined with a low, or medium 
level of food availability). Under alternative conditions, land reform will probably 
increase food insecurity. However, by pursuing land reform, countries that can 
expect some reduction in food insecurity may find themselves trapped in a situation 
characterized by low levels of land concentration and a medium level of food 
insecurity. Under these conditions, there is little hope of short-term improvement. To 
the extent that the vast majority of food-insecure countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South East Asia find themselves in just these conditions, this is a worrisome 
finding.
2 Availability and Entitlement 
There are two main approaches to the study of food insecurity: the food availability 
approach and the entitlement approach.1 This chapter provides an overview of these 
approaches, and an assessment of their merits and weaknesses in explaining hunger 
in the developing world. In Section 2.1, I provide an overview of the availability 
approach to food insecurity. In Section 2.2, I present the entitlement approach—the 
approach that dominates the debate today. In Section 2.3, I argue for the advantage of 
this perspective, mainly because it focuses on the correct level of analysis. In the 
following section, I review the entitlement approach literature with broad strokes, 
before using Section 2.5 to discuss the most important shortcomings with this 
literature and conclude that the previous research deals too lightly with the issue of 
food availability. Because food availability influences food prices, I argue that it 
needs to be integrated into the entitlement approach. I summarize the chapter’s 
argument in Section 2.6. 
2.1 The Food Availability Approach 
The food availability approach dominated academic debate on food insecurity from 
the 19th century until it was challenged by the entitlement approach in the 1980s. 
This section describes the availability approach. An important critique of this 
approach is advanced by the entitlement approach, which will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
The food availability approach derives its name from a focus on how much 
food is available in a society. Food insecurity is assessed by comparing the amount 
of food available in an area to the minimum amount necessary (to feed all of its 
inhabitants). This can be done at the global, regional, and/or national levels.2 At the 
global level, food insecurity aims to measure whether the earth can produce enough 
food to feed its entire population. Regional and national food insecurity is evaluated 
1 When applied to famines, the first approach is called the food availability decline approach (FAD). 
2 If not otherwise stated, a region is applied to groups of countries (for example Latin America and the 
Caribbean) and not to the sub-national level.  
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by comparing actual food supplies to respective sustenance requirements. As food 
supply incorporates production, imports and exports, it is possible to have full food 
security (from a food availability perspective) in a country that has no domestic food 
production (provided that there is enough foreign exchange to import the needed 
food). Conversely, a country that produces more than enough food (relative to its 
population) can be food insecure (again, from a food availability perspective) if 
much of that food is exported (and imports are not large enough to make up the 
difference).
Within the food availability approach there are two main schools of thought. 
The neo-Malthusian school suggests that the current (and future) problem is one of 
too many people in the world, compared to the natural resources available for food 
production. Since the Second World War, when population growth accelerated in 
many parts of the developing world, there has been widespread concern that it would 
not be possible to produce enough food for this rapidly growing population. 
Adherents to this school argue that the hunger problem will persist, or even explode, 
because we are about to reach absolute limits to food production. Intensive 
agricultural methods have already deteriorated the earth’s resource base, and the 
remaining reserves are insufficient for supporting an increase in food production 
large enough to provide for the world’s rapidly increasing population. This is being 
argued at a time when the world’s population is estimated to increase by 50 percent 
during the next 50 years.3 From this perspective, solving the world’s hunger problem 
lies in controlling population growth (e.g., Ehrlich 1969; Brown and Kane 1994; 
Carson 1962; and Meadows et al. 1972 and 1991). 
 The contending school of “technology optimists” does not see things quite so 
gloomily. This school argues that there is no need to panic: calls for population 
control are unnecessary as the future holds an almost limitless potential for 
increasing food production. These optimists believe that the developing world’s 
hunger problem can be solved because the current tension between the growth rates 
of population and food production is temporary; it will soon be relieved by 
technological developments. With reference to the unused potential of the Green 
3
The UN medium projection is that the world’s population will rise from 6.1 billion in 2000 to 9.3 
billion by 2050 (UN 2001).
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Revolution, and to recent developments in the field of biotechnology, they argue that 
we are far from approaching the limit to the earth’s capacity to increase food 
production levels (e.g., Dyson 1996; Hoell 1993; Borlaug and Dowswell 1993; 
Bumb 1995; and Daw 1994). 
From this perspective, the Green Revolution provided an end solution to 
hunger; technology would enable food production to grow significantly faster than 
the population. In the wake of the Green Revolution, there was widespread optimism 
about the new high-yielding varieties of food grains and increased use of fertilizers, 
and it was suggested that famine and undernutrition would be eliminated within a 
decade (Geier 1996: 10-12). But after several decades, the hunger problem remains 
far from resolved. In 1988/90, for instance, the world’s food production was more 
than high enough to adequately feed all of its inhabitants; still, there were more than 
790 million chronically undernourished people in the developing world (FAO 1999: 
29).
2.1.1 A Long Standing Debate among Pessimists and Optimists 
We are not the first generation to be concerned with massive starvation, rapidly 
escalating population growth rates, and the earth's ecological carrying capacity. Nor 
is ours the first generation to offer retort by technological optimists. This debate 
between optimists and pessimists, as sketched above, has deep historical roots.  
Arguments about natural limits to the earth's carrying capacity have a long 
pedigree. As distantly as the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero argued that the 
world population's growth rate exceeded the earth's natural capacity to provide it 
with food. Botero claimed that: 
"Populations tend to increase, beyond any assignable limit, to the full extent 
made possible by human fecundity: the means of subsistence, on the contrary, 
and the possibilities of increasing them are definitely limited and therefore 
impose a limit on that increase, the only there is; this limit asserts itself 
through want, which will induce people to refrain from marrying unless 
numbers are periodically reduced by wars, pestilence and so on" (as quoted in 
Schumpeter, 1994: 254-55). 
Having survived nearly four hundred years of criticism, this theory is still frequently 
used to explain the world's hunger problem. It is not Botero, however, but the late 
eighteenth century priest and scientist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) who is 
best know as its sponsor.
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Malthus' prominence originates from a famous debate in late eighteenth 
century Britain, on the prospects of improving future society. At the time, Britain 
was experiencing a population explosion that fuelled worries of a growing mismatch 
between people and resources. Consistent with the period's enlightenment spirit, this 
pessimism was quickly countered by more uplifting responses. Contemporary 
optimists could point to breakthroughs in technology and human understanding: 
developments that could create a much more equitable world, free of starvation and 
disease (Jensen et al. 2003).  
Among these optimists was the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94). Condorcet 
was confident that the problem of over-population would be solved with reference to 
human reason. Productivity increases, he believed, would increase man's potential 
livelihood, as "a very small amount of ground will be able to produce a great quantity 
of supplies of greater utility or higher quality" (quoted in Sen 1994b: 74). In addition, 
Condorcet held that education would bring lower birth rates, as rational human 
beings would see the value of limiting family size, giving their children the prospect 
for longer and happier lives. Reason, the optimists argued, would secure a better 
balance between people and food (Kennedy 1993; Sen 1994a and 1994b: 74).  
The optimism of Condorcet and others provoked Malthus to publish a 
legendary text on the dynamics of hunger. In his Essays on the Principle of 
Population [1798], Malthus argued that the power of population is indefinitely 
greater than the power of the earth to produce for man's subsistence: 
"Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence 
increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers 
will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second...This 
implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the 
difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall some where, and must 
necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind" (Malthus 1993: 
13).
Malthus argued that populations would always grow until they reached or 
surpassed a food production limit imposed by the earth's limited ecological capacity. 
Even if there were no absolute limits to the earth's potential output, the varying rates 
of increase (between population and food production) would soon lead to an 
imbalance between people and food. This imbalance would impose certain checks on 
the population's growth; checks that were either of a positive or negative sort. 
Positive checks—like starvation, violence and war—would act by increasing the 
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death rate: repressing growth rates which were already too large. Negative checks or 
"moral constraints" would act by decreasing the birth rate: refraining people from 
having children that they could not possibly support (Malthus 1993: 16). Inevitably, 
both checks could be traced back to the problem of insufficient food supplies. 
For Malthus, the only feasible check on population growth was derived from 
a population's potential lack of subsistence, or the fear of such. Social reforms or 
revolutions would only magnify the problem: improving the conditions for 
population growth (because the checks on population growth would be removed), but 
without affecting the earth's capacity to produce enough food. 
2.1.2 The Debate Renewed  
As a result of the first agricultural revolution,4 the industrial revolution, and 
emigration—eighteenth century Britain managed to escape from the "Malthusian 
Trap" (Kennedy 1993).  But the debate which Malthus spawned has been with us 
ever since. Even today one can find Malthus' and Condorcet's after-followers. 
A contemporary version of Malthus' argument became popular in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. At the time, the world's poorest regions were 
experiencing a rapid increase in population growth rates, while their food production 
rates were growing relatively slowly. In this context, Malthusian theories 
experienced a renaissance. Neo-Malthusians came to argue (in very stark terms) that 
the world's population was about to surpass the carrying capacity of the earth. This, 
they argued, would lead to a major hunger catastrophe. 
At about the same time, Rachel Carson inspired the growth of an 
environmental movement with her classic book, Silent Spring (1962). Silent Spring
opened the world's eyes to the devastating environmental consequences of modern 
agriculture's growing dependence on chemicals. In so doing, Malthusian theory 
reappeared in a new guise. Not only was the population in danger of increasing faster 
than the food necessary to sustain it, but modern attempts at trying to increase food 
production rates were also bought at great environmental cost. Because of 
environmental degradation, people were being forced to move (continually) to new 
areas in order to avoid starvation. In turn, these areas would also become depleted. In 
4
This agricultural revolution consisted mainly in the introduction of crop rotation, new breeding 
techniques, better management, new equipment, clover, turnip and the potato, and the enclosure 
movements (Jones 1974). 
CHAPTER 2 
18
the view of these neo-Malthusians, population growth was like a cancer: if it weren’t 
stopped it would destroy the planet and (consequently) all of its inhabitants (Ehrlich 
1969; Meadows et al. 1972). 
In another classic book, The Population Bomb, Ehrlich (1969: 7) advocated a 
Malthusian position by suggesting that attempts at trying to provide enough food for 
everyone were destined to fail. Current levels of agricultural and industrial 
production had already surpassed the earth's ecological capacity. Attempts at 
satisfying the needs of the current population were resulting in the depletion of 
natural resources and the pollution of the environment. Ehrlich argued that the 
inevitable global food shortage was only a symptom; the real problem was that there 
were too many people on a dying planet. 
Although Ehrlich realized that programs could be developed to expand the 
earth's food production capacity, he argued that these could only offer temporary 
solutions. Based on this, Ehrlich developed a policy prescription for food aid to the 
developing world. Since the earth's carrying capacity to produce food had already 
been surpassed, food should not be given to those countries that were unable to attain 
self-sufficiency. Instead, food aid should only be given to generally self-sufficient 
countries that were overcoming immediate and/or urgent food crises. Helping other 
countries would simply be a waste of scarce resources (Ehrlich 1969: 103-5). 
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), an international group 
of scholars led by Dennis Meadows developed a computerized model to examine 
possible scenarios given various trends in population, industrialization, food supply, 
and the depletion of nonrenewable resources.5 In their model, population growth and 
industrialization were the main driving forces. The most significant constraints were 
seen to be arable land, nonrenewable resources and pollution. The main conclusions 
of the Meadows' study were as follows: if present trends continued, the "limits to 
growth" would be reached within the next hundred years. The accompanying result 
would be a sudden, uncontrollable drop in the world's population. Meadows 
concluded that such a catastrophe could be avoided if industrialization and 
population growth rates were moderated, and intensive recycling programs (of 
resources) and a radical reorientation of values (from industrial to food production) 
5This research was conducted as a part of The Club of Rome's project on "The Predicament of 
Mankind".  
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were adopted immediately (Meadows et al. 1972). The group's findings were 
published in a path-breaking book, The Limits to Growth (1972), which made 
headlines throughout the world, promoting heated debates (Cornish 1977: 243-4). 
In response to the many criticisms of The Limits to Growth, the authors 
published a follow-up book entitled Beyond the Limits (1991). This book is quite 
similar to The Limits to Growth; it deals with the same trends and forces, and uses 
the same (but improved) computer model. In addition, Beyond the Limits updates the 
study to include evidence from the twenty years that had passed since their first 
study. Their conclusions are generally similar, although they contain even stronger 
predictions of doom: the world has already reached some of its limits, and a 
significant reduction in the world's resource and energy flows is necessary. 
One of today's best-known advocates of the Malthusian position is Lester 
Brown of the World Watch Institute. In Full House (1994), Brown and Hal Kane 
estimate the earth's population carrying capacity to be about 5.5 billion. As a result, 
they argue that large parts of today's developing world are caught in a demographic 
trap: 
"Once populations expand to the point where their demands begin to exceed 
the sustainable yields of local forests, grasslands, croplands, or aquifers, they 
begin directly or indirectly to consume the resource base itself. Forests and 
grasslands disappear, soils erode, land productivity declines, water tables fall, 
and wells go dry. This in turn reduces food production and incomes, 
triggering a downward spiral in a process we describe as the demographic 
trap" (Brown and Kane 1994: 55). 
As was the case in the eighteenth century, however, contemporary optimists 
can also be found. For members of this school, technological innovations in 
agriculture have rescued the world from another "Malthusian Dilemma". Esther 
Boserup, one of the foremost optimists of the time, argued in her now classic 
Conditions for Agricultural Growth (1965), that the direction of the causal arrow 
(between population and food production growth trends) was the opposite of what 
was claimed by Malthusians—both new and old. Thus, Boserup argued that 
population growth (which was determined by biological, medical and political 
factors) leads to increased agricultural output. This stands in stark contrast to the 
traditional argument: that the limits to agricultural growth were decisive for 
determining the population's growth and decline.     
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Julian Simon adopted an even more optimistic view when he claimed that the 
balance between population and resources was actually improving, and that this 
positive trend was likely to continue (Simon 1981; Gilbert 1993: xxiv). Simon 
promoted an anti-Malthusian population theory—where rising standards of living are 
the result of increased productivity rates. Increasing productivity, in turn, is 
dependent upon technological progress, which in turn relies on the number of human 
minds. As the population increases we have access to more minds, and with them, 
improved standards of living. It is within this optimistic perspective that the 
advocates of the Green Revolution could be found.    
In summary, Brown and his fellow travelers—like Malthus and Botero before 
them—stress the importance of reducing population growth rates as a means of 
solving today's hunger problems. Contemporary optimists, predictably, stress the 
importance and hope of technological developments. This debate seems stuck in an 
eternal loop, where population growth is set off against technology and the earth's 
capacity to produce enough food.6
In the early 1980s a new perspective on food insecurity emerged. This 
perspective questioned the narrow focus on food production and supply in 
comparison to population, suggesting that poverty was the main reason for hunger. 
Furthermore, it directed our attention to people’s access to food, and how this 
depends on the economic, political and social structure of society, and the 
individual's position in it (Sen 1981: 46). The question of who has access to the food 
produced is central to the entitlement approach, to which we will now turn.   
2.2 The Entitlement Approach 
With the entitlement approach came a new vision about hunger in the developing 
world, a vision focused on poverty as the main cause of food insecurity. While 
poverty had not been entirely absent from the earlier debate, it was not until the 
advent of Sen's “entitlement approach” that this aspect took center stage. Sen 
introduced this approach in response to the more popular Malthusian-based 
explanations for starvation, and he was particularly critical of the argument that 
famines were blamed on natural disasters that caused harvest failures. In contrast to 
6 I have elaborated on this shortcoming of the neo-Malthusian debate in Brigham (2003a).  
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the rather technical and demographic determinism of the availability approach, Sen’s 
approach investigates why some groups of people have more than enough to eat, 
while others starve. In particular, the entitlement approach is concerned with 
determinants of the distribution of food between different groups in society. It sees 
starvation as a function of people’s access to (ability to produce, buy or otherwise 
command) the food they need, concentrating on how legal systems allow some 
people to starve while others live amongst plenty (Sen 1980, 1981).7
There are three basic building blocks to the entitlement approach. These are 
endowments, entitlement mapping, and the entitlement-set.   
x Endowments are all legal resources that can be used to obtain food.8 These 
resources include money, land, machinery and animals, but also more abstract 
resources such as labor power, “know how”, kinship and citizenship (Sen 
1981).
x Entitlement mapping (or E-mapping) is the terms of trade between 
endowments and food, goods and services (Sen 1981: 46). This materializes 
in, for example, the ratio between money wages and the price of food, or the 
input-output ratios in farm production (Osmani 1995a: 255). 
x The entitlement-set represents the basket of food, goods and services that a 
person can obtain using his/her endowments. 
There is a whole spectrum of ways to convert endowments into an entitlement-set. 
Sen has dichotomized these into what he calls direct and indirect entitlements. Direct 
entitlements cover the production of food for one’s own consumption. Indirect 
entitlements include a person’s purchasing power to food (obtained through wage 
labor, selling commodities, exchange for other commodities, etc.) as well as a 
person’s right to food derived from social security programs, inheritance or other 
7 Mitra (1982: 488) argues that: “[Sen] has not said anything beyond what our great grandmothers 
were already aware of.” It is not difficult to agree that there is a strong element of common sense in 
Sen’s argument. However, the novelty of the approach lies in the fact that it was forwarded in a 
systemized and formalized fashion by a renowned economist. For these reasons, it was able to 
challenge the availability approach. Even if most great grandmothers understood that starvation is 
caused by poverty, Sen's language and systematic presentation of the entitlement approach were 
responsible for introducing poverty into the contemporary academic and political debate on hunger. 
8 Sen does not consider illegal means for obtaining food, such as stealing or looting (Sen 1981: 49). 
According to Osmani (1995a: 254), legal means have to be interpreted in broader terms as social 
norms and practices, not confined to what is formally sanctioned by the state. 
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legal arrangements. Some groups may rely on both types of entitlements. For 
example, peasants may need to exchange some of their produce for other types of 
food that provide more calories, proteins etc., at a lower cost. Others may need to 
seek additional work outside the farm to supplement what they are able to grow 
themselves (Sen 1981: 45-51). 
In other words, deterioration in a person’s food security can be traced to a 
reduction in endowments and/or deterioration in the exchange rate (E-mapping) 
between the endowments and the entitlement-set. Thus, this approach directs the 
search for causal explanations at the forces that determine people's command over 
food. This stands in contrast to the availability approach, which focuses on what 
determines the level of per capita food supply. 
Sen explicitly dismisses food shortages/misbalance between population and 
food availability as the principal cause of starvation. To show this, he draws on four 
famines in the twentieth century. In at least three of the four cases, Sen shows that 
food availability did not decline and that the famines must be explained by other 
factors than a shortage of food.  
For example, during the Great Bengal Famine in 1942-43, Sen (ibid: 78) 
showed that food availability was the highest in Bengal’s history. Despite this, over 
1.5 million people died during the famine. Sen claims that these deaths resulted from 
a movement in exchange entitlements to food in disfavor of the hardest hit groups of 
agricultural laborers and fishermen. The wholesale price of rice (which was the 
staple food) rose from between Rs. 13 and Rs. 14 in December 1942 to Rs. 37 in 
August 1943 (ibid: 66). The reason for this movement was not a shortage of food, but 
two war-related developments: inflationary pressure initiated by an expansion of 
public expenditures, and speculative and panic hoardings of rice. While some groups 
were able to increase their purchasing power in pace with the price increases (e.g., 
those involved in military and civil defense works, the army, in industries and 
commerce stimulated by war activities, others (especially agricultural workers) were 
not (Sen 1981: 75-78). Thus, it was a worsening in the latter groups’ E-mappings that 
made them starve, not an absolute shortage of food. 9
9 There has, however, been a great deal of debate about the empirical studies that Sen has undertaken. 
For example, studies by Seaman and Holt (1980) and Cutler (1984) have indicated that the food 
availability decline during the Wollo famine (in Ethiopia) of 1972-74 was more severe than 
acknowledged by Sen. 
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Because Sen’s empirical work has mostly concentrated on famine situations, 
the entitlement approach is commonly perceived to apply only to famines, not to 
chronic hunger.  This is a misunderstanding. In his now legendary book, Poverty and 
Famines (1981), Sen points out that his approach can be used to find explanations for 
both chronic food insecurity and famines: “The main focus of this work is on the 
causation of starvation in general and of famines in particular” (ibid: vii). Later, in 
Hunger and Public Action, Drèze and Sen (1989) analyze situations of both chronic 
hunger and famines with the entitlement approach:10
“The two forms of calamity related to hunger with which this book is 
concerned are (1) famines, and (2) endemic undernutrition and deprivation. 
The distinction between the intermittent and explosive occurrence of famines 
and the quieter and persistent phenomenon of regular undernutrition is 
important both from the point of view of diagnosis (they have different 
features and often quite dissimilar causal antecedents) and that of action (they 
call for substantially distinctive policies and activities)” (Dréze and Sen 1989: 
260).  
This does not mean that we will (necessarily) find the same causes for both 
phenomena. Rather, I believe that we will find different answers along the lines of 
endowments, E-mappings and entitlements. 
2.3 The Benefits of the Entitlement Approach 
The concept of food security can be applied to various levels of analysis: global, 
regional, national, household and individual. At the global level, food security aims 
to measure whether the earth can produce enough food to feed its entire population. 
The value of studying global food availability (per capita) is vested in the fact that it 
is a precondition for food security at all of the other levels: if there is a global food 
shortage, some people will necessarily suffer from malnutrition. 
 In a similar manner, regional and national (per capita) food availability 
measures whether there is enough food in a region or a country, given the respective 
sustenance requirements. Like global food availability, these regional and national 
aggregations are important for measuring the overall limits of food security. 
However, these aggregates measure food security by the average amount of calories, 
proteins and/or carbohydrates that is available per capita compared to average per 
10 All of part III in the book is concerned with chronic hunger.  
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capita needs. They do not measure food insecurity in terms of how much people 
really have at their disposal. In other words, these aggregations do not give any 
information about how the food is distributed, and how many people (if any) do not 
get enough to eat.   
Measured at these levels of aggregation, food security (in terms of per capita 
food supply) provides no guarantees against hunger and starvation. Starvation only 
occurs at the individual level; a country or a region, or for that matter the globe, 
cannot feel hunger or the consequences of hunger. Sufficient overall food availability 
is thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for food security. For this reason, we 
need to address the real problems of world hunger at the individual level.  
Table 2.1: Food Requirements, Food Supply and Chronic Hunger, by  
 Developing Region 
 Min. Energy Requirement Per capita DES Stunting % 
Latin America & Caribbean 1870 2740 23 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1800 2040 38 
Near East and North Africa 1840 2960 32 
East and Southeast Asia 1880 2680 33 
South Asia 1790 2290 60 
Notes: Minimum energy requirement (in kcals per person per day) varies by region according to 
their age and sex composition. DES means dietary energy supply, and is also measured in kcals per 
person, per day. The prevalence of stunting refers to the percent of children under five, and is a WHO 
measure that indicates chronic food insecurity (as opposed to acute food insecurity, which is indicated 
by wasting) (WHO 2000: 4-5). Data on minimum energy requirement and per capita DES are from 
1990-92, while data on the prevalence of stunting are from 1990. 
Sources: The source of Minimum Energy Requirement is FAO (1996: 53).  Data on DES are 
taken from FAO (1996: 11). Data on Stunting are from the World Health Organization (WHO), and 
come from FAO (1996: 69). 
The importance of using the correct level of analysis can be illustrated by the 
following (empirical) example. In Table 2.1 we see that there was more than enough 
food in each of the developing regions to feed all of their inhabitants in 1990-92 
(contrast column two with column one). Despite these conditions at the regional 
level, millions of people suffered from chronic hunger during the same period. In this 
table, chronic hunger is captured by the percentage of the population (under five 
years in age) that is stunted.11 It is evident that we cannot draw the conclusion that 
everyone gets enough to eat on the basis of data on regional food supplies. The same 
11 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this indicator. 
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methodological inadequacy is present when food security is assessed from global and 
national data. 
Recognizing the importance of the individual-level concept, the World Bank 
has defined food security as “access by all people at all times to enough food for an 
active, healthy life” (World Bank 1986: 1). In line with the World Bank, The United 
Nations’ Development Programme has defined food security in terms of “sustained 
and assured access by all social groups and individuals to food adequate in quality 
and quantity to meet nutritional needs” (UNDP 1994: 27).12 Thus, food insecurity 
means that some people, sometimes or always, have inadequate access to enough 
food to live a healthy and productive life. The FAO (2002a) has defined food 
insecurity as “when people must live with hunger and fear starvation”. These are 
much stricter definitions of food security and insecurity than we find at the higher 
levels of analysis. The World Bank’s, the UNDP’s, and the FAO’s definitions of 
individual level food security not only require that there is enough food to go around; 
they also require that people have access to the food that they need. As a result, we 
can find individual food insecurity in areas where there exists food security at higher 
levels of aggregation. In short, global, regional and national food securities are 
preconditions, but not guarantees, for individual food security. Thus, from here on, 
when I use the terms food security and food insecurity they refer to the individual-
level concepts. 
Despite the fact that the World Bank's definition of food security refers to the 
individual’s access to food, it views the household as the relevant unit for analytical 
and policy purposes (World Bank 1986; Geier 1996: 27). The theoretical basis for 
this view is that entitlements to food are held at the household level. For instance, a 
child does not have his/her own entitlements to food, but derives them from being a 
member of a family. Women are often in the same situation as children: in many 
12 Maxwell and Wiebe (1998: 10) criticize the United Nations and World Bank definitions of food 
security for being incomplete. These definitions, they say, only regard one aspect of access to food 
(namely sufficiency), but they totally disregard the issues of sustainability and vulnerability. To 
compensate, they define a household as insecure if it “does not enjoy an acceptable likelihood that it 
will have sustainable access to sufficient food over a particular period of time”(ibid). This suggests 
that one has to consider people's sensitivity to changes in social, political, economic, and climatic 
conditions as well as disasters, to have an idea of their future food security. While the sustainability 
and vulnerability dimensions of access to food must be considered before a person can be described as 
food secure, these aspects will only remain an implicit part of my analysis. 
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developing countries women do not have the right to own land or other assets (World 
Bank 1986). However, this is true more generally: all entitlements are derived from 
an individual’s position in a wider social, economic and political structure. We can 
still speak of an individual’s entitlement, even that of a child within a household. 
Thus, the household level of analysis has an important shortcoming in that it does not 
take intra-household distribution into account. Several studies have shown that there 
is a sex bias in intra-household distribution of food (Sen and Sengupta 1983, 
Svedberg 1988).13 By using households as the unit of analysis, researchers can still 
fall victim to an ecological fallacy (albeit much less than at the global or country 
level), as they draw conclusions about individuals on the basis of aggregate 
information from the household.  
The entitlement approach to food insecurity guides research on causation and 
remedies along the lines of individuals’ endowments, entitlement mappings and 
entitlement-sets. The strength of this approach is first and foremost that it focuses on 
individuals (or groups of people’s) access to food, bringing us to the correct level of 
analysis. In addition, this approach provides us with a conceptual framework that 
systemizes the search for causes and remedies in the economic, social and political 
realms of society. 
  The availability approach’s contribution to the study of hunger and 
undernutrition is important in that it focuses on constraints and “possibilities” for 
food production and supply. But by limiting their attention to these questions, this 
approach suffers a grave shortcoming. In particular, it is unable to say much about 
the real questions at hand: Why do victims suffer from hunger and starvation in spite 
of sufficient overall food availability? And, what can be done to help them? In the 
next section we examine what researchers within the entitlement approach have 
focused on in their attempt to answer these questions.    
2.4 Previous Research on Entitlements to Food 
Because poverty is seen as the major reason for food insecurity within the 
entitlement approach, it offers as many explanations for hunger as there are 
13 It is interesting to note that the bias is against girls in South East Asia, but it is the boys that are 
disadvantaged in Sub-Saharan Africa (Svedberg 1988). 
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explanations for poverty in general. Nevertheless, it is possible to divide the most 
common explanations into (at least) three groups (Jenkins and Scanlan 2001).   
 Militarism is used by one branch within the entitlement approach to explain 
hunger. War (both internal and external) and internal repression disrupt food 
production and distribution. In a study of 16 wars in developing countries in the 
period from 1970 to 1990, Stewart (1993) found that food production per capita fell 
in 13 of the countries. In three of the countries, food production fell by more than 15 
percent. For the same period, Messer (1998) estimated that countries at war missed 
out on three percent growth in food production. Hence, even if food production per 
capita had not fallen during the course of the war, it could have been three percent 
higher if the country had been at peace. In addition, hunger is often used as a weapon 
in war. By cutting off people’s access to food, adversaries can inflict starvation upon 
their opponents, and force them into submission. Furthermore, many people lose 
income opportunities during war, as production, transport, and markets are often 
dysfunctional. Finally, a high level of military spending will often reduce the funds 
available for government investments in food security for vulnerable groups 
(Cheatham 1994; Messer 1998; Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch 2001).  
Another branch of the entitlement approach relates hunger to the aggregate 
level of economic development and economic growth (e.g., Smith and Haddad 2000; 
Jenkins and Scanlan 2001; Svedberg 2000; Haaga et al. 1985; ACC/SCN 1994). This 
branch’s faith in economic growth is derived from an assumption that the fruits of 
economic growth will trickle down to the poor. Thus, Smith and Haddad’s (2000) 
study on the causes of child malnutrition finds that growth in national income was an 
important determinant of food security, concluding that: “growth in national income 
is an extremely potent force for reducing child malnutrition.” Indeed, their report 
estimates that about half of the reduction of child malnutrition between 1979 and 
1995 came from income growth. They further found that women’s education, 
women’s status relative to men, democracy, the health environment (such as access 
to clean water, sanitation and health services), and national food availability were all 
important for explaining food security in developing countries.  
However, the dominating branch of the entitlement approach disputes the 
effect of economic growth per se, and claims that only redistributing income and/or 
wealth can solve hunger. In this context, economic growth only contributes to 
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alleviating food insecurity insofar as it finances redistributional public policies. On 
the other hand, there is no guarantee that (more) affluent countries use their wealth to 
improve the food security of the poor (Sen 1981 and 1989; Dréze and Sen 1989; 
World Bank 1986; von Braun et al. 1992; Lipton 1977; Geier 1996; and FAO 
2002a). Dréze and Sen (1989) argue that conventional estimates of real income (such 
as GDP per capita) measure aggregate wealth in the economy, but say little about 
people’s command over food. More important than a country’s level of economic 
development is how the wealth is distributed. However, they recognize that countries 
with a high aggregate level of economic development are better equipped to provide 
public support to underprivileged groups. To achieve such redistribution, public 
action, popular participation, urban bias, and improving the status of women take 
center stage. Thus, this branch of the entitlement approach expects democracies to 
have less food insecurity because elected politicians must respond to the poor 
masses’ demand for redistribution, while autocracies do not need the support of the 
(poor) population to stay in power.14 In the overall conclusion of their study, Dréze 
and Sen argue that public policy is central for reducing food insecurity. In this setting 
they emphasize the role of public participation: “It is, as we have tried to argue and 
illustrate, essential to see the public not merely as the “patient” whose well-being 
commands attention, but also as the “agent” whose actions can transform society. 
Taking note of that dual role is central to understanding the challenge of public 
action against hunger” (1989: 279).  
Although this branch of the entitlement approach offers an improvement on 
the availability approach tradition, there is room for further progress in the study of 
food insecurity. In the following section I present some important criticisms of the 
entitlement approach, with an eye at eventually developing an approach to food 
insecurity that considers entitlement and availability issues concomitantly. 
2.5 Shortcomings in the Literature on Entitlements to Food 
Much of the debate around the entitlement approach refers to work on famines. Since 
the focus of this thesis is on chronic food insecurity, I mainly describe those critical 
14 However, as I discuss in Section 5.2.1, economic elites often have more influence over democratic 
policies than the poor masses. They will often use this power to hinder policies that can improve food 
security for the poor, because these policies will most likely require increased taxation of, and reduced 
transfers to, the elite. 
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voices that deal with this form of food insecurity. When I do include criticisms 
relating to famine, I do so because these criticisms also apply to the study of chronic 
food insecurity.  
While embracing the general framework of the entitlement approach, 
Woldemeskel (1990) criticizes Sen for generally being too possession-oriented, and 
for overlooking the role of market forces and institutions. Woldemeskel argues "that 
one’s ability to command food is contingent upon four determinants: (a) availability, 
(b) institutional elements, (c) market forces, and (d) possessions. While Sen’s 
approach, anchored in (d), recognizes and dismisses (a), it all together ignores (b) 
and (c)” (Woldemeskel 1990: 491). 
Let me address his second point—b) institutional elements—first. 
Woldemeskel does not define what he means by institutions, but Scruton (1982: 225) 
defines institutions as “an established law, custom, usage, practice, organization, or 
other element in the social life of a people; a regulative principle or convention 
subservient to the general needs of a community.” In addition, Scruton states that 
institutions can be divided into three categories: the political (which is concerned 
with regulating the pursuit and exercise of power), the economic (concerned with 
maintaining production and production relations) and the cultural (involving 
education, culture, and leisure and the institutions of kinship, including the family).  
Similarly, Østerud et al. (1997: 97) claim that there is widespread agreement that 
institutions should be understood as rules and norms or a set of rules and norms 
within which actors interact (naming markets, contracts and property rights as 
examples of such).15
Defined in this way, institutions are at the center of Sen’s analysis: they 
constitute the major link between a person’s endowments and his/her entitlement-set. 
Institutions (such as citizenship, kinship and culture) interfere with market forces and 
influence the distribution of food in society. As Sen (1981: 46) puts it: “The 
exchange entitlement mapping, or E-mapping for short, will depend on the legal, 
political, economic and social characteristics of the society in question and the 
person’s position in it. Sometimes the social conventions governing these rights can 
15 There is a separate tradition within development research that focuses on institutions and is 
associated with the Nobel-laureate, Douglass North (see, for example, North (1989)). While this 
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be very complex indeed—for example those governing the rights of migrant 
members of peasant families to a share of the peasant output.” He also points out that 
social security provisions (such as unemployment benefits and employment 
guarantees) and taxation are also reflected in the E-mappings (Sen 1981: 46). In this 
light, there should be ample room for considering institutions in the entitlement 
approach.
Patnaik (1991: 3) also criticizes the entitlement approach for not privileging 
trends in food availability (per capita) as an explanation for famine. She argues that a 
decline in food availability played a much more central role in the Bengal famine 
than Sen recognizes, referring to a 30 percent decline in per capita food availability 
in the decades before the famine. Patnaik further argues that: “It would be a grave 
error to ignore or discount long-term decline in food availability for … these trends 
can set the stage for famine even though famine does not thereby become inevitable” 
(1991: 3). This shortcoming is closely related to Woldemeskel’s point “a” that Sen 
recognizes but dismisses food availability, and his point “c” that Sen completely 
ignores market forces, to which we now turn. 
Woldemeskel and Patnaik address important shortcomings in the way that 
Sen dismisses food availability and market forces. Roughly stated, market forces are 
those of supply and demand, which determine equilibrium quantities and prices in 
markets (Black 1997: 291). The entitlement approach does not, however, completely 
ignore these forces. On a general level, Sen suggests “concentration on such policy 
variables as social security, employment guarantees, terms of trade between non-
food and food (especially between labor power and food)” (Sen 1980: 620). He 
further claims, as described in Section 2.2 above, that the Bengal Famine occurred 
because of inflationary pressure (expanded public expenditure and panic hoarding of 
rice) and increased food prices. But Sen does not focus on the important relationship 
between food availability and food prices, which should be central to any discussion 
about entitlement mappings and food security.  
The level of food availability is important for entitlements to food because it 
influences food prices. Kalecki (1971: 43-61) explains this link in terms of the 
inelastic properties of food production. Because it takes time after a seed is planted 
tradition has been criticized for not discussing how power relations, and especially state power, may 
overrule institutions, the debate lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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before it bears fruit, food production cannot be expanded rapidly, and the supply of 
food will be inelastic with regard to demand. Consequently, where the level of food 
supply is low, relative to its demand, prices will tend to rise. On the other hand, 
where the supply is greater than demand, prices will tend to fall. This is unlike (the 
much more elastic) production of industrial goods, where supply varies according to 
demand and prices are relatively stable (ibid). Even if they wanted to, most 
developing country governments do not have the economic means to bring prices 
sufficiently down by market interventions (von Braun and de Haen 1983). Thus, 
because of the inelastic properties of food production, availability greatly affects the 
terms of trade between endowments and food, and thereby food insecurity. 
On a trivial level, the criticism (about the disregard for food availability) may 
be easily refuted in the manner of Osmani (1995a). Osmani correctly claims that Sen 
does not dismiss food availability decline (FAD), he simply says that it is usually not 
the ultimate cause of famine and endemic hunger. Osmani further argues that Sen’s 
main aim has been to prove that food availability decline should not be taken as a 
universal explanation for all famines. For this reason, some people have perceived 
his approach to imply that food availability could never explain famines. But the 
reason for de-emphasizing food availability decline (as a cause of famine) was to 
challenge the hegemonic position of the food availability approach. Sen's purpose 
was not to prove that starvation is never caused by food shortages, but to direct the 
search for causes into new areas: endowments and E-mappings.   
E-mappings can capture the effect that market forces have on (indirect) 
entitlements to food, as it maps the relationship between a person’s endowments and 
the amount of food he or she can get from exchanging those endowments for food. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that E-mapping is a central part of the formal 
entitlement approach, Sen himself trivializes the role of food availability: “If one 
person in eight starves regularly in the world, this is seen as the result of his inability 
to establish entitlement to enough food; the question of the physical availability of 
the food is not directly involved” (Sen 1981: 8, my emphasis). In his unwillingness to 
consider both endowments and availability explanations concomitantly, I think that 
Sen’s explanation comes up short. 
However, Sen’s swift handling of food availability does not mean that the 
entitlement approach (as an approach) is unable to consider both endowments and 
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food availability concomitantly. A few recent studies have incorporated food 
availability in analyses of food insecurity at the individual level. These studies meld 
the two approaches by studying how food availability influences people’s access to 
food. 
Sahn and von Braun (1989), for instance, have showed that increased 
variability of cereal production significantly increases food consumption variability. 
Furthermore, Smith and Haddad (2000) found that increased food availability had 
been responsible for about a quarter of the reduction in child malnutrition between 
1970-95. Moreover, they found that the strength of food availability’s influence 
depends on the initial level of food supply. Where food supplies are very low (such 
as in many of the Sub-Saharan countries), food availability is more important for 
improving food security—more than in countries where the food supply is relatively 
high.
On the other hand, Nubé (2001) investigated the bivariate relationship 
between food availability (measured as per capita daily energy supply) and the mean 
weight of adult women (an indicator of food security on the individual level) in 23 
developing countries, and found no significant relationship (the correlation 
coefficient was 0.01 with a p-value of 0.96). Nubé also tested the relationship 
between the prevalence of underweight women and the prevalence of underweight 
children under five, and found a strong significant correlation (the correlation 
coefficient was 0.88 and the p-value was 0.001). This suggests that women’s weight 
can be used as an indicator for food insecurity, insofar as underweight in children is a 
useful indicator (see Chapter 3). Although these findings rest on only bivariate 
correlation analyses, the results of this study indicate that food availability does not 
have much of an effect on food security in developing countries. 
However, in their cross-country, multivariate analysis, Jenkins and Scanlan 
(2001) found that the food supply weakly influences the level of hunger among 
children under five (in developing countries). They offer two, somewhat 
contradictory, conclusions about the effect of the food supply on child hunger. First, 
they conclude that: “Food supply has a positive but small impact,16 suggesting that 
critics of the “food availability” thesis who contend that food supply is irrelevant 
16 They use the prevalence of children under five with healthy weight as their dependent variable. 
Thus, a positive effect means that it is good for food security. 
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have overstated their argument” (ibid: 737). However, in their overall conclusion 
they state that: “Our most important finding is the relatively weak impact of food 
supply on child hunger rates” (ibid : 738). 
One explanation for this weak effect may be that Jenkins and Scanlan do not 
include a variable that can account for the income side of the entitlement mapping 
(E-mapping) in their analysis. While they do control for the level of economic 
development, and economic growth, these variables do not say anything about the 
distribution of income. Thus, Jenkins and Scanlan study the effect of food 
availability separately from people’s endowments. Of course, this is no better than 
studying the effect of people’s endowments separately from food availability (and 
thereby the price of food). 
In a preliminary analysis of the relationship between food availability 
(measured as per capita dietary energy supply in percent of the average minimum 
requirement) and the prevalence of stunting in the 41 developing countries used in 
this study, I found a correlation (Pearson’s r) of  –0.514 (with a p-value of 0.001). 
This indicates that high food availability is associated with a low prevalence of 
stunting (in children under five). Although this is a considerably stronger correlation 
than was found in Nubé’s (2001) analysis of the relationship between DES per capita 
and the mean weight of adult women (above), it nevertheless implies that the food 
availability ratio is an insufficient explanation for the prevalence of stunting. This 
insufficiency is clearly evident in Figure 2.1, where we find that some countries with 
a food availability ratio below 100 (which indicates an absolute food shortage) have 
a lower prevalence of stunting than some countries with a positive food availability 
ratio.
Of course, from a bivariate correlation analysis we cannot say that food 
availability has an independent effect on stunting. This analysis is only meant as a 
first step in a longer journey toward understanding the causes of food insecurity in 
developing countries. In order to establish whether food availability has an 
independent effect on food insecurity, we need a carefully specified multivariate 
model of food insecurity.  
In spite of his defense of Sen, Osmani offers an insightful analysis of the 
relationship between food availability and food insecurity. In his own study of “The 
Food Problem in Bangladesh” (1995b) Osmani argues that the importance of food in 
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Figure 2.1: Food Availability Ratio and Stunting
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Operationalization and sources: See Section 6.2: The Indicators. 
the production structure of developing countries gives food availability great 
influence on the level of economic activity and, thus, the incomes and the food 
entitlements of the poor. Not only does food production affect the entitlements of 
peasants (whether they produce food for self consumption or for the market) and 
agricultural wage workers (that rely on participation in agricultural (food) production 
for their incomes), but the level of agricultural (food) production also influences the 
incomes of the non-agricultural population through linkages between growth in the 
agricultural and the industrial sectors. Thus, the influence of food availability on real 
income stems from the central role that food production has in the production 
structure of developing countries, as well as the relationship between food 
availability and the price of food (Osmani 1995b).  
Given the division in research on food insecurity between studies that focus 
on food availability, and those that focus on entitlements to food, this link is mostly 
neglected.
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2.6 Summary  
This chapter has aimed to provide the larger context of debate, within which this 
project is embedded. Toward that end, it had three main purposes. First, this chapter 
aimed to describe the availability approach, and explain why it offers insufficient 
explanations to the study of hunger. This dearth stems mainly from the fact that it 
focuses on the wrong level of analysis and, therefore, overlooks the issue of 
distribution. The second aim to this chapter was to argue that the entitlement 
approach is a useful framework for studying chronic food insecurity. The entitlement 
approach is superior to the availability approach because it: (a) focuses on the 
individual level of analysis; and (b) can provide an explanation for why some people 
starve when others live amongst plenty. The chapter’s third purpose was to argue that 
food availability matters for individual food security, even though the availability 
approach is insufficient. Because food availability influences food prices, it is 
important for entitlements to food. Thus, food availability needs to be integrated into 
the entitlement approach.  
 By juxtaposing and combining these two disparate approaches I aim to show 
the potential of an approach that builds on the strengths and insights of both. In 
Chapter 5, I will employ this synthesized approach to sketch a conceptual scheme of 
the relationship between land concentration and food insecurity.  
However, before we move on to the conceptual and empirical analyses, it is 
important to gain some insight into the extent of the problem of food insecurity, as 
well as the pattern of land distribution in the developing world. In this chapter we 
have seen that the availability and the entitlement approaches have diverging 
definitions of food insecurity. From the availability perspective, food insecurity is a 
state of there not being enough food. A description of the extent of food insecurity 
from this perspective would focus on the (average) per capita food supply, compared 
to the people’s average food needs. From the entitlement approach, on the other 
hand, food insecurity is a state of not having enough food. This definition demands 
indicators that reflect people’s access to food.  
There should be no doubt that this study needs an indicator of the second 
kind, one that reflects people’s access to food. However, there is also controversy 
over how to measure people’s access to food. For this reason, the next chapter will 
discuss the alternative methods, and explain why I rely on the prevalence of stunting 
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in children under five as my indicator for food insecurity. Only then, when I have 
arrived at a useful indicator for food insecurity, can I describe and explain the extent 
of the problem in the developing world.   
3Measuring Food Insecurity
Once we choose to define food insecurity as inadequate access to food, the next task 
is to find an indicator that captures this phenomenon. There are two comprehensive 
databases on access to food in the developing world: 1) the FAOSTAT database 
published by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2002b); 
and 2) the “WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition”, from the 
World Health Organization (WHO 2000). Both databases try to capture the 
phenomenon of entitlement to food, but they do so in different ways: the FAO data 
measures inadequate access to food (and is called the “Food Inadequacy Approach”); 
the WHO data measures the result of inadequate access to food (and is labeled the 
“Anthropometric Assessment Approach”) (FAO 1996: 6).  Both measures have their 
merits and problems. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify why I use the WHO 
measure of the prevalence of stunting in children under five as my indicator for food 
insecurity.  
This chapter has four sections. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I describe the methods 
used to produce the WHO’s and the FAO’s data, and discuss their (relative) qualities 
and shortcomings. In essence, the nature of my research question leads me to rely on 
the WHO’s data. As there is some disagreement in the literature about the validity of 
this indicator for food insecurity, Section 3.3 explains why this is the best indicator 
for my study. In this section I also discuss the potential problems that may result 
from using the prevalence of stunting in children under five as my indicator for food 
insecurity. Section 3.4 summarizes.  
3.1 The WHO’s Method 
The WHO data come from the “WHO Global Database on Child Growth and 
Nutrition” (WHO 2000). These data are derived from anthropometric measures of 
representative samples of children under five. Insofar as child malnutrition is 
correlated with that of the rest of the population, it serves as a proxy for food 
insecurity in the general population. As mentioned in Section 2.5, Nubé (2001) 
studied the relationship between the prevalence of underweight in children under five 
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(one of three WHO-indicators of malnutrition) and the prevalence of low Body Mass 
Index (BMI) among adult women in 23 developing countries, and found that these 
measures were highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient 0.88 with a p-value of 
0.000). Although the sample size is small, this result indicates that the nutritional 
status of children under five is a useful indicator of undernutrition in the population 
at large. However, it is important to keep in mind that the data draws from children 
under five, and not the whole population.   
 An accurate anthropometric assessment of the number of undernourished 
people in an area requires that the whole population be examined. But investigating 
the nutritional status of every person in the world, a region, or—for that matter—a 
country, is impossible. Time and money constraints simply forbid such a detailed 
census (Foster 1992: 31-2; FAO 1992).  In its place are second-best studies, based on 
sampling techniques. 
 The WHO’s database uses measures for underweight, stunting, and wasting in 
children under five. This age group is used because growth patterns of well-fed, 
healthy preschool children from diverse ethnic backgrounds are very similar (WHO 
2000: 5). Stunting means low height-for-age, and reflects chronic undernutrition. 
Wasting is low-weight-for-height, and indicates in most cases a recent and severe 
process of weight loss. Underweight means low weight-for age, and reflects low 
body mass (relative to chronological age). This last measure is influenced by both the 
child’s height and weight. For this reason, the measure is a bit complicated to 
interpret because it fails to distinguish between tall, thin children and short children 
with adequate bodyweight. As a result, the measure cannot help us to determine 
whether malnutrition has been chronic or transitory (WHO 2000: 4).   
These measures are compared against a reference population: the American 
population of children under the age of five. This reference population has been used 
since 1970, when a wide survey of these measures on American children was 
completed (WHO 2000: 5-6). Scholars consider this a reliable reference because, as I 
mentioned above, there is very little cross-ethnic variations in this measure for well-
fed, healthy preschool children (WHO 2000: 5-6). Studies have shown that children 
of socio-economically advantaged classes in developing countries follow the growth 
reference curves of healthy, well-nourished children in developed countries. 
Similarly, children of the same genetic background show widely differing growth 
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performance depending on the environment in which they live. As a result, the 
dominant opinion today is that people of all races have the same growth potential, 
even though this growth potential may not be attained in one generation. 
Consequently, country-, or race-specific growth references are not appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the reference standard has recently been challenged, and the WHO is 
currently reconsidering its applicability (WHO 2000: 5-6). 
There is disagreement about the threshold, under which a person should be 
classified as undernourished. Osmani (1992: 2-5) categorizes this disagreement in 
terms of a conflict between two groups. On the one hand, so-called ‘conventionalists’ 
argue that all people who are suffering from any degree of nutritional deficiency 
should be counted among the undernourished. On the other hand, ‘adaptionists’ 
argue that such an ideal state is unattainable, and that the human body adapts itself in 
a number of ways to minimize the consequences of nutritional constraints. Adherents 
of this ‘theory of adaptation’ suggest that many standard bodily functions may 
perform at a satisfactory level, even when standard nutritional requirements are not 
met. As a result, they suggest that the only practical measure of the magnitude of 
nutritional deficiencies is one aimed at very serious conditions: conditions so serious 
that they pose a threat to life.  
In the WHO, a child is considered undernourished if his or her measure falls 
below two standard deviations from the norm. This reflects the WHO’s conventional 
position in the debate about what constitutes hunger: the child is counted as 
undernourished even if he or she is not dying. The reason for counting these children 
is that such a degree of undernutrition is a hindrance for the child’s well being, and 
poses a long-term threat to his/her life.
The anthropometric data are gathered from different sources such as 
government health statistics, survey reports from international and non-governmental 
organizations, and articles published in the scientific press. All of the surveys that are 
included in the database are subject to specific standards with regard to sampling, 
measurement techniques, and presentation (WHO 2000: 10).1
1 For a few countries, where such standardized information is unavailable, other—less reliable—
information is provided. Wherever this is the case, it is stated in the notes to the data, and they are not 
considered part of the database (WHO 2000: 10). 
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Unfortunately, nationally representative (and comparable) surveys of this 
kind are costly and time consuming. In addition, these measures used by the WHO 
incorporate an element of disease, as unfulfilled growth potential can result from 
both inadequate food intake and disease. (I will discuss this further in Section 3.3). 
These are two of the reasons why the FAO has chosen a different way of assessing 
and measuring the problem of food insecurity. We will now examine this approach.
3.2 The FAO’s Method 
The FAO’s data on undernourishment are derived by the ‘food adequacy approach’ 
outlined above, and contain estimates of the number of people whose food intake, 
measured in caloric intake, is insufficient for meeting their basic energy requirements 
(FAO 1999: 6). This measure is calculated by combining information on the amount 
of food available to a population and how this food is distributed among individuals 
in that population.  
 The FAO also resides within the conventionalist camp with regard to when a 
person should be considered food insecure (undernourished). This is reflected in the 
reference standard that they use for how many calories are regarded as a minimum 
requirement, which is set by the method recommended by the FAO/WHO/UNU's 
“Expert Consultation on Energy and Protein Requirements”. This reference standard 
reflects ‘the average calories (kcals) needed per day to maintain body weight and 
support light activity’ (FAO 1992: 7). This standard implies that an undernourished 
person cannot obtain enough calories to maintain the weight that is appropriate for 
his (or her) height, sex and age. The reference to light activity varies for children and 
adults. For children, light activity means the level that is normal for children in 
affluent societies. For adults, light activity implies the minimal activity required for 
productive work (Alexandratos 1995: 50; FAO 1992: 7-8, 12). Therefore, the 
average minimum requirement varies across countries according to the different age 
and sex composition of the populations.   
 Traditionally, the most common method for measuring the prevalence of food 
insecurity in the developing world has been in terms of the balance between the 
number of people in a country or region, and the amount of food available for human 
consumption in that area. These estimates were usually derived by the “Food Balance 
Sheet” (FBS) approach. The FBS approach begins by taking the aggregate food 
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stocks from food balance sheets at the beginning of the year. It then adds to them the 
amount of food produced and imported, while subtracting from this the amount of 
food exported, used as livestock feed and seed, and the food stocks remaining at the 
end of the year. By converting the estimated food available for human consumption 
of each commodity into kilocalories (kcals), and dividing these by the number of 
people in the area, it is possible to calculate per capita food supply figures for these 
balance sheets. The average supply of kcals per capita is then compared to the 
average minimum requirement of those people (Foster 1992: 3, 31-2). 
This method reflects the availability approach’s view of food insecurity. The 
problem with this aggregate method of measuring undernutrition is that the test is 
performed at aggregate levels, while the conclusions refer to individuals. From these 
aggregate measures, one cannot conclude whether all people get enough food at all 
times. As I discussed in the Chapter 2, having enough food in the area is a 
necessary—but not sufficient—criterion for individual food security. The food in a 
given area might be distributed in ways that leave some people with less, while 
others get more, than their minimum requirement. As a result, this aggregate method 
of measuring under nutrition can only be used to identify countries or regions where 
undernourishment rates are expected to be high.  
 For this reason, the FAO has developed a better method that takes the data on 
average per capita food supplies in given countries (derived by the food balance 
sheet approach) and combines them with information on the expected distribution of 
the food within these countries. In this way they try to work around the ecological 
fallacy of drawing conclusions about individuals on the basis of aggregate data. 
Thus, the FAO estimates the prevalence of undernutrition on the basis on the 
following factors: 1) the age and sex composition of the population, which decides 
the average minimum calorie requirement; 2) the average per capita food supply in 
the country, derived by the FBS approach;2 and 3) how this food supply is assumed 
to be distributed among individuals in that country.3
2 The accuracy of these data has been questioned because the underlying data needs are so enormous, 
and precise values are often missing for at least some of the inputs. Where input is missing, the blanks 
are filled in with estimates based on approximations and informed guesswork. The data should 
therefore be interpreted with caution (FAO 1996; Alamgir and Arora 1991; Millman and de Rose 
1998: 22). There are, however, no better cross-country data on food supply available.   
3 The method is described in detail in FAO (1996, Appendix 3).  
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The distribution of food within countries is based on information about the 
amount of food to which individuals—within representative samples of the 
population—have access. (The FAO has found that most people in developing 
countries have access to less than the country’s average per capita food supply, while 
considerably fewer people have access to more than this amount.) The sources of 
information, from which the distribution is estimated, vary from country to country. 
Some countries have household-level data on energy intake, food expenditure and 
total income and expenditure, from which it can be calculated directly. Other 
countries have only some of these data, while for still other countries no such data 
exist. For countries in the latter two categories, the FAO uses data on the general 
distribution of income and wealth, of which land concentration is a major 
determinant. However, the accuracy of these estimations is necessarily lower when 
they are based on more indirect information (FAO 1996: 134-35). When estimating 
the prevalence of undernutrition in a specific country, the per capita food supply and 
the distribution of food are combined to construct the distribution curve of the 
country’s food supply. From this curve one can derive the percentage of the 
population whose food intake falls below the average minimum requirement (FAO 
1999). In these calculations it is assumed that the distribution of food varies so little 
over time that it does not have to be computed anew for each point in time that the 
data on undernourishment are estimated.  
This method is designed to estimate the proportion and/or the number of 
undernourished persons, but it cannot identify who the undernourished are. Thus, it 
cannot be relied upon for targeting interventions that benefit undernourished people. 
Furthermore, the FAO does not have information on changes in the distribution of 
food (over time). Since the food supply is the only variable (in this indicator) that the 
FAO measures over time, changes in undernourishment simply reflect changes in per 
capita food supply over time (Svedberg 2000: x). Therefore, these data cannot be 
used to monitor the effects of redistributional polices.  
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3.3 Consequences of Using the Prevalence of Stunting to Measure Food 
Insecurity 
Since the data on undernourishment (food intake) are estimated on the basis of food 
availability4 and its distribution, and for many countries the information about this 
distribution is based on information about the distribution of access to land, I cannot 
use these data for studying the effects of land concentration and food availability on 
food insecurity. The relationship between food availability and undernourishment is 
tautological; when food availability increases, food insecurity is reduced. The 
relationship between land concentration and undernourishment is determined by the 
extent that the estimation of the coefficient of variation (CV) is based on the 
distribution of landholdings. Because I cannot use the FAO’s data on 
undernourishment, I will have to use the WHO’s data on child malnutrition. What, if 
any, consequences will this have for my analysis?  
The FAO’s data on undernourishment and the WHO’s data on malnutrition 
measure two different things. The FAO’s data measure access to food, compared to 
requirements (for a healthy and productive life). The WHO’s data measure the 
nutritional status of children under five, which reflects the outcome of both food 
intake and disease. Nubé (2001: 1279) has tested the correlation between the 
prevalence of inadequate access to food (measured in terms of the FAO’s data on 
undernourishment) and undernutrition (measured in terms of the WHO’s data on the 
prevalence of underweight in children under five) in 23 developing countries,5 and 
finds a correlation coefficient of only 0.26 (with a corresponding p-value of 0.24). 
When I performed a similar test and correlate the prevalence of stunting in children 
under five (as estimated by the WHO) and the prevalence of undernourishment (as 
estimated by the FAO) in 84 developing countries around 1995, I get a correlation 
coefficient (Pearson’s r) of 0.56 (with a p-value of 0.000).6 Although the correlation 
is better in this sample than in Nubé's, it remains low in this context.7
4 Food availability is operationalized as daily per capita dietary energy supply (DES), which is the 
same operationalization I use in the computation of the Food Availability Ratio in my analysis (see 
Section 6.2). 
5 The data on both indicators are from the years 1990 to 1997. 
6 The source of the WHO’s data is De Onis et al. (2000), and the source of the FAO’s data is FAO 
(2002b). 
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Nubé asserts that there are two possible reasons for the low correlation. First, 
Nubé discusses the possibility that the poor correlation can be explained by different 
levels of disease or physical activity between countries with the same level of food 
consumption. The conclusion is that: “available information suggests that such 
factors are unlikely to play a major role in explaining these findings” (Nubé 2001). 
Nubé claims that the primary reason for the incoherence between the two indicators 
is the poor quality of the FAO’s data on undernourishment. Because the estimation 
procedures are so complex, “data on prevalence rates of food energy inadequacy are 
likely to be subject to wide margins of error. On the other hand, available 
anthropometric data are likely to be less subject to biases or errors, mainly as a result 
of the fact that the collection of anthropometric data is a relatively straightforward 
procedure” (Nubé 2001). 
It is generally accepted that malnutrition (among children) is a result of too 
little (and/or wrong) food and disease (Pinstrup-Andersen 1995: 2). However, it is 
also acknowledged that a child’s dietary intake affects his or her health status (e.g., 
low dietary intake leads to a weakened immune system), and that health status affects 
the dietary intake (e.g., the child loses his or her appetite when sick and the dietary 
intake will be low, and/or the child cannot utilize all the nutrients if it has diarrhea) 
(UNICEF 1990, 1998; Jonsson 1993; Engle et al. 1999; Smith and Haddad 2000; 
DeRose and Millman 1998: 8). How problematic is it, then, to use the nutritional 
status of children, or more precisely the prevalence of stunting, as an indicator of 
access to food? The most important question in this regard is: How much of the 
prevalence of stunting in children under five is a result of food insecurity, and how 
much can be explained by disease? 
Osmani (1995b: 335) argues that: “the prevalence of stunting…[in 
Bangladesh…] persists among three-quarters of the population due to the cumulative 
effects of long-term nutritional deprivation”.  Like others, Osmani argues that 
diseases related to health conditions (such as sanitation and the quality of drinking 
water) influence malnutrition in developing countries, but that: “it is also true that 
lack of food accentuates the effects of such disease-induced malnutrition. As a result, 
7 I have discussed the problem with the low correlation between these two measurements of food 
insecurity in Brigham (2003b).  
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those with a poorer entitlement to food are more vulnerable to physical malnutrition” 
(ibid).  
Svedberg (2000: 203) argues that: “most studies of disease as a cause of 
inadequate growth are beset with problems. The incidence of disease is known to 
correlate strongly with poor sanitation and a variety of socio-economic variables that 
also affect child growth and weight, which have seldom been controlled for”. 
Tomkins and Watson (1989) reviewed the literature on malnutrition as a cause of 
impaired immune response. They found evidence that lack of food weakens the 
immune system. Thus, according to this study, a lack of food leads to a higher 
propensity for disease. Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch (2001) argue that 
children who are undernourished “are more likely to have impaired immune systems, 
poorer cognitive development, lower productivity as adults, and greater susceptibility 
to diet-related chronic diseases such as hypertension and coronary heart disease later 
in life.”  
It is therefore probable that poor children in developing countries come down 
with diseases (more often than other children) because their immune system is 
weakened from prolonged lack of nutrients. In addition, it is probable that most 
diseases would not result in stunting if the child had access to adequate food before, 
during and after the illness. Thus, while stunting results from inadequate access to 
food and disease, it can be argued that inadequate access to food is the most 
important determinant.8
In the field of nutrition studies it is argued that a child’s food intake is 
determined by access to food and the care environment. This literature also claims 
that disease (among children) is determined by the care environment and access to 
basic health services. Finally, we have seen that it is recognized that food intake 
influences disease, and that disease influences food intake. This recursive 
relationship between food intake, disease, and children’s nutritional status is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
8 AIDS will most probably affect the nutritional status of children that are infected, and of children 
whose parents are infected and become unable to provide for their families. Besides, it could be 
argued that the prevalence of AIDS is higher among the poor and uneducated, and thus has some of 
the same basic causes as stunting. However, the AIDS epidemic had barely started in the mid 1908s 
(which is the period under study). Since the years covered by this study are mainly before the onset of 
the AIDS pandemic, the disease cannot be an important cause of the prevalence of stunting. Thus, I 
will not speculate further into this issue.   
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Figure 3.1:  Causes of Child Malnutrition   
Source: Adapted from UNICEF (1998), Smith and Haddad (2000) and Jonsson (1993)
From Figure 3.1 we can see that the immediate causes of child malnutrition 
are inadequate dietary intake and disease, and the interplay between these two 
factors. The underlying causes for inadequate dietary intake are insufficient access to 
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food, and inadequate care for mothers and children. Thus, a child can have 
inadequate dietary intake even though he or she has access to enough food, if he or 
she does not receive proper care. Care in this connection means that the responsible 
persons are able to understand and fulfill the nutritional and health related needs of 
the child. Making sure that children are immunized (if possible) is mentioned as an 
important aspect of such care (UNICEF 1998). The underlying causes for disease are 
also inadequate care for mothers and children (as they were for food insecurity), as 
well as poor water, sanitation and health services.  
Turning to the basic causes in Figure 3.1, we find that insufficient access to 
food, inadequate care for mothers and children, as well as poor water, sanitation and 
health services have their roots in the quantity and quality of the actual human, 
economic, and organizational resources (in the country), and the way they are 
controlled. Again, these are a result of the potential resources of environment, 
technology and people. Among the “upper level” basic causes we find factors 
associated with different branches of the entitlement approach: e.g., public policy, 
participation, regime type, war, and the level of economic development (as well as 
hereto understudied factors). It is at this level that we find (the organizational aspect 
of) land distribution, as well as food availability and agricultural productivity (and 
the interplay between them). The most basic of the basic causes is the 
interrelationship between the amount of natural resources, the number of people that 
depend on them, and the technology that can transform potential resources into actual 
resources. These are factors associated with the availability approach. From this 
figure we see that the basic influences on child malnutrition depend on political, 
cultural, religious, economic, and social systems (i.e., the focus of the entitlement 
approach).      
To amend for the fact that disease is a (minor) cause of stunting, I could 
control for the incidence of disease (in children under five). However, there are no 
comparable data that cover enough of the countries in this study. Therefore, I will 
include variables that previous research (e.g., UNICEF 1998 and Smith and Haddad 
2000) has found to have an effect on the prevalence of disease. For this purpose I 
will include child immunization rates and the percent of the population that has 
access to improved water source and sanitation facilities. By including these control 
variables in the multivariate regression analyses of the causes of food insecurity, I 
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can possibly isolate the effects that the other variables—that are on a lower causal 
level in Figure 3.1—have on the access to food.  
 In conclusion, there is no consensus in the literature about the greater 
reliability of the one (WHO) or the other (FAO) dataset, as an indictor for food 
insecurity. Since there is no consensus, it is up to the individual researcher to choose 
the indicator he or she believes is best suited for the particular study. As explained 
above, the nature of my research question compels me to use the WHO’s data on 
malnutrition in children under five. Following Foster (1992: 36-40), Osmani (1995b: 
335), and Nubé (2001), among others, this should not be controversial or 
problematic.  
3.4 Summary  
In this chapter we have seen that the FAO’s data on undernourishment is an indicator 
of inadequate access to food, while the WHO’s data on stunting is an indicator for 
the result of inadequate access to food and disease. I will use the WHO’s indicator on 
the prevalence of stunting in children under five because land concentration is an 
internal component of the FAO’s data. In their stead, the WHO data can serve as a 
proxy for food insecurity. In using this proxy, we need to keep in mind that the data 
only say something about the nutritional situation of children less than five years of 
age. In addition, I will control for variables that are associated with the prevalence of 
disease, to (try to) separate the effects that the other variables in the model have on 
the access to food. 
In the previous chapter I defined food insecurity as inadequate access—or, in 
other words, inadequate entitlements—to food. This chapter has provided us with an 
indicator of food insecurity that can be used in an analysis of its relationship with 
land concentration and food availability. Hence, we are now ready to examine the 
trends in food insecurity and land concentration. This is the purpose of the following 
chapter.    
4The State of Food Insecurity and Land Concentration in 
the Developing World  
I have now explained why I consider the concept of food insecurity in terms of 
entitlements to food (in Chapter 2).  I have also argued that the prevalence of 
stunting in children under five is the best indicator for inadequate entitlements to 
food, at least for the purpose of this study (in Chapter 3). Now that I have defined 
the meaning of food insecurity, and resolved the question of how to measure it, I 
can turn to an empirical description of the problem at hand. Thus, this chapter 
provides an account of the state of food insecurity and land concentration in the 
developing world. Towards that purpose, it has three sections. The first section 
discusses the prevalence of food insecurity in the developing world today, with 
reference to historical trends and future projections. In the second section, I define 
the concepts of land concentration and reform, and describe patterns in land 
concentration across the developing world. In Chapter 5 we will see that the 
availability of land (per capita), as well as land and labor productivity in 
agriculture, influence food insecurity. For this reason I also use this section to 
provide background information on these conditions. I summarize the chapter in 
the third section.  
The descriptions are focused on the regional level. There are two reasons 
for prioritizing this level of aggregation. First, trends and structures tend to vary 
more across these regions than within them. My second reason is parsimony: a 
focus on individual countries would be too complicated and unwieldy. Besides, 
the data are, for the most part, readily available in the regional aggregates used 
herein.1
One final caveat: I have not been able to locate data for the various 
indicators aggregated in the same regional categories.2 For this reason, I will not 
1 There is also variation in the variables described in this chapter within the regions. These 
variations in the prevalence of stunting, land concentration, arable land per worker, as well as 
agricultural land and labor productivity will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, as we study the 
independent variables’ bivariate relationship with food insecurity and/or land concentration.
2 In particular, cross-temporal data on the prevalence of stunting in children under the age of five 
are not available in the same regional aggregates as the other indicators in this chapter.     
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be able to compare the levels and developments of food security, food supply and 
the various aspects of the agrarian structure within developing regions. A cross-
regional comparison, one aspect at a time, will have to suffice, until we turn to the 
cross-country analysis of the relationships in Chapters 6 and 7.  
4.1 The State of Food Insecurity  
The purpose of this chapter is to get an overview of the magnitude of the problem 
that will be analyzed. For this reason, I will focus the description on the same 
indicator for food insecurity as used in the empirical analysis in Chapter 6 (i.e., 
the WHO’s stunting indicator). In addition, I will provide a brief sketch of the 
(alternative) FAO’s data on undernourishment, in order to swiftly compare the 
pictures painted by these different indicators. I will first describe trends, from 
1980 to those projected for 2005, for stunting in children under the age of five 
across: 1) Asia, 2) Africa, and 3) Latin America and the Caribbean. I will then 
briefly discuss the food supply situation across the five developing regions (South 
Asia; East and South East Africa; Near East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and Latin America and the Caribbean) as well as the developing world as 
a whole, and compare these regions to the average for the industrialized countries. 
Since the FAO’s data on the prevalence food insecurity are based on these 
measures of food supply, the discussion of these data follows. 
The dimensions of the food insecurity problem are enormous. As shown in 
Table 4.1, in the year 2000, there were more than 180 million stunted children 
under the age of five in the developing countries. This represents approximately 
32 percent of the population of children under five. In other words, one out of 
every three children below five in the developing world suffered from 
malnutrition.3 Still, progress has been made. Over the two decades between 1980 
and 2000, the number of stunted children decreased by 40 million (or 18 percent).  
Most of this reduction occurred between 1990 and 2000. The projected numbers 
for 2005, 164.7 million (or 29 percent of the children under five), shows that 
further reductions are expected.  
3 Malnutrition can mean both undernourishment and obesity. In this thesis, the term malnutrition 
means undernourishment, if not otherwise stated.   
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Table 4.1: The Prevalence of Stunting in the Developing World, 1980-2005 
Prevalence of Stunting 
Percent of Children under Five Number of Children (millions) 
1980 1990 2000 2005* 1980 1990 2000 2005*
All Developing Countries 47.1 39.8 32.5 29.0 221.3 219.7 181.9 164.7
Asia 52.2 43.3 34.4 29.9 173.4 167.7 127.8 110.2
Africa 40.5 37.8 35.2 33.8 34.8 41.7 47.3 49.4
Lat. America & Caribbean 25.6 19.1 12.6 9.3 13.2 10.4 6.8 5.1
Note: * = projections.
Source: De Onis et al. (2000: 1226-7)
When we look at the regional disaggregates in Table 4.1, we see that most 
of the malnourished children can be found in Asia. In the year 2000, there were as 
many as 127.8 million stunted children under five in this region, while there were 
47.3 million in Africa and 6.8 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
However, measured in terms of the percent of the population of children under 
five, Africa fares worst. In Africa as a whole, 35.2 percent of the children under 
five were stunted, Asia followed closely behind with 34.4 percent, while Latin 
America and the Caribbean fared much better with 12.6 percent. Looking into the 
near future, Africa is the only region where an increase in the absolute number of 
stunted is expected. For the other regions (as well as the developing world as a 
whole) a reduction is anticipated. If we look back to 1980 and 1990, we see that 
Asia had a higher prevalence of stunting (in %) than Africa. It is also interesting 
to note that Africa, at these times, had a lower prevalence of stunting than the 
average for all developing countries.  
In addition to the disparities across regions, there is also considerable sub-
regional variation. To begin with Africa: in the year 2000, the prevalence of 
stunting varied between 20.2 percent in Northern Africa, 34.9 percent in Western 
Africa, and 48.1 percent in Eastern Africa. The predicted increase in the number 
of stunted children under five in Africa (about 2 million by the year 2005) is 
expected to take place mostly in Eastern Africa, less in Western Africa, while the 
number of stunted is predicted to decline (by 0.5 million) in Northern Africa. 
There is also variation among the sub-regions in Asia, where the prevalence of 
stunting is 43.7 percent in South-Central Asia, compared to 32.8 percent in South-
Eastern Asia. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the prevalence varies from 24 
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percent in Central America, to 16.3 percent in the Caribbean, and down to 9.3 
percent in South America (De Onis et al. 2000: 1226). 
Table 4.2 lists the ten countries with the highest prevalence in stunting 
(according to the latest estimates after 1990). These countries have prevalences of 
stunting ranging from about 45 to 55 percent of children under the age of five. 
Bangladesh has the highest stunting prevalence of all countries (where there are 
data) with 54.6 percent, India follows with 51.8 percent, and Guatemala is ranked 
third with 49.7 percent.4 We can see that the three worst countries are situated 
outside of Africa, which is the region with the highest average, and only five of 
the countries on the list are in Africa. Guatemala is the only country on the list 
from the Latin America and the Caribbean region (although Honduras also had a 
prevalence of stunting as high as 38.9 percent in 1996). In addition to the ten 
countries shown in Table 4.2, seven additional countries have a prevalence of 
stunting over 40 percent. These countries are Lesotho (44.0), Mauritania (44.0), 
the United Republic of Tanzania (43.4), Zambia (42.4), Niger (41.1), Yemen 
(42.4) and Bhutan (40.0).5 Of these states, five are in Africa. 
Table 4.2: Top Ten Developing Countries in Terms of the Prevalence of 
Stunting
Country Stunting, % of Children < 5 Year of Survey 
Bangladesh 54.6 1996-97 
India 51.8 1992-93 
Guatemala 49.7 1995 
Rwanda 48.7 1992 
Mali 48.6 1996 
Nepal 48.4 1996 
Madagascar 48.3 1997 
Malawi 48.3 1995 
Lao. People’s Democratic Republic 47.3 1994 
Myanmar 44.6 1994 
Source: India: WHO (2000); all other countries: De Onis et al. (2000: 1228-9)
Sommerfelt and Stewart (1994) have studied the distribution of food 
insecurity between rural and urban areas within 19 developing countries from 
4 The prevalence of stunting may be even higher in Ethiopia, as data on rural stunting from 1992 
show a prevalence of 64.2 percent. Since stunting generally is higher in rural areas (Sommerfelt 
and Stewart 1994: 26) it is uncertain whether the prevalence for the whole country is higher than 
the 54.6 percent in Bangladesh.  
   
5The years of these surveys are all between 1996 and 1998. 
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Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. They found stunting to be 
considerably higher in rural areas, in all but one country (Trinidad and Tobago, 
where stunting is at the exceptionally low level of 4.8 percent in both rural and 
urban areas). The median level of stunting in urban areas was 21 percent, while 
the median in rural areas was 31 percent. Despite the fact that the problem is 
worst in rural areas, there can be little doubt that there is a serious problem of 
food insecurity in urban areas as well.   
In Chapter 2, I argued that food availability influences food insecurity. 
Although we have yet to discuss the causes of food insecurity, it is useful to get 
an overall picture of the food supply in the developing world at this point. In 
studying the actual supply (per capita) in the developing regions, it is important to 
keep in mind that a person in developing countries needs (on average) more than 
1,700-1,900 kilo calories (kcals) per day (FAO 1996: 61).6
We can see from Table 4.3 that there was a considerable smaller food 
supply in all the developing regions, compared to that in the industrialized world. 
Furthermore, we can see that the per capita food supply has increased over the 
period covered in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter region has 
experienced a decline in per capita food supply from 2,140 to 2,040 kilocalories, 
per person, per day. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the lowest 
food supply around 1990. 
Table 4.3: Per Capita Food Supply by Region, 1969/71 – 1990/92 
Region Per caput DES (Kcal/day) Average Annual Rate of Increase 
1969-71 1979-81 1990-92 
1969-71 to 
1979-81 
1979-81 to  
1990-92 
Industrialized countries 3,120 3,220 3,410 0.3 0.5 
Developing countries 2,140 2,330 2,520 0.9 0.7 
Latin America &  Caribbean 2,510 2,720 2,740 0.8 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,140 2,080 2,040 -0.3 -0.2 
Near East and North Africa 2,380 2,850 2,960 1.8 0.3 
East and South East Africa 2,060 2,370 2,680 1.4 1.1 
South Asia 2,060 2,070 2,290 0.0 0.9 
Source: FAO (1996: 11)
Even though per capita food supply declined, the total food supply in Sub-
Saharan Africa increased by 2.6 percent between 1969/71 and 1979/81, and by 
6In addition to getting enough calories, it is also important to get enough proteins, fats, 
micronutrients, etc. This is not reflected in these measures of food supply. 
CHAPTER 4 
54
2.9 percent between 1979/81 and 1990/92. When the per capita food supply 
nonetheless decreased, it is a consequence of an even faster growth in population 
over the same periods. All regions have experienced population growth in this 
period, but it is only in Sub-Saharan Africa that population growth has outpaced 
the growth in food supply (FAO 1996: 13). 
In Chapter 3 I described how the FAO estimates the prevalence of food 
insecurity on the basis of the per capita food supply and information (of varying 
quality) about its distribution within the population. These data on 
undernourishment (try to) mirror people’s access to food (and not the result of 
inadequate access as the data on stunting try to reflect); they paint a picture of the 
prevalence of food insecurity in the total population (not only children under 
five). In Chapter 3 we also learned that there is a weak correlation between the 
prevalence of stunting in children under five and the prevalence of 
undernourishment, and that the weak correlation is most probably a result of 
unreliable estimates of undernourishment. (Recall that this was the conclusion in 
Nubé 2001). In this light, it is somewhat problematic to include a description of 
the status and trends in undernourishment parallel to the above discussion on the 
prevalence of stunting. On the other hand, since these data are very often used to 
describe the state of food insecurity in the developing world, I will briefly 
introduce the FAO estimates of undernourishment. 
These estimates (from FAO 2002a) show that there were approximately 
799 million people in the developing world that were chronically undernourished 
in the year 2000. This represents approximately 17 percent of the population (at 
the time). Of the 799 million undernourished, as many as 508 million (or 16 
percent of the population) could be found in Asia and the Pacific (India alone 
accounts for 233 million, and China for 119 million), 196 million (or 33 percent 
of the population) were in Sub-Saharan Africa, 55 million (or 11 percent of the 
population) in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 40 million (or 10 percent of 
the population) in the Near East and North Africa. This indicator also shows that 
the overall trend in the developing countries has been positive. In 1970 there were 
about 940 million undernourished people in the developing world, constituting 36 
percent of the population. By 1980, the respective numbers had fallen to 843 
million and 26 percent. Thus, from 1970 to 1980 there was a reduction of ten 
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percentage points, or approximately 100 million fewer people were 
undernourished. Subsequently, the rate of decrease has slowed, as the reduction in 
the number of undernourished from 1990 to 2000 was only 20 million, or 3 
percentage points. 
When we compare the 17 percent undernourished in the developing world 
as a whole (as estimated by the FAO), with the 32.5 percent of children under five 
that were stunted (as estimated by the WHO) in the year 2000, we see that the two 
indicators give very different pictures of the state of food insecurity.7 It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to speculate further about the reasons for this discrepancy. 
Since I cannot use the FAO’s data in my empirical analysis, because (as discussed 
in Chapter 3) the FAO relies on information about the distribution of land to 
estimate them, I will now leave this indicator behind, and use only the prevalence 
of stunting as the indicator for food insecurity.  
In this section we have seen that the state of food insecurity in the 
developing world is both dismal and grave. Although some progress has been 
made over the past decades, there is still an enormous problem of food insecurity 
across this part of the world. We have further seen that although most of the food 
insecure people live in rural areas, the problem is also serious in urban areas. The 
food supply situation across the developing world is also quite grim, but is 
improving in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, where it is deteriorating. 
Lastly, we looked at the FAO’s indicator for food insecurity in the total 
population. These data also paint a dismal picture of the state of food insecurity in 
the developing world. However, they are highly inconsistent with the stunting 
indicator for food insecurity (and will not be referred to hereafter).    
The above discussion has provided a glimpse into the situation of food 
insecurity in the developing world. We will now turn our attention to the 
description of what I expect is a basic cause of this food insecurity, namely the 
pattern of land concentration, and other related aspects of the agrarian structure. 
7 In Brigham (2003b), I have documented these differences more closely. 
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4.2 The State of Land Concentration
Before I begin a description of the past and present situation regarding land 
concentration, it will be useful to explain how I intend to use central concepts 
related to land concentration and land reform.  
In this thesis, land concentration means the distribution of agricultural 
landholdings in a country. A landholding is “all land that is held by a household 
or a person, whether it is owned, leased, or held on some other basis” (Bruce 
1998b: 5). Thus, land concentration is not confined to the distribution of outright 
ownership of agricultural land; it also concerns the degree to which use-rights to 
land are distributed in other forms of arrangements. Since it is commonplace in 
many developing countries to hold land in some form of tenancy, I have chosen to 
focus on the concentration of landholdings, and not ownership. A weakness with 
this definition is that the rights to cultivate land do not always coincide with the 
rights to its produce. Tenants pay a (sometimes very large) part of their output in 
rent, and I do not have access to data (on enough countries) to control for this. 
However, the distribution of landholdings arguably provides a better picture of 
the poor’s access to land than the distribution of land ownership. In addition, it is 
possible to find data on the size distribution of landholdings for many more 
countries than is the case for the distribution of land ownership. Finally, it is 
important to note that I use land distribution and land concentration 
interchangeably in this thesis.  
Land tenure is closely related to the concept of land concentration (as 
defined in this thesis). Barraclough (1973: 33) defines land tenure as “power with 
respect to land (and water).” Thiesenhusen (1995: 6) offers a more detailed 
definition, where land tenure means legal, traditional, or customary ways of 
holding land, and includes outright ownership, cash rental, sharecropping, 
usufruct rights, as well as common property with open or restricted access. As 
such, land tenure is a concept that captures the distribution of rights to cultivate 
agricultural land. Tenancy refers to a situation where land is leased, and those that 
work the land do not own it.8
8 The concept of agrarian structure encompasses both the distribution of ownership and other 
tenure rights to land, as well as access to credit, irrigation, modern technology, infrastructure, and 
other variables that influence agricultural production. 
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According to Thiesenhusen (1995: 6), land reform means any fundamental 
alteration of the existing land tenure. This is usually understood to mean the 
redistribution of tenure rights from elite landowners to peasants without land, or 
with insecure access to it. Barraclough (1973: 33) defines land reform as a large-
scale redistribution of power with respect to land (and water) for the benefit of 
small farmers and agricultural laborers. Land reforms come in many shapes and 
styles. They differ with regard to who gives up what and how much, and who 
benefits in which way. Land can be redistributed from larger farms (over a certain 
size) to smaller, private holdings, or into cooperatives or state-owned farms. 
Tenancy contracts can be considerably improved in the eyes of the leaser, and 
land can be given or sold to the tillers. Land reform can mean the privatization of 
land held under customary tenure, settlement schemes where families are settled 
on newly developed land and/or government-owned land, and/or government-
owned land that is allocated to the poor for cultivation and/or grazing (Jazairy et 
al. 1992: 106). While a few land reforms have redistributed all agricultural land, 
most redistribute only a certain amount. Indeed, most land reforms are less 
extensive than originally intended, because of resistance to, or impracticalities in, 
the implementation process. 
When I, in the following section, briefly refer to historical land reforms in 
the developing world, the concept of land reform has the wide meaning as 
described above. Thus, land reform will be understood as the redistribution of 
outright ownership to land (from the land-rich to the landless or land-poor), as 
well as improvements in access to land and/or its output (in the eyes of the 
peasant) through changes in other tenure arrangements.9 However, when I—in the 
9 Agrarian reform is a broader concept than land reform. Barraclough (1973: 33) defines it as a 
combination of agricultural development (the application of technology and capital to increase 
farm productivity), colonization (the opening up of non-agricultural lands for agricultural 
production), and land reform (as described above). A more fruitful demarcation of the concept is 
found in Thiesenhusen (1995: 12), where agrarian reform “includes both redistributing land and 
assisting new landowners by assuring them inputs and markets, extending credit, and imparting 
certain technology that will help them to become agricultural producers.” Thiesenhusen further 
explains that in bipolar agrarian structures (where a rich elite owns most of the land and most 
peasants are landless or nearly landless and very poor) most government policy benefits the large, 
capitalist farmers. Thus, the point of agrarian reform is to send more benefits to a wider group of 
farmers, including at least some of the poor. Parsons (1984: 19-24) defines agrarian reforms as 
programs designed to modify the institutional order in agriculture to change how the economic 
system (of agriculture) relates to the social and political structure of the society. He argues that the 
interrelation between abilities and opportunities is fundamental for development. Therefore, land 
reform—which gives people an opportunity to escape poverty—is inadequate in order to change 
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concluding chapter (Chapter 8)—discuss what the results of this thesis imply 
about the potential that land reform has to reduce food insecurity, land reform will 
have the narrow meaning of a redistribution of landholdings to the benefit of 
smallholders or landless peasants. The reason land reform has this narrow 
meaning in the concluding chapter is that data constraints on variables such as 
tenure, tenancy, and landlessness, limit my analysis to the relationship between 
the size distribution of landholdings and food insecurity. Thus I can only assess 
the potential effects of a redistribution of landholdings on the basis of the results 
of the study. 
 This section has defined the concepts of land concentration and land 
reform. In the next section I will provide an empirical description of these and 
related aspects in the developing world.    
4.2.1 Land Concentration 
The purpose of this section is to provide a picture of the poor’s access to land in 
the developing world. To fulfill this purpose, I will describe the size distribution 
of landholdings across regions in the developing world. However, this will only 
tell us part of the story, as the type of tenure that the land is held in affects the 
holder’s access to the output of the land. For instance, a share cropped holding of 
two hectares where the tenant has to give 50 percent of his output to the landlord 
can be likened to a one-hectare owner-cultivated holding (with the same land 
productivity). Thus, I will try to modify the picture given by the size distribution 
of landholdings by providing information about land tenure arrangements. 
Together this will give us information about how land, and its output, is 
distributed among those who have land. However, it does not tell us how a large 
share of the agricultural population does not have access to any land.10 Thus, we 
will also consider measures of landlessness (in the agricultural population).  
In the conceptual scheme of the relationship between land concentration 
and food insecurity in Chapter 5, I will explain how and why agricultural land per 
the social structure in agriculture and spur development. The wider package of agrarian reform 
(which includes land redistribution, access to credit, infrastructure, irrigation and technology 
transfer for the poor) is necessary in order to give them the ability to realize their opportunities. 
10 The agricultural population is defined as those that are actively engaged in agriculture and their 
non-working dependants (Jazairy et al. 1992). 
THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY AND LAND CONCENTRATION 
59
agricultural capita,11 as well as agricultural land and labor productivity, influences 
food insecurity (and how these measures are influenced by land concentration). 
During this discussion, it may be useful to have some idea about the scope of 
these measures in today’s developing world. Thus, Sub-Section 4.3.2 offers an 
introduction to this side of the agrarian structure. 
There is considerable variation in the poor’s access to land within the 
developing regions. Nevertheless, it seems fruitful to talk about a typical structure 
for: 1) Latin America and the Caribbean; 2) Sub-Saharan Africa; 3) The Near East 
and North Africa; and 4) South East Asia.12
Since the poor’s access to land is of central importance in this thesis, I will 
spend some time examining data on the gini coefficient for the size distribution of 
landholdings and the prevalence of tenancy and landlessness. Gini coefficients 
provide information about inequality in the size distribution of land holdings.13
The data on the prevalence of tenancy tell us how many percent of the holdings 
are rented. However, the do not say anything about the tenancy terms or the 
degree of exploitation the tenants have to put up with. Thus, I will supplement the 
data with a description of these aspects across the regions.  
Tables 4.4.a to 4.4.d show the distribution of land holdings, the prevalence 
of landlessness in the agricultural population, and the share of holdings that are 
under tenancy in selected developing countries.14 Here we can see that land is 
generally most concentrated in Latin America. If we take the average of the latest 
reported gini coefficients in each region, we can see that Latin America has the 
highest average: 0.72. This is very high, and considerably higher than the 
averages for the Near East and North Africa (0.55), South East Asia (0.48), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (0.44) regions. Ten of the 25 Latin American countries in 
11 In Chapter 5 I discuss how agricultural land per agricultural worker (and not per agricultural 
capita) relates to food insecurity. However, these data are not available on a regional basis. In their 
place I will use agricultural land per agricultural capita.    
12 The discussion regarding Asia will sometimes refer to South Asia and other times to South East 
Asia, according to the availability of aggregate data. See World Bank (1999: 250-51) for a list of 
countries in each of the developing regions. 
13 The coefficient ranges from zero to one, where the value zero means that land is equally 
distributed among all holders, and the value one means that all of the land in the country is under 
one holding. Although there are shortcomings with this coefficient (see Section 6.2), it is generally 
accepted as the best available measure of inequality in access to land (Fields 2001). 
14 The countries in Tables 4.4.a to 4.4.d are selected on the basis of data availability. 
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Table 4.4.b have gini coefficients above 0.70 which is the benchmark for very 
high inequality (UNDP 1992, Table 4.2). This is twice as many as in the three 
other developing regions together. Kenya, Madagascar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia 
and Algeria are the only countries outside Latin America and the Caribbean that 
have gini coefficients higher than 0.70. 
With the high concentration of landholdings in Latin America and the 
Caribbean it is not surprising that landlessness reaches its highest levels (of the 
countries where data are available) in this region. In Costa Rica, as much as 44 
percent of the agricultural population is landless, and the situation is not much 
better in El Salvador and Brazil, where the levels are 41 percent and 39 percent, 
respectively. Two Latin American countries are, however, on the opposite end of 
the scale. In Grenada, only five percent of the agricultural population is landless 
(but there is a high share of tenancy), and in Jamaica only four percent. The level 
of landlessness is also high in most South East Asian countries. The Philippines 
has the highest level, where 34 percent of the agricultural population does not 
have access to land; Malaysia has the lowest, with 12 percent; and the other eight 
countries (where data are available) have between 15 and 39 percent landlessness. 
It is easy to lose sight of the magnitude of the problem when we compare 
percentages across countries. Thirty percent landlessness may not seem very high 
as it is within the normal range. But, when we consider the fact that India, which 
has an agricultural population of approximately 500 million, has a 30 percent 
prevalence of landlessness, the numbers become more dramatic. In this country 
alone about 150 million people that depend on agriculture for a living do not have 
access to any land.   
There are data on landlessness for only six countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Five of these countries have low levels of landlessness: from two percent 
in Rwanda to 16 percent in Côte d’Ivoire. The level in Lesotho (26 percent) is 
higher than in these five, but it is not very high compared to many countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and South East Asia. In the Near East and 
North Africa, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen have low levels of landlessness with only 
three, seven and nine percent, respectively. The highest level in the region is in 
Turkey, where 28 percent of the agricultural population is landless. Thus, the 
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situation is much the same as in the six Sub-Saharan countries where data are 
available.  
Table 4.4.a: Land Concentration, Tenancy and Landlessness in Selected 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Gini Coefficient for 
Landholdings 
Direction of 
Change 
Tenancy, %  
Holdings 
Landlessness, % 
Agric. Pop. 
1970 1980 1990 mid-1980s 1988 
Botswana 0.50    - - 
Cameroon 0.44 .42    - - 
Chad 0.38    - - 
Congo  0.29    - - 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.42  0.36   - - 
Ethiopia 0.32 .25 0.32    - 16 
Gabon 0.47    - - 
Gambia   0.38  - - 
Ghana 0.57 .44    14 - 
Guinea  .19 0.19  - - 
Kenya 0.74 .77   4 13 
Lesotho 0.39  0.47  - 26 
Madagascar  .80   - - 
Malawi  .36   - 8 
Mauritania  .36   8 - 
Niger  .35   - - 
Nigeria 0.37    - 9 
Rwanda  .39   3 2 
Sierra Leone 0.44  0.44  - - 
Togo  .45   21 - 
Uganda  .60 0.62  - - 
Zaire 0.37  0.39  - - 
Notes: - means not available. Gini coefficients from 1966-1975 are placed under 1970, 
from 1976-85 under 1980 and gini coefficients from 1986-1995 under 1990. 
Sources: Gini Coefficients: UNDP (1992: Table 2.2) and (1997: 198-99); Thiesenhusen 
(1995: 9); Alamgir, and Arora (1991: 99-100); IFAD (2001: 119), UCLA (1999: Table 205). 
Landlessness and Share of Land under Tenancy: Jazairy et al. (1992: 406-7 and 418-19). 
CHAPTER 4 
62
Table 4.4.b: Land Concentration, Tenancy and Landlessness in Selected 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Gini Coefficient  
for Landholdings 
Direction  
of Change 
Tenancy, %  
Holdings 
Landlessness, % 
Agric. Pop. 
1970 1980 1990 mid-1980s 1988 
Argentina   0.79  - - 
Bahamas   0.88  - - 
Barbados   0.92  - - 
Bolivia 0.60 0.55    - 10 
Brazil 0.84 0.86   16 39 
Chile 0.60  0.64  - - 
Colombia 0.86 0.70 0.71   - - 
Costa Rica 0.83 0.67    - 44 
Dominican R 0.79 0.70    20 29 
Ecuador 0.71  0.69   27 23 
El Salvador 0.81  0.57   4 41 
Grenada  0.69   52 5 
Guatemala  0.85   12 21 
Guyana  0.60   29 - 
Haiti 0.50    20 - 
Honduras 0.78 0.64 0.73    56 26 
Jamaica  0.68   21 4 
Mexico 0.58    - 32 
Panama 0.78 0.84 0.88  67 25 
Paraguay  0.94 0.91   - 27 
Peru 0.82 0.61    - 19 
Suriname  0.60   - - 
Trinidad & Tob.  0.61   24 - 
Uruguay 0.82 0.84   20 - 
Venezuela 0.92    - 27 
Notes: - means not available. Gini coefficients from 1966-1975 are placed under 1970, 
from 1976-85 under 1980 and gini coefficients from 1986-1995 under 1990. 
Sources: Gini Coefficients: UNDP (1992: Table 2.2) and (1997: 198-99); Thiesenhusen 
(1995: 9); Alamgir and Arora (1991: 99-100); IFAD (2001: 119), UCLA (1999: Table 205). 
Landlessness and Share of Land under Tenancy: Jazairy et al. (1992: 406-7 and 418-19). 
The system of customary land tenure dominates in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
this system, it is the tribe that owns the land, and (male) members of the tribe 
have equal rights to its use. It is the responsibility of tribal chiefs to ensure that all 
eligible persons are allocated farmland. Rules for eligibility vary from tribe to 
tribe, and in some cases outsiders may even acquire land if they agree to certain 
conditions. This does not mean that everyone has equally large landholdings (see 
the gini coefficients in Table 4.4.a). Women often do not have independent rights 
to land as these rights are generally allocated to the (male) head of the household 
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(Jazairy et al. 1992: 108-125; Small 1997: 46). In addition to the use rights 
allocated a person (or a family), the commons constitute an important source of 
land in many Sub-Saharan countries. 
Table 4.4.c:  Land Concentration, Tenancy and Landlessness in Selected 
Countries in The Near East and North Africa 
Country Gini Coefficient for 
Land Holdings 
Direction of 
Change 
Tenancy, % of 
Holdings 
Landlessness, % 
Agric. Pop. 
1970 1980 1990  mid-1980s 1988 
Algeria 0.72    - - 
Egypt 0.32 .35   30 25 
Iraq 0.51 .35    - 7 
Jordan  .57   25 3 
Morocco 0.59 .47    12 15 
Saudi Arabia 0.79 .83   - - 
Syria  .59   - - 
Tunisia  .58   14 20 
Turkey 0.54 .58 0.40    2 28 
Yemen  .64   - 9 
Notes: - means not available. Gini coefficients from 1966-1975 are placed under 1970, 
from 1976-85 under 1980 and gini coefficients from 1986-1995 under 1990. 
Sources: Gini Coefficients: UNDP (1992: Table 2.2) and (1997: 198-99); Thiesenhusen 
(1995: 9); Alamgir and Arora (1991: 99-100); IFAD (2001: 119), UCLA (1999: Table 205). 
Landlessness and Share of Land under Tenancy: Jazairy et al. (1992: 406-7 and 418-19). 
Although customary tenure dominates in Sub-Saharan Africa, some 
countries have privatized some of their agricultural land. In Kenya, 20 percent of 
the land is privately owned, whereas in Côte D’Ivoire it is 17 percent, and in 
Malawi, 15 percent.  However, tenancy on privately owned land is not common. 
An exception from this rule is Cape Verde, where as much as 61 percent of the 
landholdings are leased from private owners. In Southern Africa (Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa) there is a form of dualistic agrarian structure, where 
white farmers own land and blacks have access to land through the communal 
system (Jazairy et al. 1992: 108). This could, however, change with the abolition 
of apartheid in South Africa and the infamous land reforms in Zimbabwe. 
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Table 4.4.d: Land Concentration, Tenancy and Landlessness in Selected 
Countries in South East Asia 
Country Gini Coefficient for 
Land Holdings 
Direction 
of Change 
Tenancy, % 
of Holdings 
Landlessness, % 
Agric. Pop. 
1970 1980 1990 mid-1980s 1988 
Bangladesh 0.57 0.50    23 20 
India 0.64 0.55 0.43   9 (15)* 30 
Indonesia 0.72    - 15 
Rep. of Korea 0.29 0.32   - - 
Malaysia  0.51   - 12 
Myanmar  0.41 0.44  - 22 
Nepal 0.62 0.61 0.33   13 18 
Pakistan 0.43 0.54 0.37    36 30 
Philippines 0.51 0.53   33 34 
Sri Lanka 0.51 0.64   27 22 
Thailand 0.46 0.46 0.36   16 15 
Notes: - means not available. Gini coefficients from 1966-1975 are placed under 1970, 
from 1976-85 under 1980 and gini coefficients from 1986-1995 under 1990. *According to 
Lastarria-Cornehiel and Melmed-Sanjak (1999: 9) the share of tenancy in India is 15 percent. 
Sources: Gini Coefficients: UNDP (1992: Table 2.2) and (1997: 198-99); Thiesenhusen 
(1995: 9); Alamgir and Arora (1991: 99-100); IFAD (2001: 119), UCLA (1999: Table 205). 
Landlessness and Share of Land under Tenancy: Jazairy et al. (1992: 406-7 and 418-19). 
A third form of agrarian structure can be found in Tanzania and Ethiopia, 
where the state formally owns all agricultural land and the people only have 
usufruct rights. In Tanzania, village governments allocate these use-rights to 
individuals, while peasant organizations exercise this power in Ethiopia. In the 
latter case, everyone who is over the age of 18, and a member of an 
acknowledged peasant organization, is entitled to usufruct rights to a parcel of 
land. Thus, the gini coefficient for landholdings is only 0.32, which is the lowest 
among all countries in this study (regardless of region). On the other hand, the 
highest gini coefficient for the size distribution of landholdings in this region is 
found in Kenya (0.77), which is the country with the highest share of privately 
owned land. Thus, it seems as if the generally low level of land concentration, 
landlessness, and tenancy, in Sub-Saharan Africa is a result of the customary land 
tenure system (and the state ownership of land) that dominates in this region.  
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the agrarian structure is quite 
different from the structure in Sub-Saharan Africa, as it can still be characterized 
as a “latifundia” system. In this system, land ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a few wealthy landowners. Because land on these large farms is often 
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acquired for reasons of status, or portfolio investments, vast areas of arable land 
lie idle in this region. Landless or land-poor laborers work on the large farms 
(“latifundias” or “haciendas”) for very low wages. Alongside them is a peasantry 
that works tiny pieces of land, either within or outside the estates. The peasants’ 
land is often rented from landlords (or pawned to a money-lender). The amount of 
land under tenancy is relatively high in Latin America and the Caribbean. For 
example, the share of tenancy is 56 percent in Honduras, 38 percent in Belize, and 
67 percent in Grenada. The rent that peasants have to pay on land is most often 
around 50 percent of the output (either in cash or in kind), but in some countries 
they are forced to pay as much as 80 percent (Barke and O’Hare 1993: 85; Jazairy 
et al. 1992: 406-7, 418). Peasants often find themselves in a serf-like relationship 
to landlords, as they depend on them for continued access to land, for credit and 
market-access. Worse, the size of the rents that peasants have to pay on both land 
and loans can seriously jeopardize their room for maneuver.  
A wave of land reforms swept over the Latin American region in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The most radical reforms were those in Peru, Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba, where between 22 and 60 percent of the 
agricultural land was redistributed, benefiting between 20 and 60 percent of the 
rural families (Jazairy et al. 1992: 113). Cooperatives were formed by the reforms 
in Cuba, Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua, but this did not (as we can see from 
Table 4.4.b) lead to a major improvement in access to land for the poor.  Previous 
to this wave of reforms, the latifundias constituted only about 5 percent of the 
number of farm units (but they owned approximately 80 percent of the land). In 
contrast, the minifundistas (small peasants), who constituted about 80 percent of 
the population, only had access to about five percent of the land. The land reforms 
changed this ratio to some degree but not enough to erase the bi-polarity. We still 
see a few very large, and a lot of (often rented) very small, but very few medium-
sized farms (Kay 1997: 154). Most economic and political power is therefore still 
vested in the landlord-class, and peasants are marginalized in both terms.  
Thus, despite very high gini coefficients for landholdings in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the inequalities in access to the land’s output is even 
worse than reflected by these gini coefficients because many of the smallholders 
are tenants. Since tenants have to pay rent to a landlord, their access to land is 
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really lower than the actual size of the holding. This is especially so in Panama, 
where as much as 67 percent of all holdings are rented, as well as in, for instance 
Honduras and Grenada where respectively 56 and 52 percent of the holdings are 
rented.      
 The agrarian structure in North Africa and the Middle East resembles the 
latifunda system in Latin America (El-Ghonemy 1993: 34; Barke and O’Hare 
1993: 85), but the holdings are generally less concentrated and the incidence of 
tenancy and landlessness is normally lower (see Tables 4.4.b and 4.4.c). Abuse of 
the peasantry is still a serious problem in this region, though generally less than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The exploitation of tenants has been practically 
eliminated after tenure reforms in Algeria (1962 and 1970) and Iraq (1958 and 
1970), and the conditions for tenants have improved considerably in Egypt after 
the land reforms (1952, 1961, and 1969). However, the situation for tenants in 
Tunisia and Yemen is less favorable, and resembles that of many Latin American 
tenants. In Tunisia, tenancy is not regulated by law, which puts the tenants at a 
high risk of mistreatment. In Yemen, tenancy terms leave the tenants with as little 
as 15 percent of the output in cotton producing-areas, and even inflict net losses 
on them in cereal areas (Jazairy et al. 1992: 120, 418; El-Ghonemy 1990: 217).  
In South East Asia, the agrarian structure is dominated by owner 
cultivation. In most countries (where data are available) private individuals own 
more than 50 percent of the holdings of less than one hectare (Jazairy et al. 1992: 
110). However, tenancy is also found. In India, for instance, between nine and 
fifteen percent of all holdings are under tenancy.15 The percentages are higher in 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, where 36, 27, and 33 percent of all 
holdings respectively, are held on some form of tenancy (see Table 4.4.d). The 
most dominant tenancy arrangement is sharecropping, and nearly 23 percent of all 
tenancy-holdings in Bangladesh are sharecropped. The vast majority of tenants 
is—as in Latin America and the Caribbean and, to a lesser degree, in North Africa 
and the Middle East—both dependent on, and are exploited by, their landlords. In 
the more developed regions of Asia there are also incidences of what is called 
“reverse tenancy”, where owner-cultivators expand their holdings by renting in 
15 According to Jazairy et al. (1992: 418), only nine percent of the holdings are under tenancy; 
while Lastarria-Cornehiel and Melmed-Sanjak (1999: 9) state that 15 percent of the land is under 
tenancy.  
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land. In such reverse tenancy situations, it is often the tenants that have the most 
power in contract negotiations, because the “land-lords” are often marginal 
farmers whose land is not sufficient for subsistence (or small farmers who do not 
have oxen to work their land). Additionally, there are many small-to-small lease 
transactions, where both parties are more or less equal in status and bargaining 
power (Lastarria-Cornehiel and Melmed-Sanjak 1999: 9-10). Thus, the gini 
coefficient for landholdings also overstates the poor’s access to (the output of) 
land in this region.  
There have been attempts at reforming the agrarian structure in several 
Asian countries. Land reforms in Taiwan (1951 and 1953) and the Republic of 
Korea (1949) are generally looked upon as success stories because the poor won 
improved access to land, and because it is believed that the new agrarian structure 
(partially) spurred the remarkable economic growth that these countries 
experienced over the past few decades. However, the results of land reforms in 
Bangladesh (1950, 1961 and 1972) and Sri Lanka (1972) were disappointing for 
smallholders and the landless (Jazairy et al. 1992: 110-11). 
So far we have only discussed how access to land is distributed. In the 
following section we will examine how much land is available to distribute 
among the agricultural population, as well the productivity of the land and those 
who work it. 
4.2.2 Arable Land per Worker, and Agricultural Land and Labor 
Productivity
Although it is important to recognize that there can be great variation in the 
quality of land under consideration, it is useful to look at the availability of arable 
land (per agricultural worker) when considering the poor’s access to land. It is a 
rough indicator of agriculture’s potential for satisfying the needs of the people 
that rely on it for a living (as well as agriculture’s ability to provide the industrial 
sector with food and raw materials). However, to get a more refined picture of the 
land’s ability to provide for the needs of the population, we have to study land 
and labor productivity in agriculture. These measures are in focus in the latter part 
of this section. 
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Changes in arable land per worker can come about by growth or decline in the 
workforce (a result of population growth and/or increased labor absorption in the 
industrial sector), through expansion of the land frontier, land degradation, and/or 
because arable land is used for industrial or housing purposes. We can see from 
Table 4.5 that arable land per worker in agriculture has declined in the 15 years 
between 1985 and 2000 in both Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The largest 
decline has occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average level of land per 
worker declined by 22 percent, from 0.99 hectares in 1985, to 0.78 hectares in the 
year 2000. This reduction in arable land per worker happened despite an increase 
in the total area of arable land of about 10 percent in the same period, because the 
agricultural labor force increased by approximately 35 percent (World Bank 
2003).  
Table 4.5: Arable Land per Agricultural Worker in 1985 and 2000 
Region Arable Land per Agricultural Worker (ha) % Change 
1985 2000 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.99 0.78 -22 
Latin America & Caribbean 2.70 3.02 +12 
South Asia 0.69 0.57 -17 
Notes: Data are not available for the Near East and North Africa. The data are computed 
from the total area of arable land divided by the number of economically active persons in 
agriculture, both as defined by the FAO (2002b). Figures for the number of economically active 
persons in agriculture are the average for the years 1980 and 1990. 
Source: FAO (2002b)
In South Asia, there is less arable land available per worker than in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. (Unfortunately, data from 
the Near East and North Africa region is not available.) We can see from Table 
4.5 that South Asia had 0.69 hectares per worker in 1985, and that a 12 percent 
decrease left the region with only 0.57 hectares per worker by the year 2000. As 
there has been practically no change in the total amount of arable land in this 
region, the reduction is solely due to an increase in the agricultural labor force 
(World Bank 2003).  
From Table 4.5 we can further see that Latin America and Caribbean is in 
an exceptional position. With the 2.7 hectares per worker in 1985, and the 3.02 
hectares in 2000, there is much more land per worker than in the other regions. 
Latin America and Caribbean is also the only region where arable land per worker 
has increased in this period. The 12 percent increase in arable land per worker in 
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agriculture is mainly a result of a 10 percent increase in the total area of arable 
land (World Bank 2003). 
From the review above we have seen that Asia has the least amount of 
land available per person that depends on agriculture for a living, and that Sub-
Saharan Africa enjoys a somewhat better position. It is, however, important to 
keep in mind that while some farmers in Latin America have plenty of land, the 
vast majority suffers from land scarcity because of the highly unequal land 
distribution. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the possibility of producing enough food 
(and other necessary agricultural products) and generating enough income from 
the land available is determined by the level of land and labor productivity. The 
productivity of land and labor in agriculture also varies considerably between the 
developing regions. From Table 4.6 we can see that land productivity has 
increased in all regions between 1985 and 2000. However, the increase is of a 
much lower magnitude in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the other regions. The Near 
East and North Africa region enjoyed the highest land productivity in both 1985 
and in 2000, with 885 US$ and 1,331 US$ per hectare, respectively. Land 
productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean follows closely behind, as it was 
859 US$ in 1985 and 1,088 US$ in the year 2000. The levels are much lower in 
South Asia, where the land productivity has been only half of that in the Near 
East and North Africa, with only 442 US$ in 1985, and 700 US$ in 2000. The 
land productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest of all. In this region it was 
only 338 US$ in 1985, and 419 US$ in 2000.   
Table 4.6: Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity in 1985 and 2000 
Region   Land Productivity Labor Productivity 
1985 2000 1985 2000 
Sub-Saharan Africa 338 419 369 842 
Near East & North Africa 885 1 331 -- -- 
Latin America & the Caribbean 859 1 088 2 463 3 962 
South Asia 442 700 311 730 
Note: Values are in constant 1995 US$ 
Source: World Bank (2003) 
When it comes to agricultural output per worker, Latin America and the 
Caribbean are in a class of their own. In 1985, labor productivity in this region 
was 2,463 US$ per worker, which was more than six times the average for Sub-
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Saharan Africa (369 US$), and almost eight times the level in South Asia (311 
US$). In the year 2000, Latin America and the Caribbean’s lead had shrunk, but 
the labor productivity of 3,962 US$ was still much higher than the 842 US$ in 
Sub-Saharan Africa,16 and the 730 US$ in South Asia. There are no available 
estimates of labor productivity in the Near East and North Africa, but I have 
calculated the average of seven countries in the region (all the countries for which 
I could find data).17 This estimated average was 1,748 US$ in 1985, and 2,180 
US$ in 2000. If this average is representative for the region, this indicates that the 
Near East and North Africa has the second highest level of labor productivity, 
after Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The levels of land and labor productivity in agriculture are important for 
developing countries because agriculture constitutes a large part of the economy, 
and has to provide for most of the countries’ needs and incomes. Just to get an 
understanding of how the levels of agricultural land and labor productivity 
compares to that of developed countries, I might mention that in the year 2000, 
land productivity in the USA was estimated at 912 US$ per hectare, and labor 
productivity was 53,353 US$ per worker, while in France the land productivity 
was 2,828 US$ and agricultural labor productivity was 58,018 US$.18 The level of 
land productivity in France is quite a lot higher than the levels we find in the 
developing regions, but in the USA it is actually lower than the average for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. However, the difference in the level of labor 
productivity between the USA and France, on the one side, and the developing 
regions, on the other, is striking. 
16 An average labor productivity of 842 US$ seems very high for Sub-Saharan Africa, as many of 
these countries had a level of agricultural labor productivity in the range of 150-450 US$ per 
worker in the same year. However, it can (partly) be explained by the fact that the agricultural 
labor productivity was 4,698 US$ in Mauritius, 3,861 in South Africa, and 1,104 in Côte d’Ivoire. 
These countries can also (partly) explain the high increase in the regions’ average from 1985 to 
2000 (despite an overall decline in arable land per worker), as the labor productivity in these 
countries increased by 24, 35 and 53 percent, respectively (World Bank 2003). However, we 
should keep in mind that data provided by institutions like the World Bank on developing 
countries are subject to several sources of error (as discussed in Section 1.1)  
17 These countries are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
   
18 The source of land and labor productivity in agriculture for the USA and France is World Bank 
(2003).  
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4.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have seen that the developing world is crippled by food 
insecurity. According to the latest estimates (from 2000) more than 180 million 
children under five, (one in every three) are stunted as a result of inadequate food 
intake (and disease). Almost 130 million of these are found in Asia. However, 
measured in percent of the under five population, Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
highest prevalence of stunting, and it is the only region where an increase in the 
absolute number of stunted children is expected between 2000 and 2005. 
While acknowledging that food supply and food security are different 
concepts, I also reviewed the past and present food supply situation in the 
developing regions. I have done this because one of my main hypotheses is that 
the level of food supply (availability) influences the level of food insecurity. 
Although the food supply is far from satisfactory in the developing world (with 
the possible exception of the Near East and North Africa), there has not been a 
decline in the total food supply in any of the regions. Only Sub-Saharan Africa 
has experienced a faster growth in population than in food supply, leading to a 
reduction in the per capita food supply.  
To summarize the information on land concentration, tenancy and 
landlessness we can say that although there are strains of both private and state 
land ownership in Sub-Saharan Africa, customary tenure dominates in this region 
and land concentration is therefore relatively low. Moreover, the prevalence of 
landlessness and tenancy are also low. In Latin America and the Caribbean, as 
well as in Near East and North Africa, there is a bi-polar agrarian structure with a 
few large farms and many small farms (which generally produce high gini 
coefficients). However, there is a higher prevalence of tenancy and landlessness 
in the former region. In South East Asia, land concentration is only a little higher 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa and private ownership dominates, but there is also 
considerable tenancy and landlessness.  
We have further seen that the Latin America and the Caribbean region has 
considerably more land per agricultural worker than Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, and a much higher level of labor productivity. Of course, this does 
not help the poor very much, since the landholdings are concentrated in the hands 
of a few and the level of landlessness is high. In South East Asia, land is less 
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concentrated (than in Latin America) and land productivity is relatively low, but 
land availability per worker is very low, landlessness is high, and labor 
productivity is the lowest of all the regions. Neither is this situation very 
promising for the poor. Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been relatively land-
abundant, but high rates of population growth have changed this picture 
dramatically. Sub-Saharan Africa’s average gini coefficient for landholdings is 
the lowest of the four developing regions, and it has relatively low levels of 
landlessness (insofar as the few countries where there is data are representative 
for the region). Labor productivity rates are the second lowest of the developing 
regions, while Sub-Saharan Africa is at the bottom of the list with respect to land 
productivity. In the Near East and North Africa, land concentration is relatively 
high, but not as high as in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, 
landlessness is generally lower in this region than in South East Asia, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Figures for labor productivity in the Near East and 
North Africa are not available, but the average land productivity rate is the 
highest of all regions. 
In the two regions where tenancy is most prevalent (Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and South East Asia) the gini coefficients overstate the poor’s access 
to (the output of) land. Moreover, figures on landlessness give us additional 
information on the poor’s lack of access to land. However, I do not have data on 
enough cases to include the aspects of tenancy and landlessness in the empirical 
analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. To amend for this lack of data, I will include 
regional dummies that can possibly modify the information about access to land 
provided by the gini coefficient for landholdings, by capturing the different levels 
of tenancy and landlessness across the regions. These dummies will be explained 
further in Section 6.2.  
The aim of this chapter has been to provide background information on the 
state of food insecurity and land concentration in the developing world.  For this 
reason, it has been primarily descriptive. In the following chapter, I conceptualize 
how land concentration, the availability of agricultural land, as well as 
agricultural land and labor productivity influence the levels of both food 
availability and food insecurity in the developing world.  
5Land Concentration and Food Insecurity: 
A Conceptual Scheme 
In Chapter 2 I discussed two main approaches to the study of food insecurity in 
developing countries: the entitlement approach and the food availability approach. The 
first approach sees food insecurity as a consequence of inadequate endowments at the 
individual level, while the latter describes food insecurity in terms of a food shortage at 
the country or regional (whether within a country or of a group of countries) level. 
Endowments include assets (such as agricultural land), incomes from cash cropping, 
incomes from wage labor (in both agriculture and industry) and rights to social transfers.
Subsistence production (from the endowment of agricultural land) provides a “direct 
entitlement” to food, while the corresponding term “indirect entitlement” is a result of 
the exchange of endowments for food (between individuals or on the open market). 
Thus, indirect entitlements result from the terms of trade between endowments and food. 
Since food prices are influenced by food availability, I argued that people’s endowments 
and the amount of food available in a country are both essential parts of an explanation 
for food insecurity. Endowments are essential because they reflect the resources that 
people have at their disposal, and that can be used to acquire food. The availability of 
food is important because there must be enough food to cover the needs of the 
population, but also because it influences the price of food, which rises when the supply 
of food is low (relative to demand). Thus, endowments are only relevant when measured 
in relation to the price of food, and the availability of food is only relevant when seen in 
combination with people’s endowments. While the entitlement approach acknowledges 
that the price of food determines how much food can be derived from a given set of 
endowments, it downplays the price side of entitlements. On the other hand, the 
availability approach focuses on the quantity of food, downplaying the fact that the poor 
cannot access the available food when they lack endowments. Consequently, both 
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approaches stop short of a full understanding of the causes for food insecurity in the 
developing world.
In this chapter I will explore the theoretical linkages between land concentration 
and food insecurity in developing countries by clarifying how land concentration affects 
the poor’s endowments and the price of food. This chapter explores the relationship 
between land concentration and: 1) direct entitlements; 2) the endowment side of 
indirect entitlements; and 3) food availability—and thereby the price side of indirect 
entitlements. Thus, I approach the study of food insecurity from a perspective that 
focuses on entitlements to food, but acknowledges that food availability is an important, 
and necessarily integrated, part of entitlements.  
As pointed out by Maxwell and Wiebe (1999), assets can be (and are often) sold 
in order to buy food in bad years. This depletion of assets can jeopardize long-term food 
security, especially if peasants are forced to sell off some of their already small 
landholdings. To simplify the discussion, I have chosen to look at the endowments’ side 
of indirect entitlements as income, and I will not distinguish between indirect 
entitlements derived from selling off assets and other income. The bottom line is this: if 
people have to sell assets to buy food, it is because they do not have enough income to 
buy the food they need (at the current price). However, I will only discuss aspects of 
income that are related to land concentration and agrarian structure. This implies that I 
will not discuss any form of social transfer programs such as social security payments, 
unemployment benefits, food-for-work, and so on.   
To simplify the picture further, I assume that all potentially-food insecure 
farmers are subsistence producers who do not sell any of their produce on the market, 
and that peasants engaging in cash cropping are better off. In this way I avoid the 
problem of the divergent effects that food prices can have on poor peasants that depend 
on the food market for incomes and food. For these people, incomes will rise when food 
prices increase, but the effect on food insecurity is unclear because the food they have to 
buy will also be more expensive. For this reason, the food insecurity of cash croppers 
will not be considered here. In real life this simplification does not hold, because poor 
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peasants may also choose to grow cash crops.1 However, for simplicity I choose to limit 
the discussion to the effect of land concentration on the food insecurity of subsistence 
producers and the landless (agricultural and industrial) workers.2
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are vast, but separate, literatures on food 
insecurity and land concentration. The food insecurity literature seldom discusses the 
possible effects of land concentration, while the land concentration literature seldom 
deals with food insecurity—much less on both rural and urban food insecurity. The main 
contribution of this chapter is to combine these literatures, and explain how land 
concentration affects food insecurity. The common perception of the relationship is that 
where land concentration is low (and more people have access to agricultural land) food 
insecurity will be low. However, the picture is much more complicated than this. The 
relationship is quite complex, as land concentration affects food insecurity through many 
different channels. It also affects food insecurity differently according to the channel and 
group of (poor) people under consideration. This chapter provides a conceptual scheme 
that structures the relationship between land concentration and food insecurity.
This conceptual scheme is graphically presented in Figures 5.1.a, 5.1.b, and 
5.1.c. Figure 5.1.a shows how entitlements to food can be divided into direct 
entitlements (which is the same as subsistence production), and indirect entitlements 
(which are derived by income and the price of food).
Land concentration’s relationship to direct entitlements is relatively 
straightforward, but the relationship with indirect entitlements is quite complex. Figure 
5.1.b shows how land concentration influences direct entitlements to food (subsistence 
production) directly, and via agricultural labor productivity and tenancy relations. 
Furthermore, tenancy relations influence agricultural labor productivity. I will elaborate 
on all the causal relationships (arrows) in Figure 5.1.b—except for the relationship 
1 Cash crops refer to agricultural crops other than food crops, and include crops like coffee, tea, cotton, 
sugar, rubber, jute, tobacco, vanilla and coconut, etc., depending on the country concerned. Cash crops can 
be sold on the domestic market, or exported. Furthermore export crops can include both food crops and 
cash crops. Food crops are those that are important for a population’s nutritional needs, and include crops 
like rice, wheat, maize, millet, sorghum, beans, cassava, banana, yam, groundnuts, and vegetables, etc., 
also depending on the country concerned (Jazairy et al. 1992: 468). 
2 This simplification can be justified by Brenner’s (1997) argument that peasants often choose to diversify 
for subsistence instead of specializing for the market, out of “safety first” concerns (See Sub-Section 
5.3.2).  
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between land concentration and labor productivity in agriculture—in Section 5.1. As 
explained below, the effect of land concentration on agricultural labor productivity will 
be discussed in a separate section. 
Figure 5.1.a: Food Insecurity 
Figure 5.1.c (below) illustrates the complex relationship between land 
concentration and indirect entitlements to food. Land concentration influences both the 
income side and the price side of indirect entitlements. On the left-hand side of the 
figure we can see that land concentration affects the incomes of the landless agricultural 
workers via agricultural labor productivity and income distribution. In the middle we see 
how it affects the incomes of (landless) industrial workers via agricultural labor 
productivity (which in turn influences both the agricultural surplus and the demand for 
industrial products from agriculture), through government policy and income 
distribution. Finally, land concentration influences the price of food through its effect on 
food availability. The effects on food availability go via its influence on the type of 
Entitlements to Food 
Direct Entitlements/ 
Subsistence Production 
Indirect Entitlements 
Income Food
Prices
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crops that are produced, agricultural labor productivity, and self-consumption in 
agriculture. 
Figure 5.1.b: Land Concentration and Direct Entitlements 
I explain these relationships (except for the relationship between land 
concentration and agricultural labor productivity) in Section 5.2. I will first describe the 
income side, and then the price side, of indirect entitlements. Sub-Section 5.2.1 
describes the relationship between land concentration and incomes for workers in the 
agricultural sector, and Sub-Section 5.2.2 covers the incomes of workers in the industrial 
sector. I will discuss the price, or food availability, side of indirect entitlements in Sub-
Section 5.2.3.
From Figures 5.1.b and 5.1.c (as well as from the discussion throughout this 
chapter) we see that labor productivity in agriculture is a key factor affecting: 1) direct 
entitlements; 2) the income side of indirect entitlements in agriculture and industry; as 
well as 3) food availability. Agricultural labor productivity is itself influenced by land 
concentration, which means that part of the relationship between land concentration and 
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food security goes via labor productivity in agriculture. In order to avoid repetition, I 
have chosen to focus my discussion of the relationship between land concentration and 
labor productivity in agriculture in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides a summary. 
The conceptual scheme presented and described in this chapter is meant to 
provide an understanding of the complexity of the relationship between land 
concentration and food insecurity. When I analyze the relationship in Chapter 7, I will 
test a simpler model.  Simplification is necessary because there aren’t enough 
comparable data available to test all of these relationships (across a high enough number 
of developing countries that we can generalize about the results). Thus, the availability 
of data restricts the complexity of the model I will eventually test.  
5.1 Land Concentration and Direct Entitlements 
Direct entitlement to food is derived from the subsistence production of food. The 
relationship between land concentration and direct entitlements concerns whether 
peasants with rights to use (some) land are capable of producing enough food to feed 
themselves and their families, even if they have to part with some of their produce as 
“land rent” to a landlord. There is also an underlying question of whether subsistence 
producers have better food security than wage workers (in agriculture or industry).
El-Ghonemy (1990) argues that those who have access to land have better food 
security than landless workers. He writes:  
“ In situations where industry is in its infancy and agriculture is the main source 
of employment, a landless worker faces two kinds of fear and uncertainties in 
acquiring food. One is the unstable flow of income from hiring out his or her 
labour and the other is his or her dependency on the power of grain traders in an 
imperfect market mechanism. In both cases, he or she is subordinated by fear and 
indignation. But the peasant who owns or controls a small piece of productive 
land has, on the other hand, a higher degree of certainty and independence in 
acquiring most of the household’s food from his or her holding. Thus, the latter 
has more power in commanding food than the former” (El-Ghonemy 1990: 106).  
If subsistence producers have better command over food than the landless, low levels of 
land concentration would generate food security (because more people would have 
access to land). 
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However, as direct entitlement to food is achieved through the production of food 
for self-consumption, low land concentration only provides the poor with the possibility
of producing food for their own consumption. As illustrated in Figure 5.1.b, whether 
they can produce enough food to remain food-secure depends on two things: 1) their 
labor productivity; and; 2) how tenancy relations intervene. Land concentration 
influences both of these factors. 
The critical issue for subsistence producers is whether or not they can produce 
enough food from their small piece of land. Thus, in order to be food-secure, subsistence 
producers need a piece of land that is large enough and productive enough to sustain the 
peasant family throughout the year. The size and land productivity of the holding cannot 
be considered apart from the number of people that work the land and depend on it for 
their (and their family’s) food security. If the land productivity of the holding is high 
because labor intensity is high, the output may not be large enough to feed all of the 
workers. Thus, labor productivity is the critical measure for food security of subsistence 
cultivators. If, for the moment, we set tenure relations aside, the relationship between 
labor productivity and food security for subsistence producers is simple: higher labor 
productivity means more food available for consumption.  
With a given amount of agricultural land in a country, its distribution will have 
implications for the average size of the farms and the share of the agricultural population 
that is landless. The higher the level of land concentration, the smaller the numbers of 
people with access to land, and the (average) holdings will be large. A consequence of 
this distribution pattern is that a high share of the agricultural population will be 
landless. When land concentration is low, more people have access to land, a lower 
share of the population will be landless, but the holdings will be smaller. When holdings 
are small, it may be difficult for peasants to produce enough food to be food-secure—
even if the land is intensively cultivated and the yields are high—because the output per 
person may be too low. Thus, where land is scarce (in relation to people) we are faced 
with a choice between: 1) (re)distributing land to as many people as possible; and 2) 
A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME
81
providing enough land to some of the people, thus rendering the rest landless.3 In short, 
we cannot say that low land concentration necessarily means high food security in the 
agricultural population: when more people have access to land, the holdings may be too 
small for survival. Thus, whether low land concentration will lead to low food insecurity 
depends on the amount of people that rely on agriculture for a living, in relation to the 
amount of land and the land’s productivity. In other words, low land concentration will 
give low food insecurity when the land/labor ratio and the level of land productivity 
combine to give the peasants sufficient labor productivity. In Section 5.3, I will discuss 
how land concentration affects the potential for improving labor productivity on small 
farms.  
While owner-cultivators will be able to reap all the benefits of their labor, tenants 
must share them with a landlord. For this reason, it is not sufficient to measure the 
quantity (and quality) produced by the tenant in light of the needs to sustain the family. 
When land is rented we need to recognize that the peasant must sell some of the produce 
(or give in-kind) in order to pay rent to the landlord.
Tenure agreements determine how much of the production a tenant can keep. In 
their comprehensive review of the contemporary land tenure literature, Lastarria-
Cornehiel and Melmed-Sanjak (1999: 50) conclude that there are three basic issues that 
influence the decisions of both landlords and tenants when forming tenancy contracts. 
First, both landlords and tenants try to maximize income potentials when they enter a 
tenancy agreement. The landlord attempts to maximize income by finding solutions to 
agency problems (e.g., shirking in work effort and incentives to increase productivity of 
the land). Second, while the tenant tries to maximize income from the tenancy 
agreement, he is even more occupied with minimizing income variability (risk 
management). Third, the agrarian structure (land distribution and labor supply) 
determines the bargaining power of the two parties, and influences the outcome. Where 
land is concentrated in the hands of a few, and the labor supply is abundant, tenants have 
little power in the negotiations.
3
This is a dilemma similar to Ehrlich’s (1969) “lifeboat ethics”: it may be necessary to deny some people 
access to the lifeboat in order to prevent it from sinking, so that the lives of the lucky few that are already 
onboard will be saved.  
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In addition, Bhaduri (1999: 87-104) argues that it suits the interest of the 
politically and economically superior landlord class to keep the labor productivity of 
their tenants down. Under the semi-feudal conditions that prevail in large parts of Asia 
and Latin America, the landed class can actually maintain higher levels of income if they 
hamper the productivity of the peasantry. In this way the landowners perpetuate the 
peasantry’s dependence on them for land and credit, and thereby secure future incomes. 
Thus, where ownership to land is concentrated, the “class-efficiency” of the landed 
upper class hinders growth in labor productivity on leased smallholdings.  
Brenner (1997) argues that agricultural growth will only occur under capitalist 
social property relations where workers are separated from their means of subsistence. 
Under feudal-like property relations—as is common in many developing countries 
today—the economic rationality of both peasants and landlords will not lead to 
agricultural growth, but rather to underdevelopment and social crisis. Peasants will 
choose to stay independent of the market and diversify their production in order to 
supply themselves with all their subsistence needs. Thus, the basis for agricultural 
growth—which is specialization, reinvestment, and technical innovation in order to 
maximize the price/cost ratio—fails to appear. Furthermore, landlords often have greater 
incentives to increase their income by squeezing their tenants than by increasing 
production.
This section has showed that the relationship between land concentration and 
direct entitlements from subsistence production is not quite as simple as it may seem. 
Contrary to common perceptions, low land concentration does not automatically reduce 
the prevalence of food insecurity (in the agricultural sector). The balance between (on 
the one hand) people and (on the other) the amount and productivity of the land, 
determines whether peasants can produce enough food to be food-secure. If the 
population is dense, a lot of people will be landless, even if land concentration is low. 
Under these conditions, there will be a tension between access to land for the landless 
and securing large enough holdings for the peasants to survive. Furthermore, subsistence 
producers are often tenants and have to share their output with a landlord (who is often 
interested in keeping the tenants’ labor productivity down). The tenancy terms are 
influenced by the relative power of the tenants and landowners. The more concentrated 
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is the ownership to land, the more people that are landless, the harsher are the tenancy 
terms, and the tenants will be less food-secure. Since high land concentration will 
produce many landless, the number of landless will be greater the more people are found 
in the agricultural sector. In addition to affecting the food insecurity of the subsistence 
producers, as explained in this section, high land concentration may be problematic for 
the landless agricultural population in their own right. This is the focus of the following 
section.
5.2 Land Concentration and Indirect Entitlements 
We have already discussed that indirect entitlements to food (for the poor) are a function 
of the level of income compared to the price of food (see Figure 5.1.c), and that the price 
side is as important as the income side because it is the relationship between them that 
determines people’s access to food. In this section I will first discuss how land 
concentration influences indirect entitlements through incomes of the landless workers 
in the agricultural sector. I will then discuss how land concentration affects incomes of 
workers in the industrial sector. Last, but not least, I will discuss how land concentration 
influences the price of food through food availability. 
5.2.1 Land Concentration and Income of Landless Agricultural Workers 
Land concentration can potentially influence both the (aggregate) income level and the 
income distribution in agriculture (see Figure 5.1.c). Wages for landless agricultural 
workers depend on two factors: 1) how much he or she is able to produce; and 2) the 
distribution of income between the landowners and the workers. Output per worker is 
more important than land productivity for determining incomes in agriculture. If output 
in agriculture grows because more labor is added, output per worker may level-off or 
even decline, and their welfare will not improve. Thus, from a food security point of 
view, the landless agricultural population depends on increased labor productivity in 
agriculture. As already noted, the influence of land concentration on labor productivity 
in agriculture will be discussed later, in Section 5.3. We will now turn to discuss 
CHAPTER 5 
84
whether we can expect wages in agriculture to rise if labor productivity increases (or, if 
workers can increase their wages even if their productivity does not grow). 4
There is, of course, a possibility that agricultural workers can enjoy higher wages 
if their labor productivity increases, as the net product to be distributed between the 
workers and the landowners will increase.5  When fewer people have participated in the 
production (of a given output) there will be less people to divide labor’s share of the 
revenues. If many workers are needed to produce a crop, each worker will get less. This 
is easily illustrated by the extreme situation where labor productivity is so low that the 
revenues from the farm are too low to cover (any) wages for all the workers. But, high 
labor productivity in agriculture does not automatically produce higher worker incomes. 
Whether growth in output per worker actually translates into higher income for these 
workers depends on the nature of the power relations (with regard to income 
distribution) between landowners (capital) and labor.
When land concentration is high, workers are less powerful in their relations with 
landowners. This is because high land concentration tends to produce high levels of 
landlessness, and a greater supply of agricultural workers. On the other hand, the 
demand for labor will be low because large farms generally employ labor saving 
technology (see Section 5.3), which means that labor intensity is lower on large farms. 
Thus, the supply of labor will be much higher than the demand for it, and because of the 
“unlimited supply of labor” at the given wage-rate, the workers will have little power to 
command higher real wages (Lewis 1954).6
4 Even though we are not primarily concerned with the food security of cash croppers (or subsistence 
producers that sell some of their produce on the market), it is worth mentioning that when they (the cash 
croppers) increase their labor productivity, they can produce more of the same crop than before and 
thereby sell a higher quantity of that crop on the market. Whether this translates into higher incomes 
depends on the price elasticity of their products. The price may decline if there is a general increase in 
labor productivity so that the total supply of their crop increases. It is therefore possible that cash 
croppers’ income will stand still (or drop) even if their labor productivity increases. (This is a point 
discussed in Prebisch 1959.) However, their entitlements to food may improve if average labor 
productivity in agriculture increases, because the price of food will most likely decline and they will be 
able to buy more food for the same income. 
5 Assuming that prices don’t fall (as a result of the increased crop quantity). 
6 I will go further into Lewis’ argument in Sub-Section 5.2.2 when I discuss the income of industrial 
workers, whose wages this theory originally dealt with. 
A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME
85
The high landlessness that is associated with high land concentration 
problematizes collective action by the landless agricultural workers. Although it is 
possible to detect some common interest among landless workers, the varying interests 
of those that are employed and the unemployed can easily overshadow this 
commonality. Thus, landowners can take advantage of this conflict and fire (or fail to 
rehire the following season) those who demand higher wages or go on strike. In short: 
when land concentration is low, there are fewer landless, more landowners, and the 
landless may enjoy more power.7
Since agricultural workers often have little power to command the redistribution 
of large landowners’ income or wealth, they could seek support from governments. 
However, owners of large farms typically have much more political power than the poor 
landless population, because governments (whether democratic or not) often rely on the 
economic and political support of the land-owning class.
In particular, large landowners can expect to yield more political influence in 
light of their ability to overcome collective action problems. Mancur Olson (1965) 
argues that small groups find it easier to organize than large groups because the costs of 
organization are low, and the benefits for each member of the organization are high. The 
costs of organizing a large group are high, because (for example) there will be many 
individuals that need information, and these individuals may not have (or perceive to 
have) the same interests. The benefits for each member of a large group will be 
relatively low, so that they will not be willing to pay the high costs of organization. In 
addition, it may be difficult to exclude free riders from these benefits. Following Mancur 
Olson, we can expect that the diffuse interests of the large group of landless agricultural 
workers will prove difficult to organize in an effective manner. In contrast, the 
landowning elite will find it easier to organize, and can thereby influence political 
outcomes more effectively. Landowners will also find it easier to organize because they 
are generally better educated than the landless, and will have more of both the economic 
and the “social” resources needed to partake in organizational work (Tilly 1978: 69). 
7 A more thorough discussion of the relative power of landowners and landless workers would require that 
I address theories of collective action, the power and politics of labor unions, Marxism, political support, 
as well as revolutions. These are all vast theoretical areas, beyond the scope of the current project.  
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In short, landowners are often capable of stopping, or minimizing, the harm 
inflicted upon them from wage claims by workers and/or governmental redistribution 
policies. This makes it improbable that much of the gains (if any) from higher labor 
productivity will fall into the hands of landless workers. This is why Thiesenhusen 
(1995: 23) argues that the free market fails to transfer the gains from agricultural growth 
down to the rural poor, and that some form of government intervention is needed. He 
suggests that land reform is one of the major ways to improve conditions for the rural 
poor.8 Several studies support this relationship between land concentration and poverty. 
El-Ghonemy (1990: 172-4), for example, studies the relationship between land 
concentration and the percent of the rural population in absolute poverty in 20 
developing countries (with data on land concentration for the years 1973 to 1986). He 
finds a strong positive relationship, where the coefficient of correlation is 0.83 and the 
R2 is 0.69. He also finds that the relationship is independent of the country’s average 
income per person. Tyler et al. (1993) studied the relationship between land 
concentration and (a head count ratio of) rural poverty. They found that—with an 
agricultural growth of three percent per annum—it will take more than sixty years for 
the trickle-down effect to alleviate poverty by fifty percent. They concluded that some 
form of redistribution is necessary in order to improve the situation of the rural poor, and 
they indicated that a decrease in the concentration of land would have a considerable 
effect.
However, the relationship is not that straightforward.  One reason is that the 
political power of the landed elite can influence distribution policies (such as land 
reform) so that they do not necessarily improve conditions for the rural poor. 
Thiesenhusen (1995) argues that “[i]n Latin America land reform became a policy by 
which only “rich” and articulate peasants benefited. …The standard of living of the 
unorganized masses may have been hurt each time a smattering of better off peers was 
advanced” (p. 176). Since governments sometimes have subtle motives (or simply are 
8 The other means that he considers effective in alleviating rural poverty are: 1) to channel more resources 
(in the form of inputs, credit, technology, education, and health services) to smallholders in order to 
increase their productivity; 2) to increase farm and non-farm employment opportunities for the rural poor; 
and 3) to subsidize the rural poor through food stamps, food rations, etc. 
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incompetent), land reform often ends up in “giving with one hand and taking with the 
other”. Governments often fail to provide the necessary inputs (such as credit, irrigation, 
seed, fertilizer and knowledge) that peasants need in order to reap the benefits of reform.
Governments are also faced with the dilemma of satisfying either the rural or the urban 
sectors, because the cost of satisfying both sectors concomitantly is too high. Thus, after 
the initial granting of land, governments often pursue policies that help the non-
beneficiary groups—policies that have adverse effect on the land recipients. In 
conclusion, Thiesenhusen argues that if lower land concentration (that results from 
reform) is to have a beneficial effect on poverty, agricultural extension programs for 
peasants are necessary, at least during a transition period. Without such programs, the 
peasants will not benefit from their improved access to land.9
In The Political Economy of Rural Poverty: The Case for Land Reform, El-
Ghonemy (1990) compares the performance of agriculture after partial land reform, 
where only some land is redistributed (in ten developing countries), with examples of 
complete land reform, where all agricultural land is subject to the reform (in four 
developing countries). He finds that countries with complete land reforms perform better 
with respect to annual average growth rates of agricultural labor productivity. He 
explains the difference in performance in terms of the dualistic agrarian structure that is 
created by partial reforms. Previous landlords that now operate in the non-reformed 
sector hold on to the best land, and have substantially more capital than the peasants in 
the reformed sector. Where these landlords are able to retain considerable power (more 
power than the reform-beneficiaries), they can continue to determine agricultural 
policies. In fact, many governments choose partial reform instead of complete reform in 
order to minimize the damage to the landlords, and thereby maintain their political 
support. These findings suggest that a bipolar agrarian structure (where a few farmers 
9 Closely related to the literature on land reform and tenancy reform is the subject of rural credit markets, 
and the interface between economic power and political influence, which again generates further 
economic power. Large landowners get most of the formal-sector credit, and at better terms than do 
peasants. The reason for this is not related to risk (large landowners default as often or more than the 
peasants), but that the large farmer uses his influence to get the bulk of the rural credit. Large farmers also 
face less bureaucracy and smaller transaction costs than the peasants (Basu 1994: 6-12). 
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have a lot of land and power, and the majority have very little of both) is unfavorable to 
labor productivity on the small farms.10
Thiesenhusen (1995) also finds that a bipolar agrarian structure (which results 
from partial reforms) is unfavorable for labor productivity on smallholdings. He argues 
that production increases after agrarian reforms are due to modernization in the non-
reform sector (and not in the reformed sector). He claims that the most enduring effect 
of land reform in Latin America is increased agricultural commercialization. Landlords 
were able to keep the best land and attract the bulk of the credits and other inputs that 
followed the reform. The beneficiaries received too little land and support, and were 
therefore not able to attain a high enough level of labor productivity. Thus, reform 
beneficiaries had to seek extra work on the larger farms, which could still benefit from a 
cheap supply of labor as the reform “beneficiaries” could not earn a living off their 
land.11
 In this sub-section I have discussed the relationship between land concentration 
and the income of the landless agricultural population. The main conclusion from this 
discussion is that even if we should find that labor productivity is higher on large farms, 
it is possible that higher land concentration will generate lower food security for the 
agricultural population, as the wages for landless agricultural workers are low. There are 
two main reasons for these low wages (in addition to the generally low level of labor 
productivity in developing country agriculture: 1) workers have little power in their 
relation to the landowners (their employers), and wage claims will not be met; and 2) 
10 However, El-Ghonemy’s analysis lacks comparison with countries that have not undergone land reform. 
In order to illuminate how land concentration, and partial versus complete reforms, affects agricultural 
performance and poverty alleviation, it is also necessary to compare against cases of no reform (and 
control for other relevant variables that may explain variation in these growth rates). This thesis aims to 
(empirically) study the relationship between land concentration and food insecurity and includes countries 
with high, medium, and low levels of land concentration. To some degree, this would illuminate the 
potential for land reform to improve food security, but it will not measure the actual effects. Actual effects 
will vary not only because they result in different levels of land concentration, but also because of 
disruptions with change of owners, and agricultural extension policies.    
11 If high labor productivity leads to high food availability, which again leads to lower food prices, it is 
uncertain whether agricultural laborers will improve their food security. Even though they produce more, 
the price of what they produce decreases, the revenues of the landowners may not increase, and the wages 
might remain the same (or even drop). In this case, the landless’ purchasing power over food will depend 
on how much food prices decrease in relation to the increase/decrease in their wages.
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workers often have less influence on government policies than the landowners. Where 
land concentration is high, the potential to decrease food insecurity for the landless by 
redistributing income or land may therefore be hampered by the economic and political 
power of the landowners. If land concentration were low there would probably be fewer 
landless, and the power and the wages of the landless might be better. 
5.2.2 Land Concentration and Income of Industrial Workers
The landless in agriculture can also compete with industrial workers for work in the 
industrial sector. The problem is that the industrial sector in developing countries is 
small, and does not absorb much labor. Thus, there are already many unemployed 
industrial workers. In order to increase the possibilities for industrial income, this sector 
needs to grow. Land concentration can influence industrial growth through three main 
channels: 1) the supply of agricultural surplus, 2) the power and autonomy of 
developmental states, and 3) the effective demand for industrial products. 12
As is the case with agricultural workers, there is no guarantee that industrial 
growth will bring higher wages to industrial workers. Power relations between capital 
and labor will also determine the distribution of income in the industrial sector. Thus, 
theories concerning the relative power of landlords versus landless workers can, to a 
large degree, also explain wage levels in industry. These links are the focus of the 
discussion in this section, where we will discuss how land concentration can influence 
overall economic growth and the distribution of income in industry.  
The agricultural surplus is the share of agricultural production that is not 
consumed in the agricultural sector, and that is made available (most often through the 
market) for the industrial sector. Theories on how the agricultural surplus influences 
industrial growth belong in the “Dual Economy Perspective” that was spurred by Arthur 
Lewis’ (1954) article “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor”, and 
developed further by, among others, Kalecki (1971), Kaldor (1967), Fei and Ranis (1964 
and 1966) and Bhaduri (2003). Skarstein (1997: 82-83) has, with reference to Kaldor 
12 There are, of course, other factors than land concentration that influence industrial growth, but these are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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(1967: 54-59), summarized the importance of the agricultural surplus for economic 
growth in the industrial sector in four points:
1) The agricultural surplus is the industrial workers’ source of food. Employment in 
the industrial sector cannot grow faster than the ability of agriculture to generate 
a food surplus (large enough to feed the industrial workers). If the industrial 
labor force grows too fast for agriculture to provide them with food, severe food 
shortages and/or rapid inflation will result.
2) The industrial sector is dependent on raw materials from agriculture. If 
agriculture (or, more correctly, the primary sector) cannot generate a surplus of 
raw materials, growth in industry will stagnate. 
3) In underdeveloped countries, where industrialization has not yet gained 
momentum, agricultural exports are the most important source of foreign 
exchange earnings. Infant industries are dependent on imports of capital goods, 
but are not competitive enough to sell much of their output on the world market. 
Growth in the industrial sector is therefore dependent on agriculture’s ability to 
produce a surplus that can be exported out of the country. 
4) Since the industrial sector depends on food, raw materials and capital from the 
agricultural sector, and imports of machinery (for example) from abroad, it needs 
to “export” some of its output to the agricultural sector (or to other countries, but 
this is difficult because of their low level of competitiveness). Thus, growth in 
the agricultural surplus is necessary in order to generate the effective demand 
needed to sustain industrial growth.
I might add that the importance of the agricultural surplus is reinforced by the fact that 
most developing countries operate under serious foreign currency constraints, and they 
cannot substitute domestic agricultural production with imports of food.  
Land concentration enters the picture because it affects the level of labor 
productivity, which again affects the agricultural surplus because it determines how 
much the workers in agriculture can produce. Subsistence producers with low labor 
productivity will have to consume most (or all) of what they produce, and very little (or 
nothing) is left over to sell on the market. Most of what agricultural wageworkers 
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produce reaches the market (see Section 5.3.3, below). However, labor productivity is 
also important on the large farms, as the more the workers produce, the more reaches the 
market. In addition, land concentration influences self-consumption in agriculture, 
which again influences the size of the agricultural surplus. Self-consumption refers to 
the share of the product that subsistence producers and agricultural workers consume.13
The higher this consumption, the less output will be available for industrialization. Self–
consumption in agriculture does not only influence industrial growth, it also influences 
food availability for the net buyers of food. Because of the importance of this 
relationship, we will discuss the dynamics of self-consumption in agriculture in Section 
5.2.3.
However, the level of land concentration can also influence industrial growth 
through the power relations between the land owning elite and the government. 
According to Adrian Leftwich (1995), the exceptional industrial growth in Taiwan and 
South Korea (and partly in China) can be explained by the existence of what he calls 
“the developmental state”. He defines the developmental state as: “States whose politics 
have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the center to shape, 
pursue and encourage the achievements of explicit developmental objectives, whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by 
organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of both” (Leftwich 1995: 401). An 
important precondition for this sort of state is a relatively weak landed (upper) class 
(relative to the state’s power). Where the landed class was initially strong, these states 
pursued land reforms in order to break their political hegemony. It was then possible to 
pursue policies that could spread the gains of economic growth to larger groups of 
people, and thus form the basis for dynamic domestic markets. Leftwich contrasts the 
experiences of these East Asian States with those in most Latin American countries 
(where the landed upper class enjoys much greater political power). He concludes that 
the East Asian developmental states possessed enough autonomy to attract foreign 
capital and simultaneously set conditions on capital in order to make it serve domestic 
developmental goals (Leftwich 1995: 417). 
13 In this discussion I will liken agricultural wageworkers with the industrial population, as both groups 
are net-buyers of food.  
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Redistribution of land is also seen as an impetus for industrial growth through 
raising effective demand. Developing countries typically have a small domestic market; 
because such a large portion of the inhabitants is poor, only a small elite participates in 
the money economy. Thus, the domestic market is too small to sustain a growing 
domestic industry. Rather than using exports to expand markets, land redistribution can 
expand the domestic market by improving the poor’s economic situation and raising 
effective demand for simple consumer goods (that can be produced domestically). As 
argued by Prosterman et al. (1990: 312): “Land reform can generate increased overall 
economic activity, including the creation of nonagricultural jobs. As a broad base of 
agricultural families benefiting from land reform receive higher incomes, they enter the 
market place for a range of locally produced goods and services.” This argument 
assumes that incomes among the poor will be higher, and more evenly distributed, after 
land reform. As discussed in the previous section, this is not necessarily the case.  
Along these same lines, Barraclough (1973: 30; 1991: 78) argues that insofar as 
land reforms serve to redistribute income from the rural rich to the rural poor, the 
demand from the agricultural sector for industrial products will most likely rise. 
Barraclough suggests that such an “internal market” strategy for industrial growth, 
which relies on increasing demand from the country’s poor, will give more immediate 
poverty alleviation than an export-led strategy. In the latter strategy the industrial 
sector’s need for food and raw materials are favored above increased consumption in the 
agricultural sector. Low land concentration can also help reduce poverty because the 
demand for farm labor is higher when land concentration is low. Large farms, which are 
generally relatively highly mechanized, have a much higher land/labor ratio than smaller 
farms, and are much more likely to have capital-intensive growth (Binswanger et al. 
1995).14
A common argument against the more equitable distribution of income that is 
sought through land reform is that the capital accumulation of the large landowners will 
disappear, consequently reducing investments in industry. This argument is based on the 
14 However, in order for the agricultural sector to sell its surplus, there must be an effective demand from 
the industrial sector. Thus, there is reciprocal dependency on effective demand in the two sectors of the 
economy.
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assumption that the rich invest most of their income in domestic production (and thereby 
contribute to economic growth). However, studies from developing countries with high 
land concentration have shown that large landowners spend most of their income on 
consumption of foreign goods and travels, while very little (about 15 percent) was 
invested. Of these investments, a considerable portion was in land, foreign stocks and 
bonds, or in the construction of luxury hotels and apartments (Barraclough 1973: 31). 
This far I have traced the relationship between land concentration and the 
aggregate income side of indirect entitlements to food in the industrial sector. Another 
important aspect of the incomes of the poor in the industrial sector is how the fruits of 
industrial growth are distributed. Lewis (1954) argues that the wage level in industry 
depends on income levels in agriculture, because peasants and agricultural workers will 
not seek employment in industry if the wages in industry are lower than what they can 
earn at home (Lewis 1954: 148-9).15 Thus, the income level in agriculture determines the 
minimum wage in industry. (Lewis argues that, for several reasons, the minimum wage 
will be 30-50 percent higher than the agricultural wage.) At this wage level, Lewis 
argues, the supply of labor will be unlimited, “which means that if capitalists offer 
additional employment, there will be far more candidates than they require: the supply 
curve of labor is infinitely elastic at the ruling wage” (Lewis 1972: 77).
 Lewis’ argument builds on the premise that there is (disguised) unemployment 
in agriculture. In the previous Sub-Section (5.2.1) I argued that high land concentration 
would probably produce low wages for (landless or land poor) agricultural workers, 
because high unemployment among landless agricultural workers made them 
replaceable and because collective action problems render them powerless in relation to 
the landowners and the government. The high landlessness associated with high land 
concentration also means that the supply of labor for the industrial sector will be high. 
Thus, the power of the industrial workers in their relations with capital owners, as well 
as with governments, will also be relatively weak when (agricultural) land concentration 
15 Lewis uses a distinction between traditional and capitalist sectors, not agricultural and industrial sector 
as I do here. These categories do not overlap completely, as the traditional sector also includes several un-
capitalistic urban activities such as domestic work, handicrafts, etc.
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is high. Hence, land concentration may influence both the minimum and the maximum 
wage levels in industry.
To summarize, I have used Section 5.1 to examine the relationship between land 
concentration and direct entitlements, and Sub-Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 to discuss how 
land concentration affects the income side of indirect entitlement to food for the landless 
agricultural population and the industrial workers, respectively. The motivation for this 
examination has been to find out whether smallholders are more food-secure than the 
landless. It has become evident that the answer to this question is not as simple as initial 
appearances might suggest.  
As far as direct entitlements are concerned, low land concentration gives (at least 
some of) the rural poor the possibility of producing the food they need. Their ability to 
do that will depend on how much land they have access to, and the productivity of that 
land (or, in other words, their labor productivity). Furthermore, tenancy relations 
determine how much of the output can be consumed by subsistence producers. Since 
most developing countries are densely populated, one can expect to find a tension 
between the landless (that want access to land), and the subsistence producers’ need for 
large enough holdings to ensure their food security.
The incomes of landless agricultural workers are probably lower when land 
concentration is high (than if land were distributed more equally). This is probably true 
because there are more landless people when a few people own most of the land, and the 
more landless there are, the less power they have to command higher wages (from 
landowners) or redistribution policies (from governments). Having said this, landless 
agricultural workers have a better chance of acquiring higher wages when their 
productivity is higher.
On the other hand, high land concentration can lead to higher labor absorption in 
the industrial sector. Industrial growth is dependent on an agricultural surplus for raw 
materials and food for the workers. High land concentration is beneficial for the 
agricultural surplus because more of the output reaches the market from large farms. If 
labor productivity is lower on small farms, the food surplus will be even lower in 
countries with low land concentration. Where land concentration is high, however, the 
landed elite can influence governments to hamper policies that could lead to industrial 
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growth (if the policies conflict with their interests). The industrial sector also depends on 
the agricultural sector as a market for their finished goods to finance the “imports” of 
raw materials and food from the agricultural sector. A policy encouraging low land 
concentration has the potential of expanding such a market. If this potential is to be 
realized, however, labor productivity on smallholdings must be high enough so that 
peasants can sell (at least) some of their output on the market (and get cash to buy the 
industrial goods). The relationship between land concentration and industrial growth is 
thereby somewhat contradictory: the supply of inputs for industries improves with high 
land concentration, while the demand for its products worsens (depending on how levels 
of labor productivity are affected by land concentration). Furthermore, as long as there is 
considerable unemployment in the agricultural sector, the supply of labor will be 
“unlimited”, and industrial wages will probably not increase even if the industrial 
economy grows. On the other hand, the previously unemployed will have increased their 
income. 
The degree to which income translates into entitlements to food depends on the 
entitlement mapping between income and food (or, in other words, the price of food). I 
have previously (in Section 2.5) argued that the price of food depends on the level of 
food availability per person. The price side of the entitlements to food is the focus of the 
following sub-section, where I discuss how land concentration influences food 
availability. 
5.2.3 Land Concentration and Food Availability 
Food availability refers to how much food is available per person in a country. The 
amount of food available for human consumption depends on the food supply, 
utilization, and the size of the population. On the supply side, food availability includes 
both domestic production and imports of food (including aid). The food supply is 
utilized for human consumption, exports, stocks, feed and seed (FAO 2002a). It is 
important to recall that developing countries have limited foreign exchange reserves, and 
that these reserves must cover the import needs of industry and consumers, in addition to 
the eventual imports of food. As food is something that can be produced with domestic 
resources and domestic technology, it is important for these countries to be as self-
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sufficient as possible. In this way, limited foreign exchange can be used to import the 
high-tech machinery needed for industrial growth, but that cannot be produced 
domestically.  
There are two main reasons that food availability influences food insecurity. The 
first is that there has to be enough food in a country to satisfy the nutritional 
requirements of the population. Among the poor, those who have access to land try to 
produce enough to meet their needs. The landless (whether working in the agricultural or 
the industrial sector of the economy) have to buy the food they need. Their food security 
depends on the price of food (in addition, of course, to their level of income, which we 
have already discussed). Thus, the second reason that food availability matters for food 
security is that, as discussed in Section 2.5, food prices are to a large degree dependent 
on the relationship between the supply of food, and its demand. If the demand for food is 
greater than the supply, food prices will tend to rise, because it takes a long time to 
expand food production (Kalecki 1971: 43-61). 
 We have already noted how land concentration affects the subsistence 
producers’ ability to produce enough food for themselves. For this reason, the following 
discussion of food availability is concerned with the amount of food that is available on 
the market, for net buyers of food. It is for these people that food security depends on the 
price of food.
Land concentration affects food availability (on the market) through (at least) 
two possible channels: the type of crop that is produced, and labor productivity. In 
addition, land concentration influences the distribution of food between net-producers 
and net-buyers of food, through its effect on self-consumption in agriculture (see Figure 
5.1.c). These issues constitute the focus of this section. 
Messer and DeRose (1998) argue that land distribution influences how much 
food is grown in a country, relative to cash crops such as coffee or sugar. Owners of 
large farms tend to grow cash crops instead of food crops because they can earn more 
money from selling this on the world market. Using examples from Guatemala and El 
Salvador, they show that subsistence farmers were pushed off the most productive land 
to allow for larger holdings, aimed at coffee production. What determines the choice of 
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crops on large farms is the relative price of cash (versus food) crops, and commercial 
farmers seek to maximize their profits, not food security for the poor.
It may not be obvious, but smallholders are critical for the supply of staple food in 
developing countries. Table 5.1 shows the share of the total production of rice, wheat, 
and maize produced by smallholders in selected developing countries. Here we see that 
smallholders produce a large share of the food in these countries. In Burundi, for 
example, smallholders produce 95 percent of rice, maize and other food crops, even 
though they control only 52.2 percent of the cropland. In Ethiopia, smallholders produce 
90 percent of all food crops, but hold only 28.4 percent of the cropland. In Ecuador,
Table 5.1: Share of Smallholder Farmers in Total Food Production in Selected 
Developing Countries, 1965-1988 (Percent) 
Country Rice Wheat Maize Other Food Crops Share of Cropland 
Bangladesh 70 30 .. .. 67.9 
Burundi 95 .. 95 95 52.2 
Central African Republic .. 80 80 90 .. 
Congo .. - 90 90 85.4 
Ecuador 25 27 53 40 7.5 
Ethiopia - 90 90 90 28.4 
Ghana 60 - 78 83 69.9 
Guinea 89-90  80-90 80-90 95.1 
Indonesia 75  75 90 72.0 
Madagascar 70 .. 60 90 62.4 
Nigeria 90 .. 90 90 70.9 
Sierra Leone 61 - .. 63 10.9 
Sri Lanka 45 - 45 .. 40.7 
Tanzania .. .. 80 80 .. 
Thailand 48 - 37 33 29.9 
Zaire 60 .. 48 60 49.9 
Zambia 63 6 32 72 72.0 a
Notes:
a indicates wetland; smallholders comprise all farmers operating less than three hectares of 
cropland; cropland is defined as “arable and permanent” cropland.  Data that were not available are 
marked “…”, while those that are not applicable are marked “-“.
Source: Jazairy et al. (1992: 15) 
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smallholders hold only 7.5 percent of the cropland, but grow 25 percent of all rice, 27 
percent of wheat, 53 percent of maize and 40 percent of other food crops.16
Part of the development debate argues that industrialized countries should open 
up domestic markets for food imports from developing countries. This, it is argued, will 
increase incomes among poor peasants in the South. This argument is problematic when 
we consider that most smallholder peasants are subsistence producers, and sell very little 
of their produce on the market. On the other hand, large farms (that are generally capital 
intensive and labor extensive) are the main producers for (international) markets. Thus, 
increasing exports would probably not raise the poor’s incomes. Furthermore, 
encouraging exports could entice large farms to produce crops for export, instead of 
food for the domestic market (thereby contributing to lower food availability and raise 
food prices in developing countries).
In addition, subsistence farmers produce more plants (grain, roots, etc.) than 
animal products because they cannot afford to lose food value in the food chain. Large 
farms are freer to choose land-extensive animal production when market conditions are 
right. In short, low land concentration is expected to bring higher food availability 
because small farms produce food (at low levels of the food chain) while large farms 
have a tendency to grow (non-food) cash crops and animal products, when market 
conditions are conducive for such products.17
While large farms produce more cash crops and animal products that are higher 
up in the food chain (than small farms), the overall supply in the market will also depend 
on the labor productivity of those that produce food. Obviously, some large farms will 
produce food. Equally obvious is the fact that some subsistence producers will produce 
16 According to El-Ghonemy (1990: 32), the 1970 World Agricultural Census shows that it was 
smallholders with less than one hectare that grew most of the food grain in developing countries (at that 
time). In particular, these smallholders grew 74 percent of all harvested wheat, 68 percent of the rice, and 
60 percent of the maize.  
17 Of course, much of the developing world’s foreign exchange is earned by exporting agricultural goods, 
because these countries have little, and often uncompetitive, industry. This is a dilemma, because if the 
agricultural sector produces export crops instead of staple food for the country’s poor, domestic food 
security may be compromised (at least) in the short run. In the long term, food security may improve (by 
way of “trickle-down” effects) if the industrial sector grows and people’s income (and import capacity) 
increases. However, it is problematic to postpone people’s food security for years or decades.    
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some excess for the market. Indeed, in most cases it is reasonable to expect that 
subsistence farmers will try to produce more food than they need, so that they can sell or 
trade. But, it is important to note that they will only (voluntarily) sell some of their 
output when they have first satisfied their own need for food. 
 Brenner (1997) argues that peasants in late medieval and early modern Europe 
had a “safety first” attitude which made them choose to diversify production for 
subsistence instead of specializing production and exploiting the gains from trade. To 
engage in the market meant that they had to compete with other producers. This 
competition leads to a never-ending search for (and application of) improved inputs and 
technology. Such competition makes them depend on the market for inputs and 
technology, as well as for the income they need to buy food. Since the price of both 
inputs and food can vary considerably, peasants that depended on the market ran a 
higher risk of income failure and starvation. This is not unlike the situation facing many 
smallholders in developing countries today. Thus, it is not unreasonable for them, out of 
“safety first” concerns, to diversify their production for subsistence, even if their labor 
productivity may be higher if they specialize production and engage in trade. 
Subsistence producers can market a surplus in good years, but in bad years they are 
“free” to consume all that they can produce.  
Table 5.2 provides data on the marketed share of smallholder farmers’ food 
production in (selected) developing countries. It shows that smallholders generally 
market only 10-20 percent of what they produce. To this rule there are exceptions. In 
Bangladesh, smallholder farmers market 80 percent of their maize production and 60 
percent of the wheat and other food crops (but only 20 percent of rice, which is the most 
important staple food in that country). In Pakistan, smallholders market 90 percent of 
food crops other than rice, wheat and maize (of which they only market 20 percent of 
each crop).  
While we do not have any data for the marketed share of the output on large 
farms, it is reasonable to believe that they market close to 100 percent of what they 
produce. The marketed share of domestically produced food will thus be lower in 
countries with an agrarian structure dominated by small farms, than in countries where 
land is concentrated into large holdings. 
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Table 5.2: The Marketed Share of Food Production among Smallholder Farmers 
in Selected Developing Countries (Percent of Output) 
Note: Marketed share includes cash sales and barter transactions (both through official and private 
channels). Data are of mixed quality and should be treated with caution (Jazairy et al. 1992: 468).  
Source: Jazairy et al. (1992: 412-13) 
An example from the Chinese (collectivization) land reform in the 1950s 
supports the argument that a lower share of the food output reaches the market when 
access to land is distributed more equally. From Table 5.3 we can see that grain 
production increased in China during the height of the collectivization process. 
Nevertheless, the surplus of grain available for the urban sector declined.18
Table 5.3: Surplus of Grain Available for Urban Areas in China, 1954/55-1956/57 
(Millions of tons) 
1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 
Total grain output 169.5 183.9 192.7 
Total collections and purchases 53.9 52.0 49.9 
Re-sales to rural areas 24.7 20.2 24.5 
Available for urban consumption, exports and government stockpiles 29.2 31.8 25.2 
Source: Eckstein (1966: 312)
Thus, we can expect that countries with many small farms will have a high share 
of subsistence production. Since lower land concentration most likely means smaller 
18 The urban sector does not necessarily coincide with the non-agricultural sector, because there may be 
some agricultural activity in urban areas and some industrial activity in rural areas. 
Country Rice Wheat Maize Other 
Food Crops 
Bangladesh 20 60 80 60 
Bolivia 30 10 10 50-80 
Ecuador 5-10 5-10 5-10 5-10 
Ethiopia - 18 18 18 
Indonesia 10 - 10 10 
Madagascar 10 - - 10 
Mexico 10-15 10-15 10-15 10-15 
Pakistan 20 20 20 90 
Peru - 30-35 30-35 30-35 
Sri Lanka 15-20 - 15-20 - 
Tanzania   25 25 
Zambia 100 - 30 10-15 
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farms and more subsistence production, self-consumption will probably be higher (and 
the marketed share of output lower) where land is equally distributed.
The peasant’s labor productivity also determines whether a high share of 
subsistence producers means low food availability (on the market). According to Lippit 
(1978: 58) and Barraclough (1991: 129), income elasticity for food is high where 
consumption is very low (and relatively low where consumption is high). Consequently, 
it is likely that smallholders/subsistence farmers who (in many cases) are living near 
subsistence levels will increase their consumption of agricultural products if their labor 
productivity increases. The elasticity of the food surplus with regard to growth in food 
production may therefore be negative in the early stages of development. The income 
elasticity of self-consumption in agriculture will most likely decline at higher levels of 
agricultural labor productivity (Skarstein 1997: 111-112). 
However, smallholders can only choose to consume all of their output in so far as 
they are owner-cultivators. Tenants must produce a surplus in order to pay the rent to 
their landlord. The marketed share of food production will therefore be higher where 
peasants are mostly tenants and not free-holders.  
In Conditions of Agricultural Growth, Boserup (1965) argues that farmers in 
“primitive” societies only increase land productivity in order to avoid a reduction in the 
level of food consumption. She argues that: “the effort devoted to food production >in
primitive societies@ is often seen to be limited to the bare minimum of hours in order to 
avoid starvation. This attitude may help explain why, in communities with a system of 
long fallow and with abundant land and little input of agricultural labor, the cultivated 
area is often barely sufficient to give a crop which can last until the following harvest” 
(Boserup 1965: 54). She explains this activity in terms of the high value these people put 
on leisure time (compared to increased consumption). The implication of this theory is 
that a food surplus will not be generated because cultivators will only produce enough to 
(barely) feed themselves and their families. Boserup further assumes that these 
“primitive” people will reduce their leisure time and work more “…only under the 
compulsion of increasing population or under the compulsion of a social hierarchy” 
(1965: 54).
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I do not mean to suggest that low labor productivity in developing country 
agriculture today is due to peasants prioritizing leisure over (hard) work. The point I 
want to make is that where land is distributed into many small owner-cultivated farms—
and peasants are not compelled to generate a surplus to pay rent on their land—the 
surplus of food available for the net-buyers of food will most likely be lower than if the 
small holders were tenants.
In neo-classical economics it is held that the agricultural surplus will grow if 
food prices are high (relative to prices on industrial goods), because this will provide 
farmers with incentives to decrease the share of their output that they retain for self-
consumption (and increase their total output). If food prices are low, farmers do not have 
an incentive to sell more of their output on the market, because they have to sell too 
much in order to afford too few industrial products.19 Bhaduri (2003: 5-6) has explained 
how, from a neo-classical perspective, the favorable terms of trade for agricultural 
products will influence the food surplus:
“Not only might a higher agricultural price provide stronger incentive to increase 
agricultural output in the manner taught usually by textbooks (although empirical 
evidence on this point is ambiguous in developing countries) but more 
interestingly, the availability of industrial goods as well as its relative price in 
terms of agricultural goods might also influence the amount that farmers decide 
to retain for self-consumption.”
There are several problems associated with this liberalization-strategy for 
increasing the food surplus. First of all, food insecurity among the poor net-buyers of 
food will increase when prices are allowed to rise. If this were only a short-term effect, 
and if the food surplus were soon to rise and lead to lower prices and better food security 
in the long run, the problem would not be so severe. But, there are several reasons to 
believe that the expected increase in the food surplus will fail to materialize. The first is, 
as argued by Bhaduri (2003: 8-9), a consequence of the (different) ways that prices are 
formed in agriculture and industry. In agriculture, prices are formed after supplies arrive 
19 It is further believed that governments should not intervene in the price determination (but only ensure 
the conditions for a free market), because this free market will ensure the “right” price for food. When the 
food surplus is too small, there will be food shortages, and prices will rise. Farmers will then invest in new 
technology, and/or more land in order to increase their (marketed) production. When the surplus is too 
large, there will be insufficient demand, prices will fall, and farmers will reduce their production to avoid 
losses.
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on the market, in response to demand, which means that they are largely demand-
determined. Industrial prices, on the other hand, tend to be cost-determined because they 
are set prior to sale, and variations in demand are usually dealt with through changes in 
inventory or the volume of production. As we have already discussed, it takes a long 
time before increases in demand for agricultural products (food) translates into increased 
production (Kalecki 1971). When we combine this observation with Kaldor’s (1978: 
207) argument that “the price of labor in terms of food cannot fall below a certain 
minimum determined by the cost of subsistence, whether that cost is determined by 
custom or convention or by sheer biological needs”, we begin to understand why the 
favorable terms of trade (in the eyes of the agricultural sector) is short lived. This chain 
of reasoning is simple and strong: 1) higher prices of food will be met by higher wage 
claims; 2) higher wages will be met by higher prices on industrial goods; and 3) the 
price of food will no longer be high in relation to industrial goods. Thus, only food price 
inflation (and subsequently general inflation) is produced (Bhaduri 2003).20
This section has looked into three main links between land concentration and 
levels of food availability: type of crops, labor productivity and self-consumption. Large 
farms probably produce more cash crops (in relation to food crops) and animal products 
than small farms. By means of this mechanism, high land concentration will lead to 
lower food availability. On the other hand, nearly everything that is produced on these 
farms reaches the market, while small farms market less, if anything at all (depending on 
their labor productivity). This link counteracts the (possible) negative effect of high land 
concentration for food availability from more cash crops and animal products on large 
farms. Thus, there is no clear-cut relationship between land concentration and food 
availability. Finally, it is still unclear whether large and small farms differ with respect 
to levels of labor productivity. This is the focus of the next section.
20 However, for subsistence producers that produce a surplus for the market, higher food prices may 
translate into higher incomes. As these peasants do not depend on the market for their access to food, 
higher food prices may give them the possibility to invest in inputs to improve their labor productivity, 
and thereby their food security. 
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5.3 Land Concentration and Labor Productivity in Agriculture 
Throughout this chapter it has become clear that agricultural labor productivity is an 
important factor for explaining food insecurity in developing countries. The purpose of 
this section is to explain how land concentration influences labor productivity in 
agriculture. 
We can briefly recall from the previous two sections that labor productivity in 
agriculture influences food insecurity in the following manner:  
1)  High agricultural labor productivity is important for direct entitlements to 
food for subsistence producers because it determines whether or not peasants 
can produce enough food to keep themselves (and their families) food-secure. 
2) High agricultural labor productivity influences indirect entitlements to food 
through the income of landless agricultural workers, to the degree that their 
wages increase when they can produce more. 
3) High agricultural productivity influences indirect entitlements to food 
through the income for the (landless) industrial workers because growth in 
the agricultural surplus is beneficial for industrial growth.  This relationship 
lies in the fact that the agricultural surplus provides food and raw materials 
for industrial input, as well as effective demand for industrial products; and 
the level of the food surplus is influenced by agricultural labor productivity. 
Industrial workers benefit to the degree that their wages increase when the 
(industrial) economy grows. 
4) Insofar as high agricultural labor productivity stimulates industrial growth, it 
may also increase labor absorption in industry, and decrease the number of 
landless agricultural workers. Landless laborers in agriculture become more 
powerful in their relation to landowners, raising wages.  
5) High agricultural labor productivity influences the level of food availability 
(per capita) in the country, and consequently the price of food for the net-
buyers of food. 
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In this way, labor productivity in agriculture influences food security via both 
entitlement relations and food availability relations, and represents a bridging force 
between entitlements to food and food availability.  
 In the following section I discuss the relationship between land concentration and 
labor productivity in agriculture. This discussion has two parts. In the first part (Sub-
Section 5.3.1), I explain why I approach the discussion of agricultural labor productivity 
through the channels of land productivity and the amount of arable land per worker (or, 
in other words the land/labor ratio). In Sub-Section 5.3.2, I discuss how land 
concentration affects agricultural labor productivity through these channels. 
5.3.1 Land Productivity, the Land/Labor Ratio, and Labor Productivity in 
Agriculture
In this section I explain the relationship between land productivity, the land/labor ratio, 
and labor productivity in agriculture. It is important to recognize this relationship 
because we will subsequently (in Sub-Section 5.3.2) discuss how land concentration 
affects agricultural labor productivity, via the channels of land productivity and the 
land/labor ratio.
Timmer (1988: 304) elegantly describes the relationship between the land/labor 
ratio, land productivity and labor productivity in agriculture: 
“Productivity in agriculture is traditionally measured in one of two ways: in 
output per hectare, or output per agricultural worker. Despite the focus by 
agricultural scientists on the former measure, from a welfare perspective the 
latter measure is clearly the relevant one. Output per hectare is important only as 
a vehicle for raising output per worker. In land scarce environments facing rapid 
population growth and limited absorption of labor by industry, of course, raising 
output per hectare may be the only way to raise labor productivity.”
In extending this discussion, Timmer (ibid: 303-304) distinguishes between technology 
that raises land productivity, and technology that increases the land/labor ratio. The first 
type of technology consists of biological and chemical innovations such as (chemical) 
fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid seeds. The second type is composed of mechanical 
innovations, such as tractors and other machinery, that make agricultural work easier 
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and reduces the need for labor (per unit of output and per unit of cultivated land). This 
machinery can also increase land productivity, but is mostly designed to save labor.  
 The relationship between agricultural labor productivity, land productivity and 
the land/labor ratio can be expressed by the following identity: 
Y/L Ł (Y/A) • (A/L),                                                    (5.1) 
where Y represents value added in agriculture, L represents the labor force, and A 
represents the amount of cultivated land. Thus, Y/L symbolizes agricultural labor 
productivity, Y/A captures land productivity, and A/L represents the land/labor ratio. 
From this identity we can see that an increase in labor productivity can result from 
higher land productivity (Y/A) and/or a higher land/labor ratio (A/L) (Hayami and 
Ruttan 1985: 119). 
Since the product of two numbers on a natural scale is the same as the sum of 
two numbers on a logarithmic scale, the identity can also be expressed as: 
log (Y/L) Ł log (Y/A) + log (A/L).                                     (5.2) 
This identity is the basis for Figure 5.2, which visualizes how different combinations of 
labor-saving and/or land-saving developments in agriculture affect land and labor 
productivity, respectively. 
The 45q line in the figure reflects a constant land/labor ratio. The short arrow at 
the center of the figure illustrates a fictitious country’s path to higher labor productivity. 
For this country, higher agricultural labor productivity is achieved partly through raised 
land productivity, and partly through an increase in the land/labor ratio. We can see from 
the figure that  
¨ log (Y/L) Ł ¨ log (Y/A) + ¨ log (A/L),                              (5.3) 
where the relative contribution of the increase in the land/labor ratio is shown as ¨ log 
(A/L), the relative contribution of the rise in land productivity as ¨ log (Y/A), and the 
total increase in agricultural labor productivity is shown as ¨ log (Y/L).
Only movements to the right—that mirror higher output per agricultural 
worker—can possibly help to improve worker welfare (depending on the distribution of 
the output between labor and landowners). Movements along the 45q line mean that the 
land/labor ratio remains constant and that increased labor productivity results from 
increases in land productivity alone. A straight movement to the right implies no change  
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living standards 
Figure 5.2: Classification of Changes in Agricultural Productivity 
Y/L
Note: The vertical axis is crop yields per hectare, and the horizontal axis is agricultural output 
per worker (both on an logarithmic scale), the agricultural workforce is measured as the entire 
economically active population in agriculture. 
Source: This is a modified version of a figure adapted from Timmer (1988: 305) 
Reduced A/L
Increased A/L 
¨ logY/L
¨ logY/A 
¨ logA/L 
45°
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in land productivity, a decline in the agricultural workforce per hectare, and a 
simultaneous increase in the use of labor saving technology to keep the production levels 
up with fewer workers. This is only probable in situations where idle land can be 
colonized. It further requires that new land can be brought under cultivation faster than 
the population grows. It is an unlikely path in today’s developing countries, where 
reserves of land are small (with the exception of some countries in Latin America) and 
the population is growing rapidly. Today’s developing countries are more likely to 
experience movements in three different directions. First, movements might go straight 
up (increased land productivity but not labor productivity). This option is sometimes 
referred to as “running fast technologically to stand still economically”. The second 
option is upward to the left. Here the increase in land productivity is eaten up by an 
increase in the labor force, with reduced labor productivity as the result. In the third and 
worst case, the movement can be downward and to the left. This means that both land 
productivity and the land/labor ratio decreases, leading to a decrease in labor 
productivity. This path can arise in situations of rapid population growth and 
deteriorating soil quality, due to, for instance, over-intensive production (Timmer 1988: 
304-306).
  Timmer (1988: 310) uses data from Hayami and Ruttan (1985) to show that 
economies of scale explain about 25 percent of the lower labor productivity in India, the 
Philippines, and Peru (in 1960 and 1980) compared to the United States. The remaining 
three fourths of the labor productivity difference is (equally) accounted for by different 
endowments of: 1) internal resources, such as land and livestock; 2) technical inputs, 
such as fertilizers and machinery; and 3) human capital, such as general and technical 
education. Timmer concludes that developing countries have the potential to increase 
their labor productivity in agriculture through increased land productivity—in spite of a 
declining land/labor ratio (1988: 310). Hayami and Ruttan conclude (from the same 
data) that: “it is especially encouraging to find that the agricultural production function 
in LDCs are neutral with respect to scale” (Hayami and Ruttan 1985: 157). Thus, their 
conclusion is that farms do not have to be large in order to achieve high levels of labor 
productivity. If the small farms could get access to the same “internal resources, 
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technical inputs and human capital” that is available to the large farms, labor 
productivity levels would be almost as high as on large farms.  
In my opinion, there are two problems with Hayami and Ruttan’s conclusion. 
First, I would not have argued that “the agricultural production function is neutral with 
respect to scale”, when it (according to their analysis) account for as much as 25 percent 
of the difference in labor productivity between the three developing countries and the 
Unites States. Second, it is not as simple as it sounds for small farms in developing 
countries to raise their labor productivity by obtaining access to the same “internal 
resources, technical inputs and human capital” as they have on the large farms in the 
United States (or in their own country). After all, the problem is often that small farms in 
developing countries do not have access to these inputs. This raises the crucial question 
of whether it is possible for smallholders in the developing countries to improve their 
labor productivity. This is the focus of the next sub-section. 
5.3.2 Land Concentration and Agricultural Labor Productivity 
Neo-classical economics has dominated much of the thinking about agricultural 
development policies for several decades. Within this approach it is believed that price 
incentives are the best means for increasing productivity in agriculture. There are, 
however, alternative approaches to explaining agricultural labor productivity. This 
section will trace some grounds for pessimism about the effect of liberalization on 
agricultural labor productivity. For example, in his empirical study of 20 Indian districts, 
Schäfer (1997) finds that aggregate agricultural production is largely unresponsive to 
prices, and that growth in agricultural production is highly dependent on infrastructure 
(such as length of roads, degree of irrigation and number of markets). Schäfer also 
reviews a number of other studies on the price responsiveness of the aggregate 
agricultural supply. He concludes that: “The results, so far, do not lead to elasticity 
optimism” (1997: 102). 
Binswanger (1995) argues that even though the price elasticity of supply of 
individual crops (or small groups of crops) is high, the price elasticity of the total 
agricultural production is very low in the short run because the factors of production—
land, capital and labor—are fixed (in the short run). A farmer can shift resources from 
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one crop to another without raising the total output. Thus, growth in one crop takes 
resources away from other crops, but growth in aggregate production fails to appear. In 
the long run, agricultural production is responsive to prices, but the process will take 
from ten to twenty years, and only if more resources are devoted to agriculture. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the roots of low labor productivity are found in 
agricultural price distortions. It is more probable that the roots lie in institutions within 
the agricultural sector, and how these affect power relations between smallholders, 
owners of large estates, the landless and the government.  
Land concentration is at the center of these issues, as it materializes in the size 
and distribution of farms, which coincides with the distribution of economic and 
political power, and unequal possibilities to attain the resources necessary to increase 
productivity.21
In the remaining part of this section I will discuss how land concentration affects 
land productivity and the land/labor ratio—and thereby agricultural labor productivity. 
In this discussion I will use the identity Y/L { (Y/A) • (A/L) (Identity 5.1, as explained 
above), as a guiding principle. 
I will first discuss theories about how land concentration affects land 
productivity, where there appears to be little consensus. Theories about the relationship 
between land concentration and the land/labor ratio are more uniform, arguing that small 
farms have lower land-labor ratios than large farms. The relationship between land 
concentration and the land/labor ratio will enter into the discussion as we begin to see 
that much of the variation in land productivity is due to variations in labor intensity. 
Last, but not least, I will discuss how the interaction between land productivity and the 
land/labor ratio affects labor productivity on large versus small farms.  
 There is disagreement about whether land productivity is higher on large or 
small farms. On the one hand, it is possible to find arguments that large farms have 
21 This does not always have to be true, as the size of farms depends on how much land is available per 
person, and how it is distributed. However, for the sake of analytical parsimony I will assume that high 
land concentration is associated with large farms, and low land concentration with small farms. 
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higher land productivity than small farms. These arguments explain the higher land 
productivity of large farms in terms of:22
a) better educated managers; 
b) a division of labor and specialization, and also that;  
c) larger farms can generate more revenues, have better access to credit, and can 
therefore invest in more inputs such as irrigation, and fertilizers.
On the other hand, there is “The Inverse Relationship Theory”, which argues that land 
productivity is higher on small farms. This perspective can be traced back to Adam 
Smith’s (1776) legendary The Wealth of Nations. By comparing the conditions of large 
estates with smallholdings in their neighborhood, Smith argued that small farms enjoyed 
higher land productivity because they were more adaptive to new technology (Smith, 
cited in El-Ghonemy 1990: 133). He claimed that “great proprietors were seldom great 
improvers, because their style of life (dresses, staff, house, etc.) constituted a state of 
mind and habit that led to the neglect of their vast estates” (ibid.: 137).
 Since Adam Smith, much has been written on the subject. There is a whole range 
of studies that support an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity. 
Among these studies different causal explanations may be found. The most common of 
these are that:23
a) a larger part of the holdings are in productive use on small farms than on large 
farms;  
b) small farms plant more crops per year than large farms; 
c) small farms plant higher value crops, while large farms are often engaged in 
land extensive production (such as livestock); 
d) large landowners often invest in land for other reasons than to use it as a 
productive resource (such as for social prestige and political power, or as a 
“portfolio” investment in periods with high inflation);
22 See for example Ellis (1988: 194-195); El-Ghonemy (1990: 123), and Patnaik (1972). 
23 Bharadwaj (1974: 11-31); Ellis (1988: 198-199); El-Ghonemy (1990: 128-132); Tyler et al. (1993); 
Thiesenhusen (1995: 10); and Boserup (1965). 
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e) small farms are often family run, so they enjoy more flexibility with regard to 
seasonal employment; and 
f) labor intensity is higher on small farms. 
This last point, about higher labor intensity on smaller farms, brings us to the 
heart of the relationship between land and labor productivity, namely the land/labor 
ratio. Boserup (1965) argues that population growth (and thereby a decrease in the land-
labor ratio), is the most important explanatory factor for growth in land productivity. 
When the population increases, agricultural land will have to be used more intensively in 
order to increase land productivity sufficiently to feed the additional people.24 More 
intensive use of the land means shorter fallow periods and a higher input of labor. Multi-
cropping requires more man-hours per hectare because there is less seasonal 
unemployment and the land has to be ploughed and fertilized (and sometimes irrigated) 
in order to bear crops more often. She writes:
“As long as the population of a given area is very sparse, food can be produced 
with little input of labor per unit of output and virtually no capital investment, 
since a very long fallow period helps to preserve soil fertility. As the density of 
the population in the area increases, the fertility of the soil can no longer be 
preserved by means of long fallow and it becomes necessary to introduce other 
systems which require a much larger agricultural labor force. By the gradual 
change from systems where each cultivated plot is matched by twenty similar 
plots under fallow to systems where no fallow is necessary, the population within 
a given area can double several times without having to face starvation or lack of 
employment opportunities in agriculture…[T]he complex changes which are 
taking place when primitive communities change over to a system of shorter 
fallow are more likely to raise labor costs per unit of output than to reduce them” 
(Boserup 1965: 117).
From this we can conclude that Boserup means that a decrease in the land-labor 
ratio will probably lead to an increase in land productivity, but decrease (or stabilize) 
labor productivity. This implies that small farms may have higher land productivity 
24 She assumes all land as cultivated, while some of the cultivated land is only used once in a generation 
(or more) while other land is used every year, or even several times a year (land is replanted right after the 
previous crop is harvested). A reduction in fallow periods is thus interpreted as an intensification of land 
use. Along with the reduction of fallow time comes technological change, because different tools are 
needed to cultivate land with short or no fallow systems (than land that is under long fallow systems). 
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levels than larger farms, because they employ labor more intensely. However, labor 
productivity levels will probably not be higher, because of the lower land/labor ratio 
(resulting from high input of labor).  
On the other hand, Dyer’s (1991, 1997 and 1998) studies of land productivity on 
Egyptian farms conclude that while there might have been an inverse relationship 
between farm size and land productivity before the Green Revolution, this relationship 
has broken down. Today’s large farms can generate the capital needed to keep up with 
technological developments. Since smallholders often do not have enough land (or 
inputs) to make a “decent” living, the inverse relationship is a result of desperate 
families fighting for survival on too small pieces of land. By trying to scratch a living 
from inadequate holdings of land, family farms use the land much more intensively than 
their larger counterparts. Over time, such intensive farming will degrade the quality of 
the soil and give rise to even greater hardships. According to Dyer, “the inverse 
relationship is not a product of superior efficiency on the part of small farms nor is it due 
to better quality land on the small farms” (1997: 146) but “...arises from the desperate 
struggle of poor peasants for survival on below subsistence plots of land...>and
the@...redistribution of land on the basis of the inverse relation argument therefore, far 
from alleviating poverty and creating employment opportunities, will only deepen and 
perpetuate extreme levels of exploitation and poverty” (1998: 146 and 1991: 87). 
Havnevik and Skarstein (1997) have also found evidence that small farms in 
Tanzania use their land more intensively than large farms. They reveal that while farms 
with more than 4 hectares plant less than 50 percent of their agricultural area (which 
means that they leave the other 50 percent fallow), and the farms of 0.5 to 2 hectares 
plant 75 percent, the farms of 0.5 hectares or less plant as much as 90 percent of their 
holdings. They argue that the higher intensity of land-use on the small farms is due to a 
struggle for survival in the same fashion as Dyer argues above:  
“It seems to us that the smallest holdings of less than 2 ha in Tanzania have been 
caught in a combined productivity and sustainability trap. They have too little 
resources to practice intensive agriculture with the necessary soil preserving 
practices, at the same time as they have too little land to maintain long enough 
fallow periods from a sustainability point of view. If this dilemma is not 
overcome, then overall productivity of Tanzanian agriculture will continue to 
decline” (Havnevik and Skarstein 1997: 200). 
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Dyer, as well as Havnevik and Skarstein, takes Boserup’s argument one step 
further. From Boserup’s thesis (that lower land-labor ratio spurs higher land 
productivity, primarily by way of more labor intensity), they argue that this labor 
intensification is unsustainable and will lead to low land productivity in the long run, 
because the quality of the soil is degraded. This extra step is what separates Boserup’s 
theory from the neo-Malthusian theory of population (where, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
population growth leads to over intensive land-use, reduced land productivity, and 
thereby reduced human carrying capacity). Boserup is aware of this link between 
intensive land-use and higher land productivity in the short run, to over-intensive land-
use and lower land productivity in the longer run. Nevertheless, she argues that neo-
Malthusians “neglect the evidence we have of growing populations which managed to 
change their methods of production in such a way as to preserve and improve the 
fertility of their land” (1965: 22). According to Havnevik and Skarstein, the problem is 
that the poorest peasants cannot take advantage of improved technology because they 
are too poor to afford it. Their land is simply too small for them to produce a surplus that 
can be used to acquire costly inputs. Thus the productivity of their land will fall as it is 
deprived of the nourishment it needs to sustain it.  
 Bhaduri (1997: 122) also argues that labor productivity is lower on small, family 
operated, farms because the labor intensity is higher than on large farms. He explains the 
higher labor intensity on small farms in terms of standard economic analysis: since there 
is a relative scarcity of land compared to family labor, the opportunity cost of family 
labor is zero. Therefore, family farms will use labor more and more intensively until the 
marginal product of labor becomes practically zero. On larger farms, in contrast, 
additional labor would only be put into production as long as the marginal product of 
labor is not lower than the given real wage-rate. Consequently, smaller farms have 
higher yields (per unit of land) and lower labor productivity. 
 To sum up, there seems to be a consensus that smaller farms have a lower 
land/labor ratio than large farms. In contrast, the relationship between land concentration 
and land productivity is unclear: there are studies that support “the inverse relationship 
theory” between farm size and land productivity, and there are studies that denounce it. 
However, the work of Dyer (1991, 1997 and 1998) and Havnevik and Skarstein (1997) 
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lead us to expect that small farms may enjoy higher land productivity in the short run, 
but that the low (and decreasing) land/labor ratio on these farms will lead to a fall in land 
productivity over the long run. This long-term drop in land productivity results from 
over-intensive cultivation of the land in order to maintain labor productivity when more 
and more people need to survive on the same small area of farmland. Since they do not 
have the resources to invest in preserving the land’s fertility, it will eventually become 
exhausted and land productivity will drop.
Thus, the relationship between farms size and land productivity is critical. If 
small farms, in combination with their lower land-labor ratio, also suffer from lower 
land productivity, an agrarian structure with many small farms (low land concentration) 
will be unfavorable for labor productivity in agriculture, and thereby for food security. 
However, if small farms have higher land productivity, there is a chance that also labor 
productivity could be higher on small farms.  
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have provided a conceptual scheme for the relationship between land 
concentration and food insecurity. I have discussed the dynamics through which land 
concentration affects the direct entitlements of subsistence producers, and the indirect 
entitlements of landless, agricultural and industrial workers. For the latter groups, who 
are net-buyers of food, I have elucidated how land concentration affects both the income 
and the food price side of the food security equation. Finally, I discussed the relationship 
between land concentration and labor productivity in agriculture. Because of the 
complexity of these relationships, I began with a schematic depiction (in Figures 5.1a to 
5.1c), and followed with a detailed examination of the various causal linkages. 
When land concentration is high, fewer people are subsistence producers. For the 
peasants that do have access to land, the holdings will be small (and the land/labor ratio 
will be low on these farms), and tenancy terms will probably be harsher (for those that 
rent land). It also appears that high land concentration hurts landless agricultural 
workers. Labor absorption rates are relatively low on large farms, so many landless 
workers will be underemployed. In addition, these workers have little power to 
command decent wages. For these reasons, incomes among the landless agricultural 
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workers are expected to be low when land concentration is high. Thus, for the 
agricultural population as a whole, it is most probable that high land concentration leads 
to high food insecurity. 
However, high land concentration can be beneficial for the food security of 
workers in the industrial sector, because the agricultural surplus will probably be high. 
High agricultural surplus benefits industrial growth, as it can increase labor absorption 
levels and thereby the incomes of the poor. Higher labor absorption in industry can 
reduce unemployment among the landless agricultural workers, and possibly increase 
the power of the agricultural workers in their relations with landowners. This may 
eventually improve the incomes of both groups. 
It is important to recall that the incomes of agricultural and industrial workers 
must be seen in relation to food prices. It is this relationship that determines food 
insecurity. Land concentration influences food prices through food availability. When 
land concentration is high, and the average size of farms is large, cash crops will 
probably constitute a higher share of the total agricultural production. On the other hand, 
self-consumption is lower on large farms. The effect of agricultural labor productivity 
further complicates the picture, as it is unclear if large farms have higher (or lower) 
labor productivity. It is probable, however, that labor productivity is higher on large 
farms, and thus higher where land concentration is high. If food availability is higher 
when land concentration is high, it will mitigate the negative effects from low incomes 
on the food insecurity of landless agricultural workers. It will further strengthen the 
constructive effect on food insecurity from high incomes among the industrial workers. 
The conceptual scheme in this chapter has uncovered that the relationship 
between land concentration and food insecurity is complex and contradictory. However, 
there is one simplifying cleavage that springs out of this discussion. If we look at 
subsistence producers and agricultural workers (the two main groups that depend 
directly on agriculture for a living), we see that land concentration affects these two 
groups in the same general way: high land concentration (probably) leads to high food 
insecurity in both groups. On the other hand, land concentration affects the food 
insecurity of industrial workers in the opposite direction: high land concentration will 
likely produce low food insecurity in this group. The discussion of the conceptual 
A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME
117
scheme might be summarized thus: high land concentration affects the agricultural 
population differently from the non-agricultural population.
Consequently, there are two reasons why we may get low food insecurity in the 
total population when high land concentration is combined with a low share of 
agricultural population.25 First, the agricultural population, which suffers high food 
insecurity when land concentration is high, constitutes a small share of the total 
population. Second, the non-agricultural population, that enjoys low food insecurity 
when land concentration is high, constitutes a large share of the total population. On the 
other hand, we may get high food insecurity in the total population when high land 
concentration is combined with a large share of agricultural population. 
In Chapter 7 I will test how land concentration affects food insecurity via the 
channels described in this conceptual scheme. However, the unavailability of data makes 
it unfeasible to test all the causal links that we have discussed. Therefore, the model I 
test will be a simplified version of the conceptual scheme. Before we can employ this 
statistical test, I need to build a viable model that preserves as much of the complexity as 
possible. This transition from conceptual scheme to testable model builds on the 
simplifying cleavage that land concentration affects the agricultural population and the 
non-agricultural population differently. Constructing this model is one of the objectives 
of Chapter 6.
25 Henceforth I will use “the share of agricultural population (in total population)”, “the share of the 
population that depends on agriculture for a living”, and the “the share of the agricultural population” 
interchangeably. 

6Setting up the Test
In the previous chapter I discussed how land concentration affects food insecurity for 
subsistence producers and landless workers in agriculture and industry. The outline 
of this discussion was the conceptual scheme presented in Figures 5.1.a and 5.1.b and 
5.1.c. In order to move from explaining the theoretical relationship to investigating 
the empirical relationship, we need to press the conceptual scheme into a model, 
which can be tested on a sample of developing countries.  
 This model needs to be sensitive to the fact that data are not available for 
several of the variables considered in the conceptual scheme. The challenge of this 
chapter is to preserve as much as possible of the conceptual scheme’s explanatory 
richness, while developing a testable model that captures the complexity of the 
relationship between land concentration and food insecurity.   
This chapter has three sections and a summary. In Section 6.1, I present a 
testable model based on the previous chapter’s conceptual scheme. This model 
includes both direct and indirect relationships with food insecurity. In Section 6.2 I 
discuss the indicators used to test this model. In Section 6.3, I begin the empirical 
test with simple bivariate correlations between food insecurity and the variables in 
the model, and Section 6.4 summarizes. (I perform a multivariate regression analysis 
of the model in Chapter 7.) 
6.1 From Conceptual Scheme to Testable Model 
Modeling always expresses a tension between parsimony and explanatory richness. 
In the previous chapter I chiseled out a conceptual scheme for explaining the various 
direct and indirect ways that land concentration affects food insecurity in developing 
countries. As such, the conceptual scheme has a value in itself: it fills a gap in the 
existing and separate literatures of food insecurity and land concentration. Part of the 
purpose of this thesis is to show that the relationship between land concentration and 
food insecurity is more complex and contradictory than is commonly perceived. For 
this reason, I have used the conceptual scheme to prioritize explanatory richness over 
parsimony. In a world of unlimited access to ideal data, I would test all of the 
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relationships in the conceptual scheme. Unfortunately, I do not have data to test all of 
these relationships.1 Consequently, a complex model that is directly derived from the 
conceptual scheme cannot be tested. As a result, I will have to simplify the model in 
order to test it.   
The first, and perhaps the most restrictive problem, is that we lack data on 
food security among the three different groups of people in the conceptual scheme: 
subsistence producers, landless agricultural workers, and landless industrial workers. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the best available data on food insecurity measure the 
prevalence of stunting in children under five. These data are not specified across 
producer groups (e.g., subsistence producers, landless agricultural workers, and 
landless industrial workers). They only appear as percentages of children under five 
in the total population. This makes it impossible to study the direct entitlements of 
subsistence producers separately from the landless agricultural and industrial 
workers.2 For this reason I must test the empirical relationship between land 
concentration and food security in the total population. 
Although the problem of inadequate data forces me to employ a model that is 
less complex than originally conceived, there are certain possibilities embedded in 
the available data that compensate for some of these limitations. When we measure 
the effect of land concentration in relation to food insecurity in the total population, 
we lose sight of the effects on different groups. Thus, the total population’s level of 
food insecurity will lie somewhere in between the food insecurity level of 
subsistence producers, agricultural workers, and industrial workers, according to the 
relative size of the different groups.  
One lesson from Chapter 5 will be central to the explanatory power of the 
new model. As described in the summary of that chapter, the conceptual scheme 
1
 Since data on land concentration is only available for 41 developing countries, any test of a complete 
model would quickly run into degrees-of-freedom problems. 
2 Some countries have data on stunting that are split into urban and rural populations. Although these 
groups do not overlap completely with subsistence producers, agricultural workers and industrial 
workers, we could classify the two first groups together as rural population, and the third group could 
represent the urban population (even through the industrial and urban populations are not completely 
similar, as there is industry in rural areas, and some agriculture in urban areas). However, only fifteen 
countries have separate data on stunting in rural and urban populations. Fifteen countries are too few 
from which to generalize about the effects of land concentration on food security in developing 
countries.  
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indicates that land concentration will have different effects in the population that 
depends on agriculture for a living, compared to the population that doesn’t depend 
on agriculture for a living. From the conceptual scheme we learned that high land 
concentration probably leads to higher food insecurity among the agricultural 
population, compared to the non-agricultural population. Food insecurity will be 
relatively high among the agricultural population because fewer people have access 
to land, and both labor absorption and wages are lower when land is concentrated in 
a few, large farms. For the food insecurity of industrial workers, on the other hand, 
high land concentration can be beneficial. The reason for this is that high land 
concentration probably produces a high agricultural surplus that, in turn, can spur 
industrial growth. Thus, labor absorption (and possibly wages) will increase.  
This interaction between land concentration and the share of agricultural 
population tells us that when high land concentration is combined with a large 
agricultural population (relative to the non-agricultural population), a large share of 
the total population will have low incomes. (Most people in the country rely on 
agricultural production for incomes, but income opportunities are low.) This 
contributes to high food insecurity in the total population. However, the combined 
effect on food insecurity of these two variables depends on a third factor: namely, 
food prices. In the case above, where most people rely on agriculture for a living, and 
where land concentration is high, most people in the country will be net-buyers of 
food. The food insecurity of these people also depends on the price of food: if prices 
are high, their food insecurity will be high; if prices are low, they will be less food-
insecure. Thus, the level of food insecurity in the total population depends on the 
interaction between land concentration and: 1) the share of agricultural population; 
and 2) food availability. In Figure 6.1 we can see how the effect of each one of these 
variables on food insecurity depends on the value of the other two (as described 
above).
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Since there are country-comparable data on both the share of the total 
population that depends on agriculture for a living3 and food availability, we can test 
how the interaction between these variables influences food insecurity. However, 
since I only have data on 41 cases, the model will have to include two two-way 
interactions (instead of one three-way interaction). Thus, the modeled interactions 
will be between land concentration and the share of agricultural population (on the 
one hand), and between land concentration and food availability (on the other).  
It is important to point out that there are several other relationships in the 
conceptual scheme that I cannot test because of a lack of data. In particular, I do not 
have data on the prevalence and terms of tenancy (c.f., Figure 5.1.b), self-
consumption in agriculture (or the share of subsistence production in total 
agricultural production), or the agricultural surplus (c.f., Figure 5.1.c). Furthermore, I 
have not been able to find data on the area planted with export crops or non-food 
crops, relative to the area planted with food crops for domestic consumption. Neither 
has it been possible to find comparable data on the distribution of income between 
landowners and agricultural workers, or between capital and labor in the industrial 
sector.4
I include three control variables on the basis of results from previous research 
on entitlements to food (see Section 2.4). First, I include GDP per capita because 
several studies have found that the level of income influences food insecurity. In 
addition, GDP per capita may influence food availability as countries with relatively 
high GDP per capita can import more food than countries with lower GDP per capita. 
The second control variable is war. I expect war to influence food insecurity both 
directly and indirectly via food availability, because it disrupts food production and 
distribution, and displaces people from their land, work and homes. The third control 
variable is for regime type. Based on previous research (by, e.g., Dréze and Sen 
1989) I expect to find less food insecurity in democratic states (than in autocracies), 
because people (in theory) have more influence over (redistributional) policies in the 
former. 
3 And consequently the share that depends on incomes from non-agriculture. 
4 The gini coefficient for income would have been a good indicator for the distribution of income, but 
such data on the countries of the study are extremely patchy for the period between 1980 and 1990. 
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In addition to the three control variables that are included on the basis of 
previous research on entitlements to food, I include immunization rates as well as 
improved water source and sanitation as two additional control variables. These 
variables are included because the prevalence of stunting measure includes a disease 
component. 5  In Section 3.3 I explained how stunting is a result of both inadequate 
access to food and disease. In the nutrition literature these two variables are expected 
to affect the prevalence of disease. By controlling for these variables I can possibly 
isolate the effects that the other variables in the model have on the access to food, 
and obtain better estimates of their parameters.   
Last, but not least, I have included two regional dummy variables. In Chapter 
4 I found that there is lower prevalence of landlessness and tenancy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Near East and North Africa than in the two other regions. It is 
probable that these conditions lead to lower food insecurity than we should otherwise 
expect from the level of land concentration reflected by the gini-coefficient for 
landholdings.6 Since there is a lack of data that measure landlessness and tenancy, I 
will try to measure the effect of these differences in the poor’s access to land by 
including two regional dummy variables, one representing Sub-Saharan Africa and 
the other the Near East and North Africa.7
Figure 6.2 presents a testable model for the causes of food insecurity in the 
total population of developing countries. I have removed all the variables that cannot 
be tested empirically, and arrived at a model that explains food security (in the total 
population) as a function of land concentration, food availability, the share of the 
agricultural population in total population, agricultural labor productivity, GDP per 
capita, civil war, regime type, immunization, improved water and sanitation facilities  
5 As explained in Chapter 3, AIDS is probably an important cause of malnutrition today. However, 
since the epidemic started after the mid 1980s, which is when most of the surveys on the prevalence of 
stunting used in this study were undertaken, it cannot have had any significant effect on the data in 
this study, and will not be controlled for. 
6 The data on food insecurity in this analysis is from between 1980 and 1993. Today, I would expect 
the dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa to also reflect the fact that AIDS is much more widespread in this 
region (as food insecurity today is higher in this region than in any other).    
7 In a preliminary test with three regional dummies, to capture any possible differences between the 
regions (where Latin America and the Caribbean was the reference region), the (SPSS) program 
rejected the dummy for South East Asia. This means that there aren’t any systematic differences 
between South East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean that the model doesn’t capture. This 
supports the assumption that it might be the differences in landlessness and tenancy, as discussed 
above and in Section 4.3.    
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Figure 6.2: Food Insecurity in Developing Countries: A Testable Model 
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as well as “region” (regional differences in agrarian structure not captured by the 
model).8
From this model it is clear that I expect land concentration to have a direct 
effect on food insecurity, as well as indirect effects via labor productivity and food 
availability. Since high food availability can mean both more food for subsistence 
producers and lower food prices for net-buyers, I also expect food availability 
(measured as the supply of food per capita in relation to requirements) to have an 
independent effect in addition to the interaction effect with land concentration. As 
labor productivity is important for both the amount of food that can be produced (per 
capita) and the incomes of agricultural and industrial workers, I expect it to have 
both a direct effect9 and an indirect effect via food availability.10
All in all, we have arrived at a model of the causes of food insecurity in the 
total population that captures the most important dynamics of how land concentration 
affects food insecurity in developing countries. In addition, this model is designed in 
a manner that is empirically testable. I will test this model in Chapter 7, but first I 
will describe the indicators employed, and investigate some of the bivariate 
relationships.  
6.2 The Indicators 
This section aims to describe how the variables in Figure 6.2 will be operationalized, 
and to identify possible sources of error for the statistical analysis. The scores on the 
variables for each of the countries in the study are found in Appendix A. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, I use secondary data to test the model. For this 
reason it is important to point to an underlying danger in this approach: whether the 
data are comparable across countries. The data are often gathered by the countries 
8 Since I only have 41 cases, this model will have few degrees of freedom. This makes it difficult to 
obtain results that are significant at the 0.05-level, which I will use as a threshold. I will therefore look 
primarily at the size of the standardized regression coefficient and changes in the R2 when I consider 
which variables (if any) to exclude (in the first respecification rounds).  
9 When I regress all the other independent variables of the model (of direct effects on food insecurity) 
on agricultural labor productivity, I get an R2 of 0.757. This means that the tolerance of labor 
productivity is 0.243. This is close to 0.2, which is considered to be very low (Hamilton 1992: 134). 
However, I have chosen to include this variable in the first step of the regression analysis because I 
get sensible estimates even when it is included. 
10 In addition, I expect GDP per capita and civil war to influence food availability, but these effects 
are not depicted in the figure because it would make it very “untidy”.   
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themselves, and sent to relevant agencies such as the WHO, the FAO, and the World 
Bank. Individual countries may classify the data differently, and cover different 
areas, people, incomes, etc. This, of course, is an unfortunate fact of life for 
development researchers: we use secondary data that are of varying, and often, poor 
quality. The results will therefore have to be interpreted with caution. In this section I 
discuss the validity and reliability of the indicators. 
Land concentration is operationalized as the gini coefficient for the size 
distribution of landholdings. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this measure captures the 
distribution of agricultural landholdings, and not ownership. As defined in Section 
4.2, a landholding is “all land that is held by a household or a person, whether it is 
owned, leased, or held on some other basis” (Bruce 1998b: 5). This means that my 
operationalization of land concentration incorporates both land that is owned by the 
operator, and land that the operator has on some form of tenancy arrangement. As I 
lack data on the prevalence and terms of tenancy for most of the countries in the 
study, I will not be able to control for the effect that tenancy (versus ownership) 
might have on food insecurity. In addition, the gini coefficient for landholdings does 
not reflect the level of landlessness. (I have therefore included two regional dummies 
that I elaborate on below.) The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where the value 0 
represents an equal size distribution of holdings, while the value 1 describes a 
situation where all land is held in one holding. Because data on the gini coefficients 
for landholdings in developing countries are difficult to find, I will use data from the 
years 1980 to 1993 in order to include as many countries as possible in the analysis. 
(These data are not in a time-series format; country data are from different years over 
the period). I have strived to use the most recent gini coefficients available, and I 
have collected gini coefficients from five different sources.11 Since the data are from 
so many different sources, comparability across countries may be a problem. For 
instance, the different sources might not use the same number of cohorts when 
estimating the gini coefficient. This could represent a problem because where fewer 
cohorts are used the gini coefficients will be underestimated (Fields 2001).  
Food insecurity is operationalized as the prevalence of stunting in children 
under five (in percentage terms). The sources of these data are WHO (2000) for 
11 In particular: UNDP (1992: Table 2.2) and (1997: 198-99); Thiesenhusen (1995: 9); Alamgir and 
Arora (1991: 99-100); IFAD (2001: 119), UCLA (1999: Table 205).   
CHAPTER 6 
128
India, Sommerfelt and Stewart (1994) for Trinidad and Tobago, and De Onis et al. 
(2000) for all other countries.12 The stunting data are also from between 1980 and to 
1993. Where data from more than one point of time (between 1980 and 1993) are 
available, the year closest to 1985 was chosen in order to be as close as possible to 
most of the other data in the study. The merits and problems associated with this 
indicator are described at length in Chapter 3.  
The share of agricultural population in total population is operationalized as 
the economically active persons in agriculture and their dependents, as a percent of 
the total population.  The source of these data is Jazairy et al. (1992: 404-8). 
Food availability is operationalized as the per capita dietary energy supply as 
a percent of each country’s average minimum energy requirements. These data are 
from the year 1985. Their source is Jazairy et al. (1992: 380-81).13 The per capita 
dietary energy supply equals the domestic production14 and imports of food 
(including aid), minus exports, stocks, feed and seed, divided by the total number of 
people in the country. The per capita dietary energy supply and the minimum energy 
requirement are both measured in terms of kcals per capita, per day. The minimum 
energy requirement is specified as the amount of kcals that is considered adequate to 
meet energy needs for light activity and good health. The energy requirement varies 
according to sex and age. Men and women, young and old, do not need the same 
amount of calories. Thus, average minimum requirements vary across countries 
according to the sex and age composition of the respective country’s populations.  
 Agricultural labor productivity is operationalized as the value added in 
agriculture, per economically active person (in agriculture). Value added in 
agriculture includes the value added from forestry and fisheries. My data should 
exclude the forestry and fisheries sectors, but I have not been able to locate such 
data. These data are from 1985 (the same year as the food availability indicator), and 
12 All data are originally from the WHO (2000), but I have taken them from these other sources 
because they were more readily available. 
13 These data are only available for 1985 (and 1965).  
14 I have verified that this measure includes subsistence production by contacting Mr. Edward D. 
Gillin, Chief Basic Data Branch, Statistics Division, FAO.  
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are measured in constant 1995 US$. The source of this data is the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators Online (World Bank 2003).15
Land productivity is operationalized as the value added in agriculture per 
hectare of arable land. Arable land is the sum of land under temporary crops (double-
cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land 
under market or kitchen gardens, and temporary fallow. Land abandoned as a result 
of shifting cultivation is excluded. Value added in agriculture includes that from 
forestry and fisheries. Like the agricultural labor productivity indicator, it would 
have been preferable to use data that exclude the forestry and fisheries sectors, but I 
have been unable to find such data. These data are from 1985, and measured in 
constant 1995 US$. The source of these data is also World Development Indicators 
Online (World Bank 2003). The comparability of the data on land productivity and 
labor productivity should be relatively high, as they are from the same source and 
year, and both measured in constant 1995 US$. 
The land/labor ratio is operationalized as hectares of arable land per 
economically active person in agriculture. I have calculated this ratio from data on 
arable land (as defined above) and the number of economically active persons in 
agriculture (male and female). The data on agricultural land are from 1985, while the 
data on the number of economically active people in agriculture are an average of 
1980 and 1990 populations. The source of these data is FAOSTAT (FAO 2002b).16
As explained in Chapter 5, labor productivity is the product of the land/labor 
ratio and land productivity. To test the comparability of the indicators of labor 
productivity, land productivity and the land/labor ratio, I have performed a simple 
test. I began by calculating agricultural labor productivity by multiplying the 
land/labor ratio with land productivity (for all countries in the study). I then tested 
the correlation between the calculated agricultural labor productivity and the 
agricultural labor productivity data obtained from the World Bank (2003). The 
”Pearson’s r” for this correlation was 0.872 (with a p-value of 0.000). Although the 
15 The distribution of the agricultural labor productivity variable is positively skewed, mostly because 
of the very high agricultural labor productivity in Uruguay. Thus, Uruguay is excluded in estimations 
where it is shown to have a high influence on the parameters, but otherwise Uruguay is included. 
16 The distribution of the land/labor ratio variable is positively skewed, mostly as a result of very high 
land/labor ratios in Uruguay and Mauritania. Categorization or logarithmic transformation does not 
much improve the distribution with regard to normality. Thus, I will exclude the two outliers from the 
analyses where they prove to have high influence on the estimated parameters. 
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correlation is not perfect, it is satisfactory. The discrepancy is most likely a result of 
the fact that the labor force data that are used to calculate the land/labor ratio is an 
average for 1980 and 1990, while the labor force data used by the World Bank when 
calculating the agricultural labor productivity is from 1985.17
The regional dummy variable for (possibly) capturing the differences in the 
incidence of landlessness and tenancy (not captured by the gini coefficient) between 
Sub-Saharan Africa, on the one hand, and Latin America and the Caribbean and 
South East Asia, on the other, has the value 1 for Sub-Saharan Africa and the value 0 
for the other regions. The dummy that tries to capture these differences between the 
Near East and North Africa and the two reference regions (Latin America and the 
Caribbean and South East Asia) has the value 1 for the first, and 0 for all the other 
regions.
GDP per capita is measured in constant 1995 US$, for years matching the 
year of the data on stunting for each country. The source of these data is World 
Development Indicators Online (World Bank 2003). To control for war, I have 
chosen an indicator that captures the incidence of civil war within three years before 
food insecurity is measured. This is done because none of the countries in the 
analysis have experienced interstate war within three years before food insecurity 
was measured. I have chosen to include only civil wars within the last three years 
because it is unlikely that more distant civil wars (that ended more than three years 
prior to the year when food insecurity was measured) will significantly influence 
food insecurity. The data on (civil) wars are from the Uppsala dataset that is 
available on the internet (www.prio.no/cwp/datasets.asp). In this dataset, war is 
defined as “an incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where 
the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
Of these two parties, at least one is a government of a state” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 
618-19). Originally, the civil war variable had three categories (low, medium, and 
high intensity, according to the number of battle-related deaths) and was negatively 
skewed. To avoid this problem, I have transformed the variable into a dummy where 
the value 0 represents no civil war, and the value 1 represents incidence of civil war. 
Regime type is operationalized in terms of autocracy versus democracy on a 
scale from –10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). The variable reflects an 
17 I have not been able to get hold of the World Bank’s labor force data from 1985.  
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average score on this scale for the five years prior to when stunting was measured. 
The source of these data is the Polity IV dataset that is available on the internet 
(www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity).
Immunization is operationalized as the average of the percent of children 
under one that is immunized against DPT and the percent that is immunized against 
measles. Improved water and sanitation facilities is measured in terms of the average 
of the percent of the population that has access to an improved water source and the 
percent that has access to sanitation facilities. The data on both of these indicators are 
from 1985, and their source is World Development Indicators Online (World Bank 
2003). 
Most variables, except the gini coefficient for landholdings, the prevalence of 
stunting (in children under five), the share of agricultural population, and GDP per 
capita are from 1985. Since land concentration changes slowly (even if land reform 
is being implemented), it should not be problematic that the data on this indicator are 
from five years prior, to eight years after, most other data. The prevalence of stunting 
generally changes faster than does land concentration, and the fact that these data are 
not always the same as the other indicators may be a source of error. 
The distributions of all variables (except the dummies) are tested for 
univariate normality. All of the variables except agricultural labor productivity and 
the land/labor ratio were found to be acceptable.  
There are approximately 100 developing countries in the world (Alexandratos 
1995: 404), but I have only been able to find requisite data on 41 of them. For 
statistical analyses in general, 41 cases is a small sample. However, this sample 
embraces 41 percent of the developing countries. It is also a relatively large sample 
compared to other studies of land distribution in developing countries. There is no 
clear pattern over what types of countries are included (or missing) in the sample.18
6.3 Bivariate Correlations with Food Insecurity  
The purpose of this section is to analyze the bivariate correlations between food 
insecurity and the variables in the model. In the subsequent chapter I test the model’s 
direct effects on food insecurity with multivariate regression analyses. 
18 For instance, I have data on developing countries with very low and very high levels of GDP per 
capita. The individual countries’ values on most variables are also relatively evenly spread, since they 
are close to the normal distribution.  
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I will start with a correlation analysis of the relationship between land 
concentration and food insecurity. This will give us a starting point for unraveling 
the interaction effects and the indirect effects that land concentration has on food 
insecurity. Figure 6.3 provides a scatter plot of this bivariate analysis. 
Figure 6.3: Land Concentration and Food Insecurity 
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
We can see from Figure 6.3 that there is a negative relationship between land 
concentration and food insecurity. The ”Pearson’s r” for this relationship is -0.436, 
with a corresponding p-value of 0.004.19 This means that food insecurity is generally 
lower in countries that have high levels of land concentration than in countries that 
19 The p-value is the same as the probability value, and reflects the smallest level of significance for 
which the observed sample information becomes significant, provided the null hypothesis is true 
(Johnson 1992: 407).   
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have low levels of land concentration.20 We can see that Paraguay and Brazil, which 
have very high gini coefficients for landholdings, have a relatively low prevalence of 
stunting. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Nepal have very low gini coefficients and 
very high prevalences of stunting. The negative relationship is interesting because it 
is contrary to the intuitive expectation that high land concentration gives high food 
insecurity. As I discussed in Chapter 5, however, this negative correlation can be 
explained by the expectation that land concentration affects different groups (within 
a given country) in different ways.  
Figure 6.3 also reveals that it is Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, and Chile 
that have the lowest level of stunting (among the countries of the study), closely 
followed by Paraguay, Brazil, Jordan and Tunisia (as well as Uruguay and Panama, 
though their names are not visible because the dots are too close to Brazil and 
Paraguay). These countries are found in the vicinity of the lower right hand corner, 
which means that they have a high gini coefficient (for landholdings) and a low 
prevalence of stunting. Most of the Latin American countries in the study are found 
in this lower right hand corner (except Guatemala, Peru and Honduras, which have 
much higher levels of stunting). In the upper left hand corner, which constitutes 
countries with low gini coefficient and high prevalence of stunting, we find nearly all 
the South East Asian countries (except Thailand) and some of the Sub-Saharan 
countries.
We can further see from Figure 6.3 that most of the values on the gini 
coefficient are associated with both high and low levels of food insecurity. When we 
compare Trinidad and Tobago with Bhutan, two countries with approximately the 
same gini coefficient for landholdings, we see that the prevalence of stunting is only 
4.8 in the former country, but as high as 56.1 in the latter. Thailand and Pakistan are 
also examples of a pair of countries with approximately the same gini coefficient for 
landholdings, but highly divergent prevalences of stunting. While their gini 
coefficients are close to 0.35, the prevalence of stunting is “only” 21.5 in Thailand, 
but as high as 57.9 in Pakistan. 
As explained above, I expect the effect of land concentration to depend on the 
share of the agricultural population (in the total population) and the level of food 
20 From the scatter plot (Figure 6.3) it looks as though the relationship may be curvilinear. However, 
the curvilinear relationship is weaker than the linear.     
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availability. When we study Figures 6.4 and 6.5, it is interesting to note that Trinidad 
and Tobago (with lower prevalences of stunting) has a very small share of 
agricultural population (only eight percent) and a high food availability ratio (120 
percent). In contrast, Bhutan has an agricultural population of 91 percent and a food 
availability ratio of 107 percent. The lower prevalence of stunting in Trinidad and 
Tobago—despite the same level of land concentration as in Bhutan—can possibly be 
explained by the combination of high land concentration, small share of agricultural 
population, and a high level of food availability. On the other hand, in the cases of 
Thailand and Pakistan, the pattern is partly reversed. Thailand, with a much lower 
stunting level, has a larger share of  agricultural population (62 percent) than 
Pakistan (54 percent). However, Thailand has a higher food availability ratio (108) 
than Pakistan (94), and this can perhaps explain why the former has a lower 
prevalence of stunting than the latter (despite equal levels of land concentration).  
Figure 6.4: The Share of Agricultural Population and Food Insecurity 
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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  Furthermore, in Figure 6.4 we see that the relationship between the percent of 
agricultural population (of total population) is positively correlated with the 
prevalence of stunting. The “Pearson’s r” for this relationship is 0.716, and the p-
value 0.000. However, this does not mean that there is an independent, causal 
relationship from the former to the latter. The share of the agricultural population 
does not have any influence on food insecurity in itself. It is merely a contextual 
variable that influences how land concentration affects stunting.21
When we study Figure 6.4 more closely, we see that the (mostly Latin 
American) countries in the lower right hand corner in Figure 6.3 (high gini 
coefficient and low stunting) are found in the lower left hand corner of Figure 6.4. 
This means that countries with high gini coefficients for landholdings and low 
stunting levels also have small shares of agricultural population. This is consistent 
with my expectation that high land concentration is beneficial (for food security) in 
countries where most of the people do not depend on agriculture for a living. With 
further examination of Figure 6.4, we see that the South East Asian countries that we 
found in the upper left hand corner of Figure 6.3 (low gini coefficients and high 
stunting levels) are situated in the upper right corner of Figure 6.4. Thus, countries 
with low gini coefficients for landholdings and high stunting levels also have a large 
share of agricultural population. This is less consistent with my expectations, as I 
expected low land concentration to be beneficial for countries with a larger share of 
agricultural population.22
The explanation for this phenomenon may be found in the level of food 
availability in these countries. When we look at Figure 6.5, we see that the (South 
East Asian and Sub-Saharan) countries in the upper left corner of Figure 6.3 (low 
land concentration and high prevalence of stunting), and the upper right section of 
Figure 6.4 (large agricultural population and high stunting), are also found in the 
upper left hand corner of Figure 6.5. This means that they have low food availability. 
It is possible that the low level of food availability in these countries is responsible 
for the high levels of stunting. 
21 It might also reflect a lower level of labor productivity in agriculture, compared to industry.  
22 I will test and explain this interaction effect (as well as the interaction between land concentration 
and food availability) statistically in the multivariate regression analysis in Chapter 7.  
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Furthermore, Figure 6.5 shows that food availability is negatively correlated 
with the prevalence of stunting. The ”Pearson’s r” coefficient for this relationship is 
relatively strong  (-0.514) and the p-value is low (0.001). This is as expected: high 
food availability should mean more food for subsistence producers and lower prices 
for net-buyers of food.  
Figure 6.5: Food Availability Ratio and Food Insecurity  
Food Availability in % of Requirements
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
The dotted, vertical line in Figure 6.5 marks a food availability ratio of 100 
percent. Countries at this ratio have just enough food to cover the minimum needs of 
their population, assuming it is evenly distributed. Countries with food availability 
ratios above 100 percent have more food than the absolute minimum, while countries 
with food availability ratios below 100 percent do not have enough food to feed the 
whole population at a bare minimum, even if the food were equally distributed. In 
these countries, some people will necessarily be undernourished, and the extent of 
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undernourishment depends on the income distribution.23 What is interesting to note 
in Figure 6.5 is that as many as 17 of the 41 countries have a food availability ratio of 
less than 100 percent. In the upper left hand corner of this figure we find countries 
with a very low food availability ratio combined with a very high prevalence of 
stunting. Here we find Ethiopia (with a food availability ratio of 73 percent, and a 
stunting prevalence of 64.2 percent), and Bangladesh (with a food availability ratio 
of 78, combined with a stunting prevalence of 67.5 percent). These two cases (as 
well as Nepal, Pakistan and India, which also have low food availability ratios and a 
high prevalence of stunting) support the argument that low food availability produces 
high levels of food insecurity.  
Ghana and Turkey, on the other hand, are interesting cases in that they have 
very low food availability ratios (78 and 85, respectively), but a relatively low 
prevalence of stunting (26 percent and 20.5 percent, respectively). This conflicts with 
my expectations. To explain the low prevalence of stunting in these two countries, 
we can return to Figures 6.3 and 6.4 to examine their level of land concentration and 
share of the agricultural population. We can see from Figure 6.3 that Ghana’s gini 
coefficient for landholdings is 0.44, and Turkey’s is 0.40. These gini coefficients are 
among the very lowest of the countries in this study. Additionally, in both countries 
the share of the agricultural population is about 50 percent. The low stunting in these 
countries can probably (at least partly) be explained by their low levels of land 
concentration, combined with moderately sized agricultural populations (which can 
possibly produce a relatively equal income distribution). Thus, it is possible that the 
food available in these countries is relatively equally distributed: this should produce 
less food insecurity than if the food were distributed in a manner that gives a few 
people much more than they need, and a majority of the people much less than they 
need.
By studying Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 we have visually analyzed how the effect 
of land concentration depends on the share of the agricultural population and the 
level of food availability. In order to obtain firmer results that (hopefully) can be 
generalized to developing countries beyond this study; I will test these interaction 
23 It is more correct to say that it depends on the distribution of endowments, but I use income 
consistent with the rest of the discussion in Chapter 5.  
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effects in a multivariate regression analysis in the following chapter.24 Before doing 
this, I will discuss the correlation between agricultural labor productivity and 
stunting, and take a brief look at the correlations between stunting and the control-
variables GDP per capita, regime type, civil war, immunization and water and 
sanitation.
Figure 6.6: Agricultural Labor Productivity and Food Insecurity
Agricultural Labor Productivity (US$)
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
 In accordance with the conceptual scheme from Chapter 5, I expect 
agricultural labor productivity to be negatively correlated with food insecurity. 
Higher labor productivity gives subsistence producers more food from their land and 
the possibility for better incomes and lower food prices for agricultural and industrial 
workers alike. Figure 6.6 confirms the overall expectation that agricultural labor 
24 I have chosen not to include scatter plots of the prevalence of stunting against the two interaction 
variables in the model. The reason for this is that these plots do not provide insight into how the 
interactions work. To illustrate how the interactions influence the prevalence of stunting I will include 
conditional effect plots after I have arrived at my final model of food insecurity (with the help of 
multivariate regression analyses). 
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productivity is negatively correlated with food insecurity. The “Pearson’s r” for this 
relationship is -0.611 with a p-value of 0.000.25
 We can see that most countries with high agricultural labor productivity also 
have low levels of stunting. Only Latin American countries and Tunisia are situated 
in this lower right hand corner of the figure (high labor productivity and low 
prevalence of stunting). In the center of the figure, where a medium level of 
agricultural labor productivity is combined with a medium prevalence of stunting, we 
find mostly countries in the Near East and North Africa. The Sub-Saharan and South 
East Asian countries are located in the upper left-hand corner, where low agricultural 
productivity is combined with a high prevalence of stunting. There are a few 
exceptions to this pattern. Thailand and Ghana, for instance, have low levels of 
agricultural labor productivity but relatively low levels of stunting. Guatemala has a 
medium level of agricultural productivity, but a very high stunting level. Colombia 
has a somewhat higher stunting level than the other Latin American countries with 
more or less the same level of agricultural labor productivity. Finally, Trinidad and 
Tobago has only a medium level of agricultural productivity, but the lowest 
prevalence of stunting in the sample.  
 It is interesting to compare Trinidad and Tobago with Guatemala, as the two 
countries have approximately the same level of agricultural productivity, but the 
prevalence of stunting is only 4.8 percent in the former and as high as 57 percent in 
the latter. To explain this divergence in the prevalence of stunting, I note that the two 
countries do not differ very much with regard to land concentration and food 
availability, but that Trinidad and Tobago has a very low share of agricultural 
population, combined with higher immunization rates. In addition, there was civil 
war in Guatemala, but not in Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, an explanation for the 
much higher prevalence of stunting in Guatemala, compared to Trinidad and Tobago, 
is likely found in the different values on the three latter variables.   
 The GDP per capita control variable has a strong, negative, correlation with 
stunting (with a “Pearson’s r” of –0.686 and a p-value of 0.000). This means that 
there is lower stunting in countries with a high GDP per capita. However, in line with 
25 Uruguay with a labor productivity of 6,537 US$ and a prevalence of stunting of 15.9 percent, is not 
included in the scatter plot (but is included in the estimation of “Pearson’s r”) because it makes most 
other countries appear so close together that I cannot show their names. When Uruguay is excluded 
from the ”Pearson’s r”, it increases to -0.677 with a p-value of 0.000. 
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the argument that the level of economic development per se does not much affect 
food insecurity, but that it mostly facilitates redistributional policies that have 
stronger effects (e.g., Sen (1981 and 1989); Drèze and Sen (1989); World Bank 
(1986); see Section 2.4), I do not expect GDP per capita to have a strong independent
effect on food insecurity (but that this strong correlation results from the correlation 
between GDP per capita and other variables that also have an effect). 
The correlation between the regime-type control variable and the prevalence 
of stunting is very weak and negative (the “Pearson’s r” is -.254 with a p-value of 
0.109). The negative correlation means that there is less stunting in countries that are 
more democratic. The very high levels of stunting in India, Pakistan and Nepal, 
combined with their relatively high scores on the democracy scale, explain part of 
the reason why the correlation is weak. In addition, Chile, Jordan and (to a lesser 
degree) Paraguay and Tunisia have relatively autocratic regimes combined with a 
low prevalence of stunting.  
The civil war control variable is positively correlated to stunting, with a 
“Pearson’s r” of 0.331 and a p-value of 0.035. Thus, there is a weak tendency for 
countries suffering from civil war to have a higher prevalence of stunting. 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia, two countries with the highest occurrences of stunting, 
have both experienced civil war. In contrast, the Latin American countries with very 
low levels of food insecurity (and favorable conditions of agricultural population, 
food availability and agricultural productivity) have not experienced civil war. We 
should also take notice of Guatemala and Peru—countries with a much higher 
prevalence of stunting than the other Latin American countries (except Honduras)—
despite more or less similar values on most of the other casual variables. The data 
show that there was (in the mid 1980s) civil war in these two countries. This is a 
possible explanation for their higher level of food insecurity.  
The immunization rate has a strong, negative correlation with stunting, with a 
“Pearson’s r” of –0.634 and a p-value of 0.000. Furthermore, access to an improved 
water source and sanitation facilities also has a relatively strong, negative, correlation 
with stunting, with a “Pearson’s r” of –0.564 with a p-value of 0.001. This means 
that there is less stunting in countries where more children are immunized, and/or 
more people have access to (relatively) clean water and sanitation.     
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6.4 Summary 
This chapter has had three purposes. The first was to discuss how the lack of data for 
several of the relationships has made it necessary to reformulate the conceptual 
scheme into a more testable model. The most important shortcoming that results 
from this process is that the testable model does not distinguish between the effects 
of land concentration on peasants, landowners and non-agricultural workers, 
respectively. I was able to compensate for some of this loss by including an 
interaction term between land concentration and the share of the agricultural 
population in the model. The function of this interaction term is to elucidate possible 
differences in the effect of land concentration on the food insecurity of those who 
depend on agriculture for a living, compared to those who do not. 
The second purpose of this chapter was to describe how the variables in the 
model are operationalized and measured.   
The third purpose was to analyze the bivariate relationships between the 
prevalence of stunting and all the variables in the model (except the regional 
dummies that have little meaning in this bivariate analysis, because they are meant to 
capture the variation in food insecurity that is not explained by the other variables in 
the multivariate model). I found that:  
1) Land concentration is negatively correlated with the prevalence of stunting 
(which means that there is generally a lower prevalence of stunting in 
countries with high levels of land concentration); 
2) The share of agricultural population is positively correlated with the 
prevalence of stunting (which means that there is more food insecurity in 
countries where a large share of the population depend on agriculture for a 
living); 
3) Food availability is negatively correlated with the prevalence of stunting 
(which means that there is generally lower stunting where food availability is 
high);  
4) Agricultural labor productivity is negatively correlated with the prevalence of 
stunting (this means that where labor productivity is high there is less 
stunting); 
5) The control variables for GDP per capita, regime-type, immunization, and 
access to improved water source and sanitation facilities are all negatively 
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correlated with the prevalence of stunting (this means that there tends to be 
less stunting in countries that have high values on these variables); and finally 
that 
6) Civil war is positively correlated with the prevalence of stunting (thus, there 
is generally more stunting in countries where there was civil war).  
Of course, these bivariate correlations might be explained by the presence of 
certain values on any of the other variables in the model (as well as variables not 
captured by the model). In other words, bivariate correlation analyses cannot separate 
the effects of one variable from another. In order to see how each of these 
independent variables influences the prevalence of stunting, we have to control for 
the effect of all the others (in the model). Therefore, I now turn to multivariate 
regression analyses, which is the focus of Chapter 7. 
7Multivariate Analyses 
In the previous chapter we moved from the conceptual scheme to a testable model of 
the causes of food insecurity in the developing world. We also studied the bivariate 
relationships between the prevalence of stunting in children under the age of five and 
each of the variables in the model.1 However, in order to estimate the independent 
effect of each of the variables in the model, we need to employ a multivariate 
regression analysis. This is the purpose of the present chapter.   
The model in Figure 6.2 contains both direct and indirect effects on food 
insecurity. However, I was not able to compile data on enough countries to analyze 
the whole model as one.2  Thus, I will split the model into three sub-models, analyze 
these one by one, and combine them in a path analysis at the end.3  The first sub-
model considers the direct effects on food insecurity. This is the focus of Section 7.1. 
The second sub-model estimates the influence of land concentration and labor 
productivity in agriculture on the level of food availability. This model is tested in 
Sub-Section 7.2.1. The third sub-model is on how labor productivity in agriculture is 
influenced by land concentration, and is tested in Sub-Section 7.2.2. On the basis of 
the results from Sections 7.1 and 7.2, I use Section 7.3 to combine the three sub-
models and discuss the direct and indirect effects of land concentration on food 
insecurity. Section 7.4 summarizes.  
7.1 Direct Effects on Food Insecurity 
In this section I will test the direct effects in this model of food insecurity by using 
multivariate regression analyses.4  I will test the indirect effects in the two 
1 Except for the regional dummies, as explained in Chapter 6. 
2 If I had more cases I could analyse a whole model with direct and indirect effects in, for instance, 
LISREL. However, to perform such an analysis a minimum of approximately 150 cases is needed 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988: 415). 
3 Because the indirect effects go through variables that are interaction terms, the path-analysis will be 
informal in nature.  
4 I use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator in SPSS for Windows (Version 10.0), and exclude 
missing cases pairwise. Regression analysis provides the direction of relationships, but does not assess 
causality. The analyses can, for example, tell us how much food insecurity is expected to decline 
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subsequent sections.5 Based on expectations within the model of the causes of food 
insecurity in Figure 6.2, which were supported by the results of the bivariate 
correlation analyses in the previous chapter, I will test the following hypotheses: 
x H1: Land concentration has a direct negative effect on the prevalence of stunting;  
x H2: Land concentration interacts with the share of the agricultural population in 
its influence on the prevalence of stunting; 
x H3: Land concentration interacts with the level of food availability in its 
influence on the prevalence of stunting;  
x H4: Food availability has an independent negative effect on the prevalence of 
stunting;  
x H5: Agricultural labor productivity has an independent negative effect on the 
prevalence of stunting;  
x H6: The regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North 
Africa have independent negative effects on stunting; 
x H7: If they have any effect, the control variables for GDP per capita, regime type, 
immunization, and water and sanitation will have negative effects on the 
prevalence of stunting; and 
x H8: If it has any effect, civil war will have a positive effect on the prevalence of 
stunting. 
Since I have only 41 cases, it is very unlikely that all of these variables will 
be significant; I am working with very few degrees of freedom. I will therefore focus 
on the standardized regression coefficients6 when I determine whether each of the 
variables has an effect and should remain in the model, or if they do not have an 
when food availability increases by one unit. But, it does not say that the increase in food availability 
causes the decline in food insecurity. As far as the result of the regression analyses are concerned, it 
could be a decrease in food insecurity that causes the rise in food availability. It is only on the basis of 
theoretical reasoning that causality can be associated with these relationships. 
5 I have tested all the variables for collinearity and multicollinearity. Agricultural labor productivity is 
on the borderline with regard to multicollinearity, as it has a tolerance of only 0.233 (see Section 6.2). 
Otherwise, there are no collinearity or multicollinearity problems with the variables in the model. I 
have also tested for curve-linearity, finding none. I have compared the univariate distribution of all 
variables to the normal distribution. The only variables that deviate considerably are agricultural labor 
productivity and the land/labor ratio. As explained in Section 6.2, I have excluded outliers, but 
otherwise kept the variables in their original form. 
6 By examining the standardized coefficients we see how strong the effects are, relative to other 
variables.  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
145
effect and should be removed. I will use +/- 0.2 as an approximate lower limit for 
inclusion in the model. Because both the absolute and the standardized parameters of 
all variables will change when a variable is removed from the model, I will carry out 
step-wise removal of the variables that have no effect. I will also successively 
reintroduce previously removed variables when a new variable is removed, to see if 
it has a (significant) effect when these other variables have been removed. When the 
number of variables decrease, and the degrees of freedom increase, I will also 
consider the p-value (the level of significance is set at 0.05) and changes in R2.
However, I only describe the first and the final model in the text of this chapter. The 
outcomes of the intermediate analyses are presented in Appendix B.   
Table 7.1 shows the results of the tests on H1 to H8:
Table 7.1: First Model of Direct Effects on Food Insecurity 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients (B) 
Standardized 
Coefficients (Beta) 
P-value 
(Constant) 69.304  0.458 
Gini coefficient for landholdings  - 21.466 - 0.234 0.915 
Interaction gini landholdings & agric. population 0.776 0.673 0.129 
Food availability ratio - 0.176 - 0.141 0.863 
Interaction gini landholdings & food avail. ratio - 0.310 - 0.429 0.858 
Agricultural labor productivity  -1.919E-03 - 0.122 0.704 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 22.596 - 0.678 0.022 
North Africa and the Near East - 8.133 - 0.184 0.495 
GDP per capita  - 1.217E-03 - 0.071 0.835 
Civil war  2.855 0.088 0.594 
Regime type - 0.357 - 0.137 0.569 
Immunization - 5.444E-02 - 0.080 0.748 
Water and sanitation 4.782E-02 0.050 0.863 
Note:  R2 = 0.772, N = 27 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
We can see that the R2 is 0.772, which means that the model explains about 
77 percent of the variation in stunting. This is a relatively high R2, especially when 
we consider that we could not include all the desirable variables because of a lack of 
data. When we look at the individual standardized parameters (beta coefficients) of 
the model, we see that the interaction effect between land concentration and the share 
of agricultural population, the interaction effect between land concentration and food 
availability, as well as the dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa have the strongest 
standardized beta coefficients (0.673 and - 0.429, and  -0.678, respectively).  
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The other variables, with the possible exception of the gini coefficient for 
landholdings, have very low beta coefficients. The beta coefficient on water and 
sanitation is the lowest, and is removed first. In the following model, the beta 
coefficient of GDP per capita is lowest, and therefore removed. Thereafter, variables 
were removed in the following order: the gini coefficient for landholding (alone), the 
food availability ratio (alone), civil war, immunization, and finally agricultural labor 
productivity. However, immunization had a strong (enough) and significant effect 
when reintroduced into the model after labor productivity was removed, and is 
therefore included in the final model (of direct effects). 
Thus, it seems that neither land concentration (represented by the gini 
coefficient for landholdings), nor food availability has an independent effect. Land 
concentration only has an effect in interaction with the share of agricultural 
population and food availability, and food availability only has an effect in the 
interaction with land concentration. This is not surprising. It is probably the 
consequence of two factors. First, from the theoretical discussion, I expected that 
income and food prices had to been seen in conjunction with each other, and not 
separately. The entitlement mapping depends on both income (and assets) and the 
price of food. Since (I expect that) land concentration influences the incomes of both 
agricultural and industrial workers (see Section 5.2), it can serve as an indication of 
the income levels of these two groups. Thus, neither land concentration (representing 
income) nor food availability (representing food prices) will have independent 
effects. However, for peasants, low land concentration should give more land, and 
lower food insecurity. In addition, food availability would affect food insecurity if it 
were too low to cover the population’s minimum needs, even if it were equally 
distributed (as is the case in many of the countries of this study). When land 
concentration and food availability nevertheless do not have an independent effect, a 
possible reason is that land concentration is represented by three variables in the 
model simultaneously (in both interaction terms and alone) and food availability 
would be represented twice. With only 41 cases in the analysis, it is possible that the 
lack of effect is a result of too few cases. Of course, this may also be the case for the 
other variables that have been removed from the model. 
Agricultural labor productivity does not have a direct effect. This is most 
probably a result of the variable’s low tolerance level with regard to multicollinearity 
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(primarily because of its relationships with the gini coefficient for landholdings, the 
share of agricultural population, and the food availability ratio). In Section 7.2, we 
will see that land concentration affects agricultural labor productivity, and that 
agricultural labor productivity affects food availability. Thus, it is possible that any 
direct effect of agricultural labor productivity on food insecurity is captured by the 
gini coefficient, the share of agricultural population, and the food availability ratio.7
The GDP per capita variable does not have an effect on stunting. This finding 
supports the expectations of a dominant school within the entitlement approach, 
which claims that it is not so much the level of economic development that matters 
for food security, but rather how wealth and income is distributed.  
Furthermore, civil war does not have an effect on stunting. This is rather 
unexpected. A possible explanation for the lack of effect may be that only prolonged 
(civil) wars will deplete resources that could have been used for obtaining food 
security (or lead to migration, and disrupt food production and its distribution). In 
addition, it could be that only very intense wars affect food insecurity, and that the 
dummy variable for civil war does not capture, for instance, how many people died 
in the conflict. It is also possible that the effect of civil war is captured by other 
variables included in the model, such as food availability.8
In addition, access to improved water and sanitation facilities does not have 
an effect on stunting. This may be because disease is much less important for the 
nutritional status (of children under five) than is access to food. Thus, the effect of 
disease on the prevalence of stunting (independent of food intake) may be too small 
for both immunization and access to improved water and sanitation facilities to have 
independent effects.       
7 I could have kept agricultural labor productivity in the model to show its weak and insignificant 
direct influence on food insecurity, as it is a variable that is theoretically important. The decision to 
remove the variable from the final model (of direct effects) rests on the high p-value (0.190), in 
combination with the low standardized coefficient (-0.217), and the fact that R2 would only improve 
by 0.005 by its inclusion. Keeping agricultural labor productivity in the model would therefore not 
increase the model’s explanatory power, and make it less robust. 
8 Another possible explanation might have been that civil wars take place mostly in less democratic 
states, and that the effect of civil war might be captured by the regime type variable. This explanation 
is ruled out be the very low correlation between civil war and regime type (– 0.125 with p-value 
0.437).  
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On the basis of the results from the respecification rounds (see Appendix B) I 
arrived at a final model for the direct effects on food insecurity. This model is found 
in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2: Final Model of Direct Effects on Food Insecurity 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients (B) 
Standardized 
Coefficients (Beta) 
P-value 
Constant 60.046  0.000 
Interaction gini landholdings & agric. population 0.711 0.574 0.000 
Interaction gini for landholdings & food avail. ratio - 0.552 - 0.725 0.000 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 21.549 - 0.598 0.000 
Near East and North Africa  - 12.419 - 0.250 0.018 
Regime type - 0.648 - 0.248 0.030 
Immunization - 0.153 - 0.218 0.044 
Note:  R2  = 0.790, N = 39 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
The R2 for this model is 0.790. In Table 7.2 we find acceptable beta-
coefficients (that are significant at the 0.05 level) for: the interaction effect between 
land concentration and the share of the agricultural population; the interaction effect 
between land concentration and food availability; the dummy variables for Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Near East and North Africa; as well as regime type and 
immunization. We can further see that all the variables except the interaction 
between land concentration and the share of agricultural population have negative 
effects. This means that the higher the scores on these variables, the lower is the 
predicted prevalence of stunting. The positive effect of the interaction between land 
concentration and the share of the agricultural population means that high scores on 
this variable increase the predicted value of stunting. 
The interaction effect between land concentration and food availability has 
the strongest effect, with a beta coefficient as high as – 0.725. The dummy variable 
for Sub-Saharan Africa has a slightly lower effect, with a beta coefficient of – 0.598. 
The interaction effect between land concentration and the share of the agricultural 
population also has a relatively strong effect, with a beta coefficient of 0.574. The 
dummy for the Near East and North Africa has a relatively weak (standardized) 
effect of – 0.250. The control variables for regime type and immunization also have 
relatively weak effects, with beta coefficients of – 0.248 and – 0.218, respectively. 
The dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North 
Africa have the expected negative effects. This confirms that there is “something” 
about these regions that leads to lower food insecurity than the model otherwise 
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would predict (and that this “something” is not captured by the other variables in the 
model). I assume that these dummy variables capture the effect of lower prevalence 
of landlessness and tenancy in these two regions.9
The positive effect from regime type means that more democratic states have 
less stunting. The fact that regime type has this effect supports an argument from the 
dominant branch within the entitlement approach: that public action and participation 
is important for achieving the redistributional policies (that are crucial for low food 
insecurity) (e.g., Sen 1981 and 1989; Drèze and Sen 1989). The regime type variable 
captures this because the possibilities for political participation by the poor are (at 
least in principle) better in democracies than in autocracies.  
That immunization has an effect indicates that measures to reduce the 
propensity for disease among the food-insecure halt the downward spiral of 
malnutrition as a consequence of inadequate access to food, weakened immune 
systems, disease, loss of appetite, and further malnutrition (as explained in Chapter 
3).
Thus, I have arrived at a satisfactory model of the causes of food insecurity in 
developing countries.10 This model can be described with the following formula:11
Ǔ= 60.046 + 0.711*X1 - 0.552*X2 -  21.549*X3 - 12.419*X4 - 0.648* X5 - 0.153* X6 +Ǩ             
(7.1) 
where
X1= Interaction of the gini coefficient for landholdings and share of the agricultural  
population; 
X2= Interaction of the gini coefficient for landholdings and the food availability 
ratio; 
X3= Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa; 
X4= Dummy for the Near East and North Africa; 
9 As it is uncertain what these dummies capture, I tested the effect of a third regional dummy variable 
representing South East Asia (as this dummy could have effect for other reasons) making Latin 
America and the Caribbean the only reference region. However, this dummy variable was rejected by 
the (SPSS) program, which means that it does not have an effect. This offers some support for the 
assumption that the effects of the two other regional dummies represent the lower prevalence of 
landlessness and tenancy that characterise Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North Africa 
compared to the other two regions  
10 The residual versus predicted Y plot shows no signs of heteroscedasticity. 
11 These coefficients are unstandardized. 
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X5= Regime type; and  
X6= Immunization. 
We have seen that the interaction effect between land concentration and the 
share of the agricultural population is positive with an un-standardized regression 
coefficient of 0.711. This tells us that when the interaction variable increases by one 
unit, stunting will increase by 0.711 percent. The respective coefficient for the 
interaction between land concentration and food availability is –0.552, which means 
that when this interaction variable increases by one unit, stunting decreases by 0.552 
percent. However, it is hard to interpret how these variables interact from the 
regression coefficients alone. This is especially true in the interaction between land 
concentration and the share of the agricultural population, as the individual variables’ 
correlations with stunting have opposite signs.  
Conditional effect plots can help us understand these interaction effects. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the effect of land concentration on stunting for three different 
values of the share of the agricultural population (when all other variables in the 
model are kept constant at their means).  
Figure 7.1: Effect of Land Concentration, Conditional upon Agricultural 
Population 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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The solid line in the middle of the figure shows the effect of land 
concentration on stunting when the share of the agricultural population is at its mean 
(53 percent). The dotted line illustrates the effect of land concentration on stunting 
when the share of the agricultural population is at its minimum (7 percent). If we 
move from right to left along this line (from high to low land concentration), we see 
that the expected prevalence of stunting becomes higher as the land distribution 
becomes more equal. Thus, at these shares of the agricultural population, there is less 
stunting when land concentration is high. The dashed line (above the solid line) 
shows the effect of land concentration when the share of the agricultural population 
is at the maximum value among the countries in this study (92 percent). This line 
shows that the predicted level of stunting increases when land concentration 
increases in the context of a very large share of the agricultural population. 
Consequently, the effect of land concentration is the opposite of when the share of 
the agricultural population is low. However, the slope of this line is flatter than the 
two other lines, illustrating that the effect of land concentration is weaker at this 
share of the agricultural population than at the two lower shares (in the figure). Thus, 
the effect of land concentration on stunting is negative (the higher land 
concentration, the lower prevalence of stunting) when the share of agricultural 
population is low, and positive (the higher land concentration, the higher prevalence 
of stunting) when the share of the agricultural population is high. The effect of land 
concentration on stunting changes direction when the share of the agricultural 
population is about 79 percent (when the level of food availability and all other 
variables are at their mean).12 This is a very high share of agricultural population, as 
only 15 percent of the countries in this study have such high shares. 
Furthermore, at an approximately equal land concentration (gini coefficient 
around 0.0), the predicted prevalence of stunting is approximately the same (+/- six 
percent) for the three values of the agricultural population. However, it is unlikely 
that any country will have such a low gini coefficient for landholdings. The lowest 
gini coefficient among the countries in this study is 0.32. At this level of land 
concentration, the predicted prevalence of stunting varies from approximately 30 
12 This value should (of course) not be taken as an absolute point of reference, since the model 
explains about 80 percent of the variation in the prevalence of stunting, and the parameters in the 
model would be different if all relevant variables were included and/or all variables were correctly 
operationalized and measured. 
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percent (when the share of the agricultural population is at its minimum) to about 33 
percent (when the share of the agricultural population is at its mean), and further to 
roughly 48 percent (when the share of the agricultural population is at its maximum). 
Thus, at the lowest level of land concentration we find in this study, the predicted 
prevalence of stunting is 18 percentage points higher when the share of the 
agricultural population is at its highest value, compared to when it is at its lowest.  
At high levels of land concentration (gini coefficients around 0.9), the 
predicted value of stunting is still about 27 percent when the share of the agricultural 
population is at its mean, but the span in the predicted level of stunting from lower to 
higher shares of agricultural population has widened from 18 percentage points (at a 
gini coefficient of 0.32) to almost 55 percentage pionts. Thus, at high levels of land 
concentration, the share of agricultural population matters more for the prevalence of 
stunting than at low levels of land concentration. It is at high levels of land 
concentration that we find both the lowest and the highest predicted levels of 
stunting. 
The interaction effect of land concentration and the share of agricultural 
population illustrated in Figure 7.1 supports the expectation from my theoretical 
argument that the food insecurity of the non-agricultural population is lower when 
land concentration is high (because the agricultural surplus available for 
industrialization is larger when land concentration is high and labor absorption in 
industry increases). The results depicted in Figure 7.1 also support the expectation 
that food insecurity among the agricultural population is higher when land 
concentration is high. Although we do not have direct evidence of this, because the 
data do not measure food security in these two populations separately, this 
interpretation is indicated by the finding that high land concentration generates high 
food insecurity in the total population when the share of the agricultural population 
(in total population) is high, but low food insecurity when the share of the 
agricultural population is low.    
So far we have only studied how the effect of land concentration interacts 
with the share of the agricultural population. However, the effect of land 
concentration also depends on the level of food availability. The interaction effect of 
land concentration and food availability is illustrated in Figure 7.2. This figure shows 
the effect of land concentration on the prevalence of stunting for three different 
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values of food availability (while all other variables in the model are kept constant at 
their means).  
Figure 7.2: Effect of Land Concentration, Conditional upon Food Availability 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
 From this figure we can see that the effect of land concentration is negative 
for all the values of food availability (in this sample). This means that when land 
concentration increases, the prevalence of stunting is expected to decline. The dotted 
line shows that the gini coefficient for landholdings has a very weak negative effect 
on the prevalence of stunting when food availability is at its minimum. At this food 
availability ratio (73 percent) the predicted prevalence of stunting varies from 
approximately 45 percent when the gini coefficient is at 0.32 (the lowest in our 
sample) to about 43 percent when the gini coefficient is at 0.91 (the highest in our 
sample). From the solid line we see that the negative effect is stronger when the food 
availability ratio is at its mean (102 percent), compared to when it is at its minimum. 
From the dashed line we can see that the effect of land concentration is even stronger 
when the food availability ratio is at its maximum among the countries of this study 
(130 percent). At this level of food availability, the predicted prevalence of stunting 
decreases from about 35 percent to about 12 percent when land concentration 
increases from 0.32 to 0.91. Thus, the negative effect of land concentration is 
Food availability at:
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Gini Coefficient for Landholdings
%
 S
tu
n
ti
n
g
mean
minimum
maximum
CHAPTER 7 
154
stronger for higher values of food availability. In addition, we find that when the gini 
coefficient is at 0.32, the predicted value of stunting is ten percentage points higher 
when food availability is at its minimum, compared to its maximum. However, when 
the gini coefficient is at its maximum, the predicted prevalence of stunting is about 
30 percentage points higher when the food availability is at the minimum value, 
compared to when it is at the maximum.  
It is easier to understand why we find this relationship from an illustration of 
how food availability affects stunting at different levels of land concentration. 
Therefore, I have turned Figure 7.2 around, to plot the conditional effect of food 
availability. This plot (Figure 7.3) provides the same information as in Figure 7.2, 
but from a perspective of the effect of food availability. 
Figure 7.3: Effect of Food Availability, Conditional upon Land Concentration 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
Figure 7.3 shows that the effect of the food availability ratio on food 
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ratio increases, the predicted value of stunting goes down). The figure also shows 
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percent when the food availability ratio is at its highest (130 percent). Thus, the 
difference in the prevalence in stunting is about 25 percentage points from the lowest 
to the highest food availability ratio when land concentration is at its maximum. 
When land concentration is at its minimum, the difference in the prevalence of 
stunting between the lowest and the highest level of food availability is only about 
five percentage points.  
Thus, the effect of the food availability ratio is stronger when land 
concentration is high.13 In other words, the price of food is more important for food 
insecurity when land concentration is high. There are two possible explanations for 
this. First, when land concentration is high, fewer people have access to agricultural 
land. Thus, more people are net-buyers of food and rely on the market for their food 
security (instead of subsistence production). Second, the agricultural population will 
have low incomes, and therefore be vulnerable to high food prices. How low incomes 
among the agricultural population affect the prevalence of food insecurity in the total 
population, however, depends (of course) on the share of the population that depends 
on agriculture for a living. As explained in Section 6.1 above, I expect to find a 
three-way interaction effect between land concentration, agricultural population and 
food availability (and not two separate interactions with land concentration, as 
modeled, because I have too few cases to include the three-way interaction). 
However, it is still possible to illustrate how land concentration influences stunting at 
different combinations of agricultural population and food availability. This is what I 
have done in Figure 7.4.  
From the solid line in Figure 7.4, we see that the gini coefficient for 
landholdings has a relatively weak negative effect on stunting when both the share of 
the agricultural population and food availability are at their means. As the gini 
coefficient increases from 0.32 to 0.91, the prevalence of stunting decreases by 13 
percentage points (from 40 to 27 percent). When we have a context where a low 
share of agricultural population is combined with high food availability, the negative 
effect from land concentration on the prevalence of stunting is much stronger. If we 
follow the dotted line (that illustrates this combination) from left to right, we see that 
the predicted prevalence of stunting decreases from 25 percent when the gini 
13 This is also what we saw in Figure 7.2 that illustrates the relationship from the perspective of the 
effect of land concentration. 
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coefficient is 0.32, to 0.0 (no stunting at all) when the gini coefficient is just above 
0.6.14 This is in stark contrast to the predicted value of stunting at this (high) gini 
coefficient in the very unfavorable context of a high share of the agricultural 
population and low food availability. When all of these unfavorable conditions 
coincide, we see from Figure 7.4 that the prevalence of stunting is expected to be 
about 70 percentage points. Thus, when land concentration is at its highest, the 
difference in predicted prevalence of stunting between the most favorable and the 
most unfavorable context of agricultural population and food availability is 
approximately 70 percentage points! At the lowest gini coefficient in the sample of 
this study (0.32), the divergence between these two contexts is only about 30 
percentage points. Thus, the share of the agricultural population and level of food 
availability matters most for food insecurity where landholdings are highly 
concentrated.  
Figure 7.4: Effect of Land Concentration for Three Combinations of 
Agricultural Population and Food Availability  
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
These findings (illustrated in Figure 7.4) are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations discussed in Section 6.1 (and illustrated in Figure 6.1). For instance, the 
combination of a high level of land concentration, low level of food availability, and 
14 It is unlikely that the prevalence of stunting in any country will be zero in the “real world”. 
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a high share of agricultural population gives high food insecurity because: 1) the high 
level of land concentration will probably result in low incomes for the agricultural 
population; 2) low food availability will most likely lead to high food prices; 3) the 
combination of low incomes and high food prices leads to a high prevalence of food 
insecurity (in the agricultural population); and 4) when there is a large share of 
agricultural population (in the total population), the high food insecurity level in the 
agricultural population translates into a high prevalence of food insecurity in the total 
population.  
On the other hand, the combination of high land concentration, high food 
availability and a small share of agricultural population gives low levels of food 
insecurity because: 1) when land concentration is high, incomes among the industrial 
population will most likely be high; 2) high food availability will probably give low 
food prices; 3) the combination of a high income level and low food prices gives a 
low prevalence of food insecurity among the industrial population; and 4) when the 
industrial population constitutes a large share of the total population (the share of 
agricultural population is small), the low food insecurity rates in the industrial 
population translate into a low prevalence of food insecurity in the total population.  
In summary, the analyses in this section have shown that the level of land 
concentration influences food insecurity, and that the strength and direction of this 
influence change with two contextual factors: 1) the share of the agricultural 
population; and 2) the food availability ratio. Land concentration has a strong 
negative effect on food insecurity (food insecurity is expected to decline sharply 
when land concentration increases) when there is a small share of the population that 
depends on agriculture for a living, and/or the food availability level is high. When 
the food availability ratio is low, the negative effect of land concentration is weaker. 
Land concentration has, on the other hand, a (weak) positive effect on food insecurity 
(we anticipate a rise in food insecurity when land concentration increases) when a 
large share of the population depends on agriculture for a living.  
We have also seen that food availability has a negative effect on the 
prevalence of stunting and that the strength of the effect depends on the level of land 
concentration. The negative effect of food availability is strongest at high levels of 
land concentration. Furthermore, we saw from the standardized regression 
coefficients that the conditional effect of land concentration and food availability is 
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stronger than the conditional effect of land concentration and the share of the 
agricultural population.  
 In this section I have only tested the direct effects on food insecurity. As may 
be recalled from Figure 6.2, I also anticipate that land concentration and agricultural 
labor productivity have indirect effects on food insecurity. In the following section I 
test these relationships.  
7.2 Indirect Effects on Food Insecurity  
The purpose of this section is to test the anticipated indirect effects on food 
insecurity. We can recall from the model of food insecurity sketched in Figure 6.2, as 
well as the more general conceptual scheme (illustrated in Figure 5.1.c), that I 
expected agricultural labor productivity to influence food insecurity both directly, 
and indirectly (via food availability). The above analysis showed that agricultural 
labor productivity does not have a direct effect. However, food availability has a 
relatively strong direct effect on food insecurity in interaction with land 
concentration (we saw this from the conditional effect plot in Figure 7.3). Thus, it is 
still possible that agricultural labor productivity can have an indirect effect on food 
insecurity via food availability. In addition, I expected land concentration to have an 
indirect effect on food insecurity via both agricultural labor productivity and food 
availability.  
Thus, in the first part of this section (Sub-Section 7.2.1) I will investigate the 
effects of land concentration and agricultural labor productivity on food availability. 
As we find that agricultural labor productivity influences food availability, the 
second Sub-Section (7.2.2) will investigate the relationship between land 
concentration and agricultural labor productivity. 
7.2.1 Effects via Food Availability 
The first step in unraveling the indirect effects on food insecurity is to study whether 
agricultural labor productivity and land concentration affect food availability. The 
regression analysis above (in Section 7.1) revealed that food availability influences 
food insecurity in interaction with land concentration, but that food availability does 
not have an independent effect on food insecurity. The purpose of this analysis is to 
test whether there are indirect effects from land concentration and agricultural labor 
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productivity on food insecurity via food availability (that is part of the interaction 
variable).
I expect to find a positive correlation between agricultural labor productivity 
and the food availability ratio, because when each worker can produce more, it 
should result in more food per capita. In Figure 7.5 we see that there is a strong and 
positive relationship between labor productivity in agriculture and food availability. 
The “Pearson’s r” is 0.534 and the p-value is 0.001.15
Figure 7.5: Agricultural Labor Productivity and Food Availability 
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2  
15 The two outliers, Egypt (with a food availability ratio of 130 and a labor productivity level of only 
853 US$) and Uruguay (with a labor productivity level of 6,537 US$ and a food availability ratio of 
only 105), are not included in the figure because it is hard to see variation among the other countries, 
as well as their names, when they are included. The two countries are furthermore not included in the 
estimation of the “Pearson’s r” because they have a large influence on the parameters. When both 
countries are included, the “Pearson’s r” is much lower (0.383 with a p-value of 0.017). When only 
Uruguay is excluded, the “Pearson’s r” is 0.481 with a p-value of 0.003. When only Egypt is excluded 
the “Pearson’s r” is 0.431 and the p-value 0.008. Thus, Egypt pulls the strength of the relationship 
down a little more than does Uruguay. 
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In Chapter 5 we discussed how it is probable that land concentration affects 
the total availability of food because it influences both the type of crops grown and 
agricultural labor productivity. I expected large farms to produce more cash crops 
(such as coffee, tea, etc), and have lower levels of self-consumption. I do not have 
data on the extent of the export of agricultural products, or on imports of food. Nor 
do I have data to measure whether non-food and export crops constitute a higher 
share of agricultural production when land concentration is high. I can only test the 
relationship between land concentration and food availability (directly). Thus, I 
expect to find a negative correlation between land concentration and food 
availability.  
Figure 7.6: Land Concentration and Food Availability
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2
In Figure 7.6 we see that there is a positive relationship between land  
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concentration and food availability. For this relationship, the “Pearson’s r” is 0.512 
and the p-value is 0.001.16
The positive correlation is contrary to my expectation. To find out whether 
these two (bivariate) correlations translate independent, positive, effects on food 
availability, I will perform a multivariate regression analysis. As it is easier for “rich” 
countries to import food than for poor countries, the level of GDP per capita might 
also influence the food availability ratio.17 As there is collinearity between 
agricultural labor productivity and GDP per capita (the correlation between them is 
0.811), there is hardly any independent variation in these two variables, and one of 
them should be excluded (Hamilton 1992: 82). Since agricultural labor productivity 
is the theoretically interesting variable, I will not include GDP per capita in the 
regression analysis.  
I also expected to find that civil war would affect food availability, as it can 
disrupt the production of food (even though it did not have a direct effect on food 
insecurity). Instead, I found a very weak bivariate relationship between civil war and 
the food availability ratio (the “Pearson’s r” is only–0.195 with a p-value of 0.22118),
as well as between civil war and agricultural labor productivity and land 
concentration. Thus, I will not include civil war in the regression analysis.   
The result of this regression analysis of the effects of land concentration and 
agricultural labor productivity is shown in Table 7.3. From this table we see that the 
model explains (only) about 36 percent of the variation in the food availability ratio. 
In addition, we can see that agricultural labor productivity has a positive effect on 
food availability, with a standardized coefficient of 0.345 and a p-value of 0.048. 
This is in line with the expectation that when agricultural workers produce more, 
there will be more food (per capita) in the country. 
16 Egypt is not included in the figure because it has a very high food availability ratio (130 percent), 
and its inclusion makes it hard to see variation among the rest of the countries (as well as the country 
labels). Egypt is also excluded from the estimation of the ”Pearson’s r”. When Egypt is included, the 
”Pearson’s r” is 0.414, with a corresponding p-value of 0.007. Thus, Egypt is an outlier with relatively 
high influence on the correlation coefficient. 
17The correlation between GDP per capita and the food availability ratio is 0.477 with a p-value of 
0.002. When the outlier Egypt is excluded, the correlation increases to 0.524, with a p-value of 0.001. 
18 The p-value for land concentration is 0.55, and therefore slightly above the significance level of 
0.05 set for this study. However, since land concentration is such an important variable in the 
theoretical foundation of the model, I have chosen to keep it.  
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Table 7.3: The Effect of Land Concentration and Agricultural Labor 
Productivity on Food Availability 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients (B) 
Standardized 
Coefficients (Beta) 
P-value 
Constant 82.017  0.000 
Gini for Landholdings  25.699 0.334 0.055 
Agricultural Labor Productivity 0.00435 0.345 0.048 
Note:  R2  = 0.361, N = 36 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
Table 7.3 also documents that land concentration has an independent positive 
effect on food availability, with a standardized regression coefficient of 0.334 and a 
p-value of 0.055.19 This means that countries with high land concentration have 
higher food availability than countries with low land concentration (the predicted 
level of food availability increases as the distribution of landholdings get more 
concentrated). This effect comes on top of the eventual effect that land concentration 
has on agricultural labor productivity, and thus contradicts the expectation that this 
independent effect should be negative (because large farms would produce non-food 
and export crops instead of food for the domestic market). To interpret this 
discrepancy, we should recall how higher levels of land concentration might be 
beneficial for industrial growth (because the agricultural surplus is probably higher 
when concentration is high). Thus, it is possible that the positive effect of land 
concentration on food availability can be traced to higher industrialization—which 
generally means higher GDP per capita (because labor productivity is higher in 
industry than in agriculture)—and further to greater food imports. The relatively high 
correlation of 0.521 (with p-value 0.001) between land concentration and GDP per 
capita supports this interpretation. However, we do not have enough information to 
measure the import effect of a high GDP per capita. Consequently, we are left to 
speculate about why land concentration leads to higher food availability, even when 
we have controlled for the eventual effect of land concentration on agricultural labor 
productivity.20
In this section we have studied the relationships between land concentration, 
labor productivity, and food availability. The results of these analyses indicate that 
19 The outliers Egypt (food availability) and Uruguay (labor productivity) are not included. 
20 Since the R2 of the model is as low as 0.36, it is also possible that this effect could be negative if all 
relevant variables were included. 
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high agricultural labor productivity is important for food availability. They further 
indicate that high land concentration is associated with high food availability 
(regardless of its relationship with agricultural labor productivity). However, civil 
war does not appear to affect food availability. 
There is one last indirect effect from land concentration on food insecurity 
that has yet to be discussed. This is the possible effect that goes via agricultural labor 
productivity. We will now turn to an analysis of this relationship. 
7.2.2 Effects via Agricultural Labor Productivity 
The regression analysis in the last sub-section showed that agricultural labor 
productivity has a positive effect on food availability. In addition, we learned in 
Section 7.1 that food availability has a direct effect on food insecurity (in interaction 
with land concentration). In this sub-section I analyze the relationship between land 
concentration and labor productivity in agriculture. The purpose of this analysis is to 
find out whether land concentration also influences food insecurity via an effect on 
agricultural labor productivity.  
 We may recall from Section 5.3.1 that agricultural labor productivity is the 
product of land productivity and the land/labor ratio. We can further recall that I 
expect land concentration to influence agricultural labor productivity primarily 
through the land/labor ratio, and possibly also through land productivity. In this 
section I will first examine the overall relationship between land concentration and 
agricultural labor productivity. I will then break down the overall relationship into 
two distinct parts, studying the relationship between land concentration and 1) the 
land/labor ratio; and 2) the level of land productivity. Finally, I will study the relative 
influence of the land/labor ratio and land productivity on agricultural labor 
productivity. Together, these separate analyses will give us an idea of whether, and 
in that case how, land concentration affects labor productivity in agriculture.  
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 5 revealed that there is some uncertainty 
about the relationship between land concentration and agricultural labor productivity. 
This uncertainty has its roots in divergent theoretical expectations about how land 
concentration affects land productivity (which is one of the two factors in labor 
productivity). The correlation analysis illustrated in Figure 7.7 indicates that the 
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relationship between land concentration and agricultural labor productivity is 
positive. The “Pearson’s r” for this correlation is 0.584 (with a p-value of 0.000).21
Figure 7.7: Land Concentration and Agricultural Labor Productivity 
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
This means that countries with high land concentration have higher levels of 
agricultural labor productivity.22 In the lower left-hand corner of the figure we find 
most of the Sub-Saharan and South Asian countries. The countries in the center of 
the figure, which have medium values on both variables, are mostly a mix of 
countries from Latin American and the Near East and North African countries. Once 
21 Uruguay is excluded from the figure, because it has a labor productivity score of 6,537 US$. When 
Uruguay is included, most other countries group so close together that I can show very few of their 
names. However, Uruguay is included in the estimation of “Pearson’s r”. When the country is 
excluded, the coefficient decreases only slightly (to 0.561 with p-value 0.000). Thus, Uruguay is only 
a figurative outlier, but does not have too large an influence on the estimates.  
22 I have tested whether civil war influences labor productivity by including land concentration and 
civil war in a multivariate regression analysis. Civil war doesn’t have an effect (the beta coefficient is 
0.032 with a p-value of 0.822, and the R2 is the same as when only land concentration is included. 
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again, a group of Latin American countries stand out, now with high levels of 
agricultural labor productivity. Some of these countries, like Paraguay, Brazil, and 
Panama also have very high gini coefficients for land holdings.23 Chile, Costa Rica 
and Colombia are separated from the rest of the Latin American countries (as well as 
all the other countries) in Figure 7.7, with relatively low gini coefficients combined 
with the highest levels of labor productivity. From Figures 7.8 and 7.9 we can see 
that Chile has a relatively low land productivity level, but much higher land/labor 
ratio than the other countries (except Paraguay and Brazil). Thus, a high land/labor 
ratio can explain Chile’s high agricultural labor productivity level. Colombia and 
Costa Rica have medium values for both land productivity and the land labor ratio, 
which combines with the second and third highest levels of labor productivity. 
Figure 7.8:  Land Concentration and Land Productivity 
Gini Coefficient for Landholdings
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Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
23 Although absent from the illustration, Uruguay (with a labor productivity of 6,537 US$ and a gini 
coefficient of 0.84) is also included in this group. 
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Following the dispute about the relationship between land concentration (or, 
more correctly, the size of farms) and land productivity in the literature,24 I do not 
have a clear expectation about the direction or strength of this relationship. Indeed, 
from the scatter plot and regression line in Figure 7.8, we see that there is practically 
no relationship between land concentration and land productivity. This is confirmed 
by a “Pearson’s r” of –0.096, with the corresponding p-value of 0.571.25
This result indicates that the Inverse Relationship Theory (discussed in Sub-
Section 5.3.2) receives little support in this sample. Insofar as countries with low 
levels of land concentration generally have smaller farms than countries with high 
levels of land concentration, the inverse relationship between farm size and land 
productivity should materialize into a (strong and significant) negative relationship 
between land concentration and land productivity. This relationship was not found. 
The lack of any clear relationship between land concentration and land productivity 
can be a consequence of the deteriorating land productivity on small farms over time. 
In this case, some countries with low levels of land concentration may have come 
farther down the path of over-intensive land use than others, and this could explain 
why the relationship appears unclear.  
I expect, however, that there is a positive correlation between land 
concentration and the land/labor ratio, as I expect small farms to have lower 
land/labor ratios than large farms. From Figure 7.9 we can see that this expectation is 
supported. There is a relatively strong positive correlation between land 
concentration and the land/labor ratio, with a “Pearson’s r” of 0.623 and a p-value of 
0.000.26
24 According to the “Inverse Relationship Theory”, land productivity is higher on small farms, mainly 
because labor intensity is higher (and fallows are shorter). This position is contested by the argument 
that large farms have more resources to invest in land-saving technologies such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, herbicides, and irrigation (as well as labor-saving technology such as tractors), so that they 
can achieve just as high, or higher, land productivity levels with less labor (higher land/labor ratio) 
than the small farms. See Sub-Section 5.3.2. 
25 When the outlier Egypt is included in the estimation, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient moves to 
–0.221, with a corresponding p-value of 0.183.  
26 Neither Uruguay nor Mauritania is included in Figure 7.9 (or the estimation of “Pearson’s r”) 
because they have a much higher land/labor ratio than the other countries. Uruguay has a land/labor 
ratio of 77.16, combined with a gini coefficient of 0.84; and Mauritania has a land/labor ratio of 77.11, 
and a gini coefficient of 0.36. Both countries have high influence on the estimation of the “Pearson’s 
r” correlation coefficient. When both countries are included, the “Pearson’s r” is 0.300 with a p-value 
0.060. When only Mauritania is excluded (and Uruguay is included), the “Pearson’s r” is reduced to 
0.553, with p-value 0.000. When only Uruguay is excluded (and Mauritania is included) the 
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A regression analysis of the effects of the land/labor ratio and land 
productivity on agricultural labor productivity reveals that the land/labor ratio has by 
far the strongest effect on agricultural labor productivity (the standardized regression 
coefficient are 0.578 with p-value 0.000, and 0.076 with p-value 0.610, respectively). 
Since land concentration has a relatively strong positive correlation with the 
land/labor ratio, but no clear correlation with land productivity, the positive effect of 
land concentration on agricultural labor productivity (illustrated in Figure 7.7) must 
go through the land/labor ratio.  
Figure 7.9: Land Concentration and the Land/Labor Ratio
Gini Coefficient for Landholdings
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 It is unlikely that land concentration has much influence on the total amount 
of agricultural land. However, large farms need less labor per hectare because they 
can produce the same amount with less labor (at lower cost than if technology was 
“Pearson’s r” is 0.174 and the p-value 0.288. Thus, the outliers pull the relationship in opposite 
directions, while Mauritania has the strongest influence of the two countries. The correlation between 
the gini coefficient for landholdings and the logarithm of the land/labor ratio, including outliers 
(which is closer to the normal distribution than the raw data variable), has a “Pearson’s r” of 0.495 
with a p-value of 0.001. 
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substituted for labor). Small farms employ more labor because they have (per 
definition) little land, and need to cultivate intensively—while they do not have 
access to labor-saving technology. Small farms may also choose to employ more 
labor instead of labor-saving technology because family members otherwise would 
be unemployed, and the cost of extra labor is therefore low compared to the cost of 
labor-saving technology. When land concentration is high, there is probably less 
work to be found in agriculture, and more people are forced to find work outside the 
agricultural sector. Thus, it seems probable that land concentration influences 
agricultural labor productivity via the land/labor ratio because high levels of land 
concentration pushes people to seek work outside of agriculture, and thereby reduces 
the size of the agricultural labor force. 
On the other hand, the reason could also be that the countries with high land 
concentration have a high level of industrialization (and corresponding high level of 
labor absorption in industry), and that the agricultural labor force has been reduced 
by a pull from jobs in the industrial sector. Insofar as this high level of 
industrialization is facilitated by high labor productivity, finding the cause of the 
high land/labor ratio in countries with high land concentration will be much like 
asking which came first, the chicken or the egg. Nevertheless, it is probable that high 
land concentration is the basic condition that spurred this spiral effect. 
In this sub-section we have seen that there is a positive relationship between 
land concentration and agricultural labor productivity. Hence, the analysis confirms 
my expectation that land concentration also influences food insecurity indirectly, via 
agricultural labor productivity (as illustrated in Figure 6.2). We have further seen that 
the relationship between land concentration and agricultural labor productivity goes 
via the land/labor ratio.  
The purpose of this section has been to test two sub-models in order to unveil 
the indirect effects in the model of food insecurity. In summary, we have seen that 
land concentration affects food availability and agricultural labor productivity (via 
the land/labor ratio). We have also seen that agricultural labor productivity 
influences food availability. Thus, land concentration affects food availability both 
directly and indirectly via agricultural labor productivity. It is now time to tie these 
relationships together with the direct effect on food insecurity. This is the purpose of 
the following section.  
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7.3 A Revised Model of Food Insecurity 
The previous section analyzed the effect of land concentration on agricultural labor 
productivity, and the effect of land concentration and labor productivity on food 
availability. In this section I will graphically depict how these relate to the direct 
effects on food insecurity that we found in Section 7.1 (see Table 7.2). In doing so, 
these effects can be understood as indirect effects on stunting. As the food 
availability ratio does not have an independent effect on food insecurity, but only an 
interaction effect with land concentration—and agricultural labor productivity does 
not have a direct effect—I cannot perform a “formal” path-analysis (where the 
indirect effects can be calculated). Therefore, I will analyze how the indirect effects 
are linked to stunting in a qualitative manner, using the informal illustration of the 
effects in Figure 7.10 as a guide.27
Figure 7.10 depicts the modified version of the food insecurity model for 
developing countries (modified from Figure 6.2) that I have tested (step-by-step) in 
Sections 7.1 and 7.2. From the figure we can see that the interaction between the gini 
coefficient for landholdings and the share of the agricultural population has a 
positive direct effect on the prevalence of stunting. Thus, the higher the values of this 
interaction term, the higher the predicted prevalence of stunting. Furthermore, the 
interaction between the gini coefficient for landholdings and the food availability 
ratio, the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa, the dummy variable for the Near 
East and North Africa, regime type and immunization all have negative direct effects 
on stunting. This means that higher values on these variables give lower predicted 
values of stunting.  
We can also see from Figure 7.10 that the gini coefficient for landholdings 
has a positive effect on agricultural labor productivity (via the land/labor ratio), and 
thereby an indirect positive effect on food availability. Land concentration and 
agricultural labor productivity also affect the food availability ratio in a direct, 
positive, manner. This means that high levels of land concentration, and high 
agricultural labor productivity, are associated with high levels of food availability. 
27 Since the R2 is low for both agricultural labor productivity and food availability the coefficients on 
these variables may be inaccurate.  
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As illustrated in Figure 7.3, the direct effect of food availability is negative for all 
values in the sample of this study. In addition, the food availability ratio interacts 
with the gini coefficient for landholdings in such a way that it always has a negative 
effect on food insecurity, but the effect is stronger when the gini coefficient for 
landholdings is high. Thus, all the positive effects from the gini coefficient for  
landholdings and agricultural labor productivity to food availability translate into a 
negative effect on stunting28 (they contribute to a reduction in stunting), and they will  
be stronger when land concentration is high (compared to when land concentration is 
low).  
7.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to test empirically the causal relationships in the 
testable model of food insecurity (see Figure 6.2), originally derived from the 
conceptual scheme that was drawn up in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.1a to 5.1.c).  
Before we summarize the results, I would like to recall several sources of error 
that should be kept in mind. First, the indicator for food insecurity, the prevalence of 
stunting, is measured in percent of the population of children below five years of age. 
Thus, the data may not be representative for the total population of the countries. 
Also, disease may influence the prevalence of stunting in addition to inadequate 
access to food. Despite the inclusion of immunization rates and the percent of 
population with access to improved water source and sanitation facilities, we may not 
have been able to control for the effect of disease. Furthermore, I had to modify the 
model of food insecurity in accordance with the availability of data. Thus, all 
relevant variables could not be included. Although the two regional dummies were 
included to try to control for some of the variables without data, the estimates will 
still be influenced by omitted variables. However, the coefficient of variation (R2) is 
relatively high (0.790). This indicates that the model is relatively well specified, and 
that omitted variables may not represent too serious a problem. In addition, there is 
(of course) the general problem with comparability of data across developing 
countries, and between data collected by different international organizations. On top 
of all this, the sample of the study is relatively small (41), which can make 
28 At least within the range of the food availability ratio in this study, which is from 73 percent to 130 
percent. 
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generalizations problematic. Thus, I have reported the p-value on all the estimated 
coefficients.  
I tested the model of food insecurity in two stages. In the first stage I studied the 
direct effects on food insecurity in a series of multivariate regression analyses. The 
result of these analyses indicated that: 
1) The interaction between land concentration and the share of the agricultural 
population has a relatively strong positive (direct) effect on food insecurity;  
2) The interaction between land concentration and food availability has a 
relatively strong negative (direct) effect on food insecurity;
3) There is no direct independent effect from land concentration (because the 
direct effect of land concentration on food insecurity in the total population 
depends on the share of the agricultural population and food availability 
ratio);
4) There is no direct independent effect from food availability on food insecurity 
(because the effect of food availability depends on the level of land 
concentration);  
5) Agricultural labor productivity does not have a direct effect on food 
insecurity (probably because of the multicollinearity problem);  
6) The dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North 
Africa (that I assume capture lower landlessness and less tenure in these 
regions compared to Latin America and the Caribbean and South East Asia) 
have negative effects on food insecurity (which means that the specific 
aspects that these dummies capture lead to lower food insecurity than the 
model otherwise would predict);   
7) The control variable for regime-type has a weak negative effect (which means 
that more democratic states have less food insecurity), and the control 
variable for immunization has a weak negative effect on food insecurity 
(which means that there is less stunting where more children are immunized); 
and   
8) The control variables for GDP per capita, civil war, and access to improved 
water and sanitation facilities do not have any effect on stunting. 
I used conditional effect plots to interpret the interaction effects between land 
concentration, the share of the agricultural population, and the food availability ratio. 
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The first of these plots illustrated that land concentration has a negative effect on 
food insecurity when the share of the agricultural population is small, and a positive 
effect when the share of the agricultural population is large. This means that high 
levels of land concentration produce low levels of food insecurity when the share of 
the agricultural population is small, but high food insecurity levels when the share of 
the agricultural population is large.29
The second plot, depicting the interaction effect of land concentration and 
food availability, demonstrated that land concentration has a negative effect on food 
insecurity for all values of food availability, but that the negative effect is stronger at 
higher levels of food availability. Thus, high levels of land concentration combined 
with low levels of food availability lead to higher levels of food insecurity than high 
levels of land concentration combined with high levels of food availability. A third 
plot, that illustrated the same relationship from the perspective of food availability, 
showed that food availability has a negative effect on food insecurity for all levels of 
land concentration, but that the effect is much stronger when land concentration is 
high.
Last, but not least, I included an illustration of the effect of land concentration 
at three combinations of the share of agricultural population and food availability. 
From this illustration we could see that high land concentration leads to very high 
levels of food insecurity in the context of a large share of agricultural population and 
a low food availability ratio. However, when high land concentration is combined 
with a low share of agricultural population and a high food availability ratio, there 
will be very low (or no) food insecurity. The illustration further showed that we will 
find both the highest and the lowest prevalence of stunting where land concentration 
is high, and that the outcome depends on the context of the share of agricultural 
population and food availability.  
 The second stage of the tests was aimed to study the indirect effects of land 
concentration and agricultural labor productivity on food insecurity (via agricultural 
labor productivity and food availability). The results of these tests indicate that: 
29 In this sample, the effect of land concentration changed direction when the share of the agricultural 
population was approximately 79 percent. Hence, when the share of the agricultural population was 
less than 79 percent, high land concentration had a negative effect, and vice versa (when the food 
availability ratio was at its mean). 
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1) Land concentration has a negative indirect effect on the prevalence of 
stunting via its positive effects on agricultural labor productivity and the food 
availability ratio (thus via this mechanism a high level of land concentration 
gives low food insecurity); and 
2) Agricultural labor productivity has a negative indirect effect on stunting, 
through its positive effect on the food availability ratio (which means that 
high labor productivity leads to less food insecurity). 
At the end of these analyses, I merged the effects on agricultural labor 
productivity and food availability with the direct effects on food insecurity. This 
combination resulted in an “informal” path-diagram that illustrates the direct and 
indirect effects on food insecurity. This path diagram represents a modified model of 
food insecurity in the developing world, and shows that the relationship between land 
concentration and food availability (on the one side) and food insecurity (on the 
other) is quite complex.   
The most important result of these analyses is that land concentration 
influences food insecurity in different ways according to the context of the share of 
agricultural population and the food availability ratio. This finding is important 
because it has implications for the potential effect of land reform policies. I will 
discuss these policy implications in the concluding chapter, to which we now turn.  
8Conclusion 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to assess land reform’s potential for 
reducing food insecurity in developing countries. A subordinate objective has been to 
show that food availability influences entitlements to food. In pursuing these aims, 
this thesis has discussed alternative approaches to the study of food insecurity, and 
different ways to measure the extent of the problem. It has also described the state of 
food insecurity and land concentration across the developing world. Furthermore, 
this thesis has provided a conceptual scheme for understanding how land 
concentration and food availability affect food insecurity. Finally, it has investigated 
the empirical relationship between land concentration, food availability and food 
insecurity across the developing world, by way of a cross-country, multivariate 
regression analysis of a carefully specified model of food insecurity. The results of 
these analyses are reviewed in the following section. In the section thereafter, I 
discuss the policy implications of these results. The chapter ends with suggestions for 
further research that can shed additional light on what can be done to reduce the 
overwhelming problem of food insecurity in the developing world.   
8.1 Main Results of the Study 
The most interesting results are those that concern how land concentration and food 
availability relate to the poor’s access to food. However, before we discuss these 
results, and their implications, I would like to recall a few less central, but still 
important, findings.  
The first of these findings is that more democratic countries have a weak 
tendency to enjoy less food insecurity (than less democratic countries). This provides 
some support to Sen’s (and others’) argument that popular participation compels 
governments to implement redistributive policies conducive to food security. 
Another interesting but tangential result is that immunization reduces the prevalence 
of stunting. This would appear to be because immunization interferes with the 
reciprocal interaction between inadequate access to food and disease that results in 
stunted growth. The three additional control variables that were included in the 
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model (GDP per capita, civil war and access to improved water and sanitation) did 
not show a significant effect. 
Furthermore, the results of the study showed that regional characteristics 
associated with the Near East and North Africa, and with Sub-Saharan Africa, lead to 
lower food insecurity. We can’t be certain about the nature of these regional 
characteristics, only that they are not captured by other variables in the model. 
Nevertheless, it is probable that lower landlessness and less tenancy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Near East and North Africa (compared to Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and South East Asia) can explain at least some of these effects. Labor 
productivity in agriculture did not show an effect; probably because it showed 
multicollinearity with the variables in the first, as well as the final, model. The effect 
of agricultural labor productivity is thus captured by the other variables (primarily 
land concentration, the share of agricultural population, and food availability). In 
fact, the results of the study indicate that high levels of land concentration lead to 
higher levels of labor productivity in agriculture, and to higher levels of food 
availability. While high labor productivity levels also result in high levels of food 
availability, high food availability levels reduce the level of food insecurity (in 
interaction with land concentration).  
The most important findings in the empirical analysis are two. First, the effect 
of land concentration on food insecurity depends on the share of agricultural 
population in such a way that high levels of land concentration in combination with a 
large share of agricultural population produces high levels of food insecurity. 
Alternatively, in those countries where high levels of land concentration are 
combined with a small share of agricultural population, the level of food insecurity 
will be low. The reason that high levels of land concentration lead to high levels of 
food insecurity when the share of the agricultural population is high, is 
straightforward. People relying on agriculture for a living will have better access to 
food when they have land on which they can grow their own food (than when they 
have to rely on employment on large farms for income, and the market for food). 
Thus, in a situation where land is highly concentrated and where a large share of the 
population depends on agriculture for a living, a large share of the total population 
will not have access to enough food. The remaining population that relies on industry 
for their living, will—on the other hand—be more food-secure when the level of land 
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concentration is high. This is because there will be a larger agricultural surplus, 
higher industrial growth, and higher growth in non-agricultural employment. Thus, if 
only a small share of the total population depends on agriculture in a country with a 
high level of land concentration, the prevalence of food insecurity in the total 
population will be low, despite the fact that there is a high level of food insecurity in 
the agricultural population.  
A low level of land concentration, on the other hand, produces a medium (not 
a low) level of food insecurity. This is the result of two contradictory forces that 
come into play when the level of land concentration is low. First, there is the general 
“rule” that the agricultural population with access to land probably has better access 
to food, than those who work on others’ farms (and rely on the market). From this we 
should expect to find a lower level of food insecurity, the lower the level of land 
concentration, especially if a majority of the population lives and works in the 
agricultural sector. However, if there are (too) many people that rely on agriculture 
for their living in relation to the amount of agricultural land, there will be very little 
land per person. This means that the land/labor ratio—and, consequently, the labor 
productivity level—will be low. In this situation, peasants may not be able to 
produce enough food for themselves. In addition, they will not be able to produce the 
agricultural surplus needed by the industrial sector. Thus, when the land/labor ratio is 
low the level of food insecurity will be relatively high, both among the agricultural 
population and the population that depends on industry for a living. This produces 
the counter-intuitive results that low levels of land concentration combined with a 
large share of agricultural population, give higher levels of food insecurity than low 
levels of land concentration combined with a smaller share of the agricultural 
population.  
Why, then, will food insecurity remain at a medium level when the level of 
land concentration is low, and not at a minimum level, even when the share of the 
agricultural population is small? The fact is that when a small share of the population 
depends on agriculture for a living, there is less food insecurity when the level of 
land concentration is high. This is because most people depend on industrial incomes 
for a living, and the rate of labor absorption in industry depends on an agricultural 
surplus—which is probably higher when land concentration levels are high. Thus, 
even if there is a high rate of food insecurity among the agricultural population when 
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the level of land concentration is high, the prevalence of food insecurity will be low 
as a percent of the total population.  
This is why we find the highest levels of food insecurity in countries where 
high land concentration levels are combined with a large share of the agricultural 
population; the lowest levels of food insecurity are found in countries where a high 
level of land concentration is combined with a small share of the agricultural 
population; and medium levels of food insecurity are found where land concentration 
levels are low. Whether the level of food insecurity will be medium-high or medium-
low when land concentration is low, depends primarily on how large is the share of 
agricultural population, and how much food is available in the country.  
This brings us to the second important finding of the study: that food 
availability (per capita) influences the poor’s access to food, and that this influence 
depends on the level of land concentration. There will always be a lower (predicted) 
level of food insecurity where the food availability level is high, but the effect that a 
given level of food availability has on (the predicted level of) food insecurity 
depends on the level of land concentration. In other words, the effect of land 
concentration on food insecurity depends on the food availability ratio. This effect is 
such that at high levels of land concentration there will be less food insecurity when 
the food availability level is high, while the level of land concentration does not 
matter much for food insecurity when the level of food availability is low. In short, 
there will always be a relatively high prevalence of food insecurity when the level of 
food availability is low.  
This interaction between food availability and land concentration is relatively 
straightforward. It results from the assumption that a low level of food availability 
leads to high food prices, because the supply elasticity of food production is low.1
When food prices are high, the poor will have access to less food. It is as this point 
that land concentration enters the picture. When the level of land concentration is 
high, less people have access to land and more people will be net-buyers of food (and 
depend on the market for their food security). In addition, the agricultural population 
will have lower incomes when landholdings are highly concentrated, and these 
people’s level of food insecurity will deteriorate with any rise in food prices.  
1 I have not actively tested this assumption myself, but it rests on findings from previous work 
originally by Kalecki (1971). 
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There is a third dimension to this interaction between food availability and 
land concentration; one that the model does not capture.2 In a context where the level 
of food availability is low and the level of land concentration is high, the incidence 
of food insecurity—as a percent of the total population—will be higher when a larger 
share of the population depends on agriculture for a living. Thus, it would appear as 
though there is a three-way effect on food insecurity, where land concentration, food 
availability, and the share of the agricultural population all interact.  
To summarize, this study has shown that land concentration influences food 
insecurity in many different ways, albeit not always in the expected direction. In 
addition, this study has shown that food availability is much more important than 
most researchers within the entitlement approach tend to recognize. For example, 
Sen (1981: 8) argues that food availability is not directly involved in the poor’s 
access to food. My thesis challenges this perception. By dismissing food availability, 
scholars from the entitlement approach ignore the fact that increased per capita food 
supply can considerably reduce food insecurity in many developing countries.   
These are the results of a study that set out to address the potential for land 
reform as a policy option for reducing food insecurity in the developing world. In the 
following section I will discuss the most important lessons that these results teach us 
about the effectiveness of land reform. I will also compare the potential of land 
reform against the other main policy options that this study indicates have potential 
for reducing food insecurity in the developing world.    
8.2 Implications for Policy
The main results of this study imply that there are three main groups of policies that 
developing countries can use to reduce food insecurity: policies to redistribute land 
(land reform); policies to increase food availability; and policies that reduce the share 
of the agricultural population (i.e., increase labor absorption into industry, or—in 
shorthand—industrialization).3 The potential effect of any one of these policies 
depends on the characteristics of the specific country. Of course, the important 
2 This is because there were too few cases to test for a three-way interaction effect between land 
concentration, food availability, and the share of the agricultural population.  
3 These three groups stand out in importance because the effects of regime type and immunization are 
much weaker, and we cannot be certain why the regional dummies have an effect. 
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characteristics are: the level of land concentration, the share of the agricultural 
population, and the food availability ratio. In this section I will illustrate which 
policies have the largest potential to reduce food insecurity for countries that have 
different combinations of these characteristics. Before doing this, however, I will 
describe the three policy groups. As this discussion is meant to be illustrative, the 
sketch will be necessarily brief.  
1) Land reform policies imply the redistribution of landholdings from large 
landholders to the landless or the land-poor. Since this study has investigated 
the relationship between the size distribution of landholdings and food 
insecurity, without being able to directly control for the prevalence and terms 
of tenancy, or landlessness, the results can (as mentioned in Section 4.2) only 
tell us about the potential of this (narrowly defined) type of land reform for 
reducing food insecurity.4  If the regional dummies capture lower 
landlessness and tenancy rates, land reforms that give land to the landless 
(and not only to land-poor peasants), as well as tenancy reforms (giving the 
land to the tiller, or improving their contracts), could also be beneficial. 
2) Policies that increase food availability are those that (for example) increase 
agricultural labor productivity, encourage farmers to produce food for the 
domestic market (instead of export crops), or increase the import of food. 
This study has found that a high level of land concentration can be beneficial 
for high levels of both labor productivity and food availability (see Sub-
Section 7.2.1, and Figure 7.10). Thus, land reform may have a negative effect 
on food availability, while policies that raise agricultural labor productivity 
can help increase food availability. However, in order to simplify the 
discussion, I will assume that the level of food availability can (and will) be 
increased by means that are exogenous to the model. As I was only able to 
explain 36 percent of the variation in food availability by land concentration 
and agricultural labor productivity, it is justifiable to regard food availability 
as an exogenous variable. However, since I was not able to explain more than 
4 The implementation of land reforms is difficult because it (most often) challenges prevailing 
conceptions of property rights, and because it threatens the interests of a landowner class that typically 
enjoys enough power to disrupt the implementation process (as well as the legislation itself) 
(Thiesenhusen 1995). As my focus is on the effect of (implemented) land reform, I will not elaborate 
on these problems. 
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36 percent, it is difficult for me to say much more about the means to increase 
food availability.  
3) Industrialization policy is what I call policies that decrease the share of the 
population that depends on agriculture for a living (by increasing labor 
absorption in the industrial sector). Like the two other policy options, this 
policy is not easy to implement. Of course, there is no simple recipe for how 
to increase labor absorption in industry. After all, industrialization is one of 
the main goals that developing countries have been striving towards (with 
varying success) over the past half-century. Industrial labor absorption is a 
function of total industrial production, and requires a balance between 
technology and labor intensity that maximizes the labor absorption rate at a 
level that does not compromise the growth potential. A growing agricultural 
surplus is generally needed to provide industries with food and raw materials 
as well as demand for their products. This requires that agricultural labor 
productivity must increase more than is necessary for self-consumption. As 
we have seen, a high level of land concentration facilitates this. However, the 
industrial sector also depends on effective demand (from the agricultural 
population) for their products. A (very) high level of land concentration is 
probably not beneficial for this effective demand, as a large share of 
agricultural population has a low income. However, in order to simplify the 
discussion of the effect of an industrialization policy, I will assume that the 
share of agricultural population can (and will) be reduced by means 
exogenous to the model.   
Although it will not be easy to reach any of the goals these policy groups are 
meant to fulfill, it is important for countries to know how they might concentrate 
their efforts. Figure 8.1 will serve as an illustrative tool as we now turn to the 
discussion about which of these policy-groups has the largest potential to reduce 
food insecurity for countries with various combinations of land concentration, the 
share of the population that depends on agriculture for a living, and food availability. 
This figure is two-dimensional, but displays information on all four dimensions of 
land concentration, stunting, the share of the population that depends on agriculture 
for a living, and the food availability ratio (setting all other variables at their means). 
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As it is packed with so much information, I will take some time to explain the policy 
options available to countries in these different contexts. 
The figure is a conditional effect plot of land concentration’s effect on the 
prevalence of stunting, as predicted by the model (of direct effects) represented by 
equation 7.1 (in Section 7.1) Thus, the lines show the predicted prevalence of 
stunting as land concentration changes for a number of combinations of the highest 
and lowest values (in the sample of this study) on the food availability ratio and the 
share of agricultural population (when all other variables are at their means).5 These 
lines show that countries that have the maximum value for the share of agricultural 
population (92 percent), and a minimum value on the food availability ratio (72 
percent), will have the highest predicted prevalence of food insecurity (these 
countries are found somewhere along the line E1-D, according to their level of land 
concentration). Among countries with this combination of the share of agricultural 
population and food availability, the predicted prevalence of stunting will be higher 
the higher the level of land concentration. The line E4-A shows that we will find the 
lowest prevalence of stunting in countries that have the minimum value on the share 
of the agricultural population (7 percent) combined with the maximum value of the 
food availability ratio (130 percent), and that (for this combination) the predicted 
prevalence of stunting is lower the higher the level of land concentration. If this 
combination of the share of agricultural population and food availability ratio is 
combined with a gini coefficient of approximately 0.6 or higher, we can see that the 
model predicts that there will be no food insecurity in the country.   
In the real world, most (or all) countries will be situated somewhere between 
the line E1-D and the line E4-A, according to their combination of land 
concentration, share of agricultural population, food availability ratio, as well as the 
other variables in the model. (The predicted prevalence of stunting in the countries 
can be read from the Y-axis). Nevertheless, in order to illustrate which type of 
countries can benefit the most from the different policy-groups I will limit the 
discussion to eight possible cases of extreme values on the three contextual variables. 
These (extreme-value) combinations are depicted by the capital letters A to E in 
5 This conditional effect plot is comparable to the conditional effect plots in Section 7.1 (Figures 7.1 
to 7.4) but it includes different combinations of the share of agricultural population and the food 
availability ratio.  
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Figure 8.1. The arrows in the figure show us the directional effects from the three 
different types of policies available to countries in Context D with respect to the 
contextual variables, as well as the predicted value of stunting. These arrows will be 
explained in further detail under the discussion of Context D, below. 
Figure 8.1: Policy Options for Food Security
The purpose of this illustration is not to prescribe specific policies that will 
guarantee success for a given country, but to show the broad lines of policy options 
available to stereotypical countries as they strive for food security. However, before 
we move on to this discussion, a caveat is required. We must recall that there are 
sources of error in both the data and the model-specification (see Section 7.3). 
Furthermore, the model is based on a synopsis of the information in the sample. This 
means that there may not be any countries that fit exactly into the prescribed pattern. 
On the other hand, it is likely that some developing countries can have values on 
some of the variables that are outside the range of values in this sample. If these 
countries had been included in the estimation of the parameters in the model, they 
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would be (slightly) different, as would the model’s policy implications.6 Finally, the 
predicted level of stunting for any combinations of land concentration, share of 
agricultural population and food availability ratio are based on mean values of 
regime type, immunization, and the regional dummies. Thus, the effects in the real 
world will (of course) not be exactly as predicted by the model.  
Table: 8.1 Contexts being Discussed
Context Land 
Concentration 
Share of 
Agricultural 
Population 
Food 
Availability 
Food 
Insecurity 
Policy Options 
A High Low High No N/A 
B High Low Low Medium x Food availability 
C High High High Medium x Industrialization 
D High High Low High x Land reform 
x Food availability 
x Industrialization 
E1 Low High Low Medium-
high 
x Food availability 
x Industrialization 
E2 Low High High Medium x Industrialization 
E3 Low Low Low Medium x Food availability 
E4 Low Low High Medium-
low 
x Increase land      
concentration 
The model of food insecurity (equation 7.1) predicts that countries in context, 
A (and to the right of A along the X-axis) enjoy (full) food security, while the seven 
contexts ranging from B to E4 will suffer from food insecurity, albeit at different 
levels. For each of the seven extreme contexts with food insecurity, I will discuss the 
policy options that are most likely to reduce food insecurity. When I discuss the 
effect of the policies applicable in a given context, I discuss them one by one and 
keep all of the other variables constant (if not otherwise stated). In this way we can 
discuss how the countries in each context are affected if only that policy group is 
pursued.
6 Since all parameters have a p-value of 0.055 or lower, the parameters should not change very much 
if more countries were added to the sample.  
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Table 8.2: Classification of Selected Countries by Context 
Context Countries 
A Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Panama, (Jordan, 
Tunisia) 
B El Salvador, Peru 
C Madagascar, Uganda  
D (Kenya and Honduras, but medium value of stunting)  
E1 Mauritania, (India), Niger, Rwanda, Lesotho, Cameroon  
E2 Malawi, Thailand, Egypt 
E3 Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Turkey, Philippines  
E4 Morocco, Myanmar  
Note: Not all countries can be placed in one of these contexts, as they have mean values on two 
or more of the contextual variables, or do not have the predicted level of stunting. Kenya and 
Honduras, for instance, have high levels of land concentration, a large share of agricultural population, 
and low levels of food availability, but lower than the predicted prevalence of stunting. Furthermore, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and to a lesser degree Pakistan, have low levels of land concentration, a 
large share of agricultural population, and a low level of food availability, but higher levels of food 
insecurity than predicted. In addition, Jordan and Tunisia have lower levels of stunting than their 
relatively low level of land concentration (combined with a small share of agricultural population and 
high food availability ratio) predicts. 
Context B
Countries that find themselves in (the vicinity of) Context B already have a relatively 
low level of food insecurity in the context of a high level of land concentration, a 
share of agricultural population that is relatively small, and a low level of food 
availability. In order to reduce food insecurity further, these countries should 
concentrate on increasing food availability, as this group of policies can bring them 
all the way down to the line E4-A (which lies on top of the X-axis for gini 
coefficients higher than about 0.6), where the share of agricultural population is at its 
minimum, food availability is at its maximum, and there is no food insecurity.  
In these countries we already find a very small share of the population that 
depends on agriculture for a living. For this reason, there is no (or little) scope for 
improvement on the industrialization front. If countries in this context undertake land 
reform, the level of food insecurity will actually rise. (We can see this by following 
the line B-E3, where the prevalence of stunting rises for countries in this context as 
we move from high to low levels of land concentration.) Even though these countries 
have few policies to choose from, they can possibly solve the problem of food 
insecurity by increasing their food availability ratio (by means exogenous to the 
model).
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Context C
A medium level of food insecurity combined with a high level of land concentration, 
a high food availability ratio and a large share of agricultural population are 
characteristic of a country that finds itself in Context C. The best policy option for 
countries in this context is industrialization. By pursuing this strategy (by means 
exogenous to the model) the countries can hope to move from Context C all the way 
to line E4-A (which covers the X-axis at this high level of land concentration), where 
food availability is at its maximum, the share of agricultural population is at its 
maximum, and level of food insecurity is zero.     
 In these countries, the food availability ratio is already high. Moreover, land 
reform will (probably) not help in this context, as there is no reduction in food 
insecurity as we move from high levels of land concentration to lower levels of land 
concentration (leftward along the line C-E2). Land reform will move the countries 
from C towards context E2, or to E4 if the industrialization strategy is pursued 
simultaneously. Thus, a combination of land reform and industrialization efforts will 
reduce food insecurity by much less than the industrialization strategy alone. I will 
return to the reasons for this below when I discuss Context E1 to E4, below.     
Context D
Countries in Context D will have the most severe problem: very high levels of food 
insecurity, a large share of the population that depends on agriculture for a living, 
and a low level of food availability, combined with a high level of land 
concentration. In this context, policy makers face three possible routes for improving 
food security: land reform, increasing the food availability rate, and industrialization. 
The arrows in Figure 8.1 show to what context, and corresponding predicted value of 
stunting, the different policy groups can take these countries. 
If countries in Context D focus on policies to increase food availability, they 
can reduce food insecurity by moving the country from Context D to Context C.
However, it is a relatively ineffective strategy (unless it is combined with 
industrialization), because the level of food insecurity is still relatively high in this 
new context (C).
These countries can also reduce food insecurity by means of policies to 
increase the level of industrialization (which is shorthand for reducing the share of 
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the population that depends on agriculture for a living). Obviously, like the food 
availability strategy, this is not a policy that may be directly accessible to policy-
makers in a given country. However, if a country is able to “enjoy” industrialization, 
it can possibly decrease its level of food insecurity substantially (by moving from 
Context D to Context B). If it is also able to increase its food availability ratio 
substantially, it may possibly solve the problem of food insecurity completely.  
Countries in Context D can also reduce their food insecurity by implementing 
land reform. We can see that if a country in this context implements land reform, it 
can decrease its level of food insecurity by moving from Context D to Context E1.
While this is surely an improvement on the initial conditions, it is not a panacea: the 
model predicts that food insecurity will still affect about 50% of the population. In 
short, the land reform strategy alone does not improve conditions sufficiently.  
Although Context D is the only one of the seven contexts discussed where 
land reform might have an effect on reducing food insecurity, there is scope for 
reductions in food insecurity by land reform for all countries that find themselves 
within the shaded area in Figure 8.1. The reason for this is that a movement towards 
lower land concentration gives a lower predicted prevalence of stunting. 
Nevertheless, the closer to the solid line (or to E1 or E2) that these countries are, the 
less is the scope for improvement by land reform. Since “real” countries will be 
placed in the figure according to the actual values for all the variables in equation 
7.1, I cannot say exactly what values the countries in the shaded area will have on the 
share of agricultural population or food availability. However, we know from the 
discussion of Figure 7.1 (Section 7.1) that a country that has mean values for all 
other variables, must have a share of agricultural population (in total population) that 
is higher than 79 percent in order to be in the shaded area. We may recall from this 
discussion that 79 percent is the value where the model predicts that the effect of 
land concentration on food insecurity changes direction when all other variables are 
at their means. Countries with this particular combination of values for the variables 
can be found along the horizontal line at the bottom of the shaded area, according to 
their level of land concentration. We can see that there is no change in the predicted 
level of stunting as we move along this line. On the other hand, if the food 
availability ratio is at the maximum of the countries in this study, the line E2-C tells 
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us that land reform will not help, even if the share of the agricultural population is at 
the maximum in this study (when the other variables are at their means).  
However, if countries in Context D (as well as anywhere else within the 
shaded area) implement extensive land reforms (that bring their gini coefficient down 
below 0.6), they may run into problems as a consequence of their attained low level 
of land concentration. The reasons for this will be explained under Context E1 to E4
below.
Contexts E1 to E4
A country in Context E1 has a low level of land concentration, a large share of 
agricultural population, and a low level of food availability. In addition, such a 
country suffers from a relatively high level of food insecurity (around 50 percent 
stunting). Land reform is not an option to these countries because the level of land 
concentration is already low. By increasing their food availability to the maximum 
level (in the sample of this study), such a country can move to E2, but its level of 
food insecurity will remain relatively high. By pursuing industrialization, such a 
country can move further down to E3 (improving food security as it goes), and if it 
pursues both industrialization and food availability policies simultaneously, it can 
arrive at E4. However, this combined strategy still leaves the country in question with 
considerable food insecurity. Thus, at low levels of land concentration, food 
availability and industrialization strategies can only reduce food insecurity to about 
25 percent. The reason that considerable food insecurity will remain in this context is 
that most people live (and try to find work) in the industrial sector, while labor 
productivity in agriculture is relatively low (because of a relatively low land/labor 
ratio) and self-consumption is relatively high (because of a relatively low level of 
land concentration).7 If my analysis is correct, the countries in Context E4 must move 
rightward towards A along the line E4-A, and increase their level of land 
concentration (the size distribution of landholdings), in order to obtain lower levels 
of food insecurity. In the following section we will see why this may be easier said 
than done. 
7 I have not been able to test whether self-consumption is higher when land concentration is low in the 
countries under study. The only empirical support for this argument is the data on changes in the 
agricultural surplus after the Chinese land reform (collectivization) in the 1950s (see Table 5.3). 
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8.3 A Low Land Concentration Trap?  
Despite the hopes and ambitions of many developing country politicians and 
activists, the results of this thesis indicate that there are very few countries where 
land reform could help to reduce food insecurity. Indeed, for most countries, land 
reform will only worsen the situation. If we keep regime type, immunization, and the 
regional dummies out of the discussion by assuming that these always have mean 
values, it seems like the only countries that could possibly benefit from land reform 
are those with a large share of agricultural population and a low to medium level of 
food availability (and, of course, a high level of land concentration).8 However, if the 
land concentration level falls below medium (a gini coefficient of about 0.6) the 
results of this study indicate that full food security is best secured by allowing an 
increased concentration of landholdings. 
The crucial question then becomes: is it possible for countries with low levels 
of land concentration to achieve full food security? The “natural” way to achieve 
fewer and larger landholdings (increase land concentration) is by way of people 
leaving the agricultural sector for work in industry. For this to happen, labor 
absorption in industry has to increase. This, in turn, means that the industrial sector 
has to grow. But the industrial sector depends on an agricultural surplus to provide 
food and raw materials, as well as capital, foreign currency, and demand for 
industrial products. For the agricultural sector to provide these necessary inputs for 
industrial development, agricultural workers must produce enough for themselves, 
their dependants, and the additional surplus.  
However, one of the findings in this study is that when land concentration is 
low, so too is the land/labor ratio. As an extension, I find that when the land/labor 
ratio is low, agricultural labor productivity is also low. Moreover, when low labor 
productivity levels are combined with low levels of land concentration, a large share 
of the agricultural output will (probably) be consumed in the agricultural sector. As a 
result, the agricultural surplus available for industrialization will be small. 
Furthermore, as the population grows (as it still does in most parts of the developing 
world), and the industrial labor absorption rate remains small, parents will have to 
8 In order not to complicate matters too much, I will assume that all other variables than land 
concentration, the share of the population that depends on agriculture for a living, and the food 
availability ratio are (always) at their means, throughout the discussion of the potential for land 
reform. 
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sub-divide their holdings to provide land for their children. Consequently, the 
land/labor ratio and the (agricultural) labor productivity level decrease further. As if 
this were not bad enough, the struggle to survive from very small holdings may lead 
to an over-intensive use of the land and deteriorating land productivity (with a 
corresponding decline in labor productivity).  
Low levels of land concentration are often seen as beneficial for the 
purchasing power of the agricultural population, and thereby beneficial for the 
effective demand for consumer goods that (infant) industries need in order to grow 
(and absorb more labor) (e.g., Prosterman et al. (1990) and Barraclough (1973 and 
1991)). However, when the level of land concentration is very low, the agricultural 
population will not be able to afford many industrial products. This is because a low 
land/labor ratio, and, consequently, a low level of agricultural labor productivity, 
means that the peasantry cannot produce a surplus that can be “traded” for consumer 
products.  
Thus, it seems as though countries with low levels of land concentration 
cannot take the “natural” path for increasing their level of land concentration. Is it, 
then, possible to implement some kind of reverse land reform, where landholdings 
become larger, in order to increase the land/labor ratio and the agricultural labor 
productivity? According to Moore (1966), the enclosures of the commons in 17th
century England contributed to industrialization because it forced peasants (that 
could no longer make a living from their small holdings) to seek work in towns, 
thereby contributing to fewer, larger holdings that could produce an agricultural 
surplus. On the other hand, the enclosure movement was devastating for the peasants 
who were compelled to leave their land. Policy interventions that (so openly) take 
from the poor and give to the rich are simply not (ethically or politically) acceptable 
today. Thus, reverse land reform, with the aim of increasing the land/labor ratio, is 
not a viable option. 
Perhaps Malthus was right after all? Perhaps these countries are facing the 
problem of too many people on too little land? Can it be that population control or 
starvation are the only available options? Population control could surely check the 
further decrease in the land/labor ratio; if the absolute number of people decreases, 
the land/labor ratio (and thus the labor productivity level) would increase. The 
problem with this strategy is that children are often the only (age and illness) 
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insurance available for poor people in developing countries. Thus, it would probably 
take a very long time to reduce population growth by means of “voluntary” family 
planning (in a context of economic stagnation or decline). Just as reverse land reform 
is ethically or politically anathema, so too is forced family planning (cf., China). 
Since countries with high levels of land concentration can possibly escape from food 
insecurity almost regardless of their population level, it is the low level of land 
concentration, not population growth, which traps these countries. 
Another possibility could be to improve land productivity such that labor 
productivity rises, despite the low land/labor ratio. But is this possible—in the 
context of a very low land/labor ratio? We can recall from Chapter 2 that the 
“technology optimists” within the food availability approach argue that technological 
developments can solve the problem of low labor productivity in agriculture. 
Furthermore, despite the finding of this thesis that the land/labor ratio is very 
important for labor productivity, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) suggest that there is 
scope for improvement in agricultural labor productivity, even where the land/labor 
ratio is very low. They argue that this is made possible through investments in 
education, technology and infrastructure. However, since peasants are poor (because 
of the low level of agricultural labor productivity) they do not have the means to 
acquire costly inputs. While agricultural extension programs could be implemented 
to fill this need, a context characterized by low levels of agricultural productivity 
(and a low level of industrialization) makes it unlikely that these countries can afford 
to implement aggressive agricultural extension programs.  
On the other hand, it was exactly these factors (mentioned by Hayami and 
Ruttan) that were at the heart of the Green Revolution. This revolution took place in 
the developing world in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and boosted agricultural labor 
productivity in the developing world to previously unseen levels—by way of 
increased land productivity. The most important components of the Green 
Revolution were the increased use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation, in 
combination with the adoption of new, high yielding varieties of crops that could 
utilize these inputs more effectively than the old varieties. Equally important was the 
economic assistance from the industrialized world that helped poor farmers finance 
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the new inputs, and developing country governments to invest in education and 
infrastructure.9
In South Korea, for instance, where the land/labor ratio was extremely low 
(only 0.4 hectares per economically active in agriculture), labor productivity 
increased by 103 percent (from 2,609 to 5,297 US$) between 1965 and 1985. This 
was mainly because land productivity increased by 96 percent (from 6,547 to 12,845 
US$) in the same period, (most probably) as a result of the Green Revolution. (The 
land/labor ratio stayed approximately the same).10 As mentioned in Chapter 1, South 
Korea had at this time already implemented a land reform. As a result of this land 
reform, the gini coefficient for landholdings was only about 0.35 in the period where 
land productivity increased by 96 percent. This shows that it is possible to increase 
land productivity even when land concentration and the land/labor ratio are low, if 
the conditions are right.  
In this light, it is important to take note of the fact that many of the countries 
that find themselves in the context of low land concentration (and a low land/labor 
ratio) and medium to high levels of food insecurity are found in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This is important because the Green Revolution to a large extent bypassed this part 
of the developing world. Consequently, this region has a potential to increase land 
productivity with existing (Green Revolution) technologies, if they are given the 
same economic assistance that many countries in other developing regions received 
during the Green Revolution.11 It is also important to realize that both land and labor 
productivity in South Korean agriculture is much higher than the average for South 
9 Economic support for the research that lead to these new technologies, as well as its spread in the 
developing world, came primarily from US AID, The Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, while several other western countries gave some economic support. However, many 
critics of the Green Revolution argue that the extension programs did not reach those that needed them 
the most, and that it was the medium sized farms that benefited the most. As a consequence the 
poorest farmers became even more marginalized, and were in turn often forced to sell their land to 
those that had benefited from the Green Revolution. Additionally, it is argued that the chemical inputs 
and extensive irrigation that was a central part of the revolution has had devastating environmental 
consequences. In this way, it is argued, the Green Revolution made things worse for poor farmers 
(e.g., Shiva 1993).  
10 Land and labor productivity is measured in constant 1995 US$, and the source of these data is 
World Bank (2003). For the land/labor ratio, the source is FAO (2002b), and for the gini coefficient it 
is IFAD (2001: 118). 
11 The most important staple food in Sub-Saharan Africa is maize, and high yielding varieties of this 
crop (that can utilize fertilizers and irrigation effectively) have already been developed. In addition, it 
is possible that the (controversial) developments within biotechnology can help these countries 
improve their land productivity even further. 
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Asia, where most of the other countries with low land concentration, low land/labor 
ratio and relatively high food insecurity are found.12  Consequently, it seems as 
though it may also be possible to increase further land productivity in these 
countries, given the right conditions.  
Thus, there is some hope that the countries in “the low land concentration 
trap” may escape the Malthusian mechanism. However, it would appear that 
countries with low levels of land concentration have greater difficulty in alleviating 
food insecurity without some kind of outside help, as they seem trapped in stagnation 
caused by their low land/labor ratio.13 Nevertheless, this does not change the main 
conclusion about the potential that land reform has to reduce food insecurity in the 
developing world. For most countries, land reform will not bring about the desired 
reduction in food insecurity. While there may be other motivations for land reform 
(e.g., redistributive justice), policymakers should be aware that increased land 
redistribution might actually increase food insecurity in the country.  
In light of the popularity of land reform as a policy for reducing poverty, it is 
remarkable that only a few of the countries in this study find themselves in a context 
where they could benefit from limited land reform (i.e., a high enough level of land 
concentration and share of agricultural population, combined with a low enough food 
availability ratio). For the majority of the countries in this study, land reform seems 
to be an inappropriate strategy. More worrisome yet is the fact that a whole range of 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia (about 60 percent of the 
countries in this sample) have relatively low levels of land concentration (below the 
approximate border line of 0.6) combined with medium levels of food insecurity. 
The lower a country’s gini coefficient, the higher the level of food insecurity with 
which these countries may be trapped, if they do not receive help from the outside to 
increase land and labor productivity levels in agriculture. 
However, two modifications to the conclusion about the limited potential for 
land reform should be made. First, countries in the shaded area of Figure 8.1 will 
12 Land productivity in South Asia was only 442 US$ per hectare in 1985, and 700 US$ per hectare in 
the year 2000, while agricultural labor productivity was 311 and 730 US$ per worker in the respective 
years.  
13 Thus, it is problematic that this kind of support largely withered in recent decades, as the focus has 
been on reducing nearly all kinds of governmental spending in developing countries, instead of 
helping them to finance (agricultural) extension and infrastructure programs.  
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only find themselves in the trap if their gini coefficient for landholdings (after land 
reform is implemented) becomes lower than approximately 0.6. We see from Figure 
8.1 that countries in the shaded area below this value on the gini coefficient will not 
be able to reach the X-axis (of no food insecurity), no matter what combination of 
the share of agricultural population and food availability they might have. However, 
if more limited land reforms are implemented, and the land concentration stays above 
a gini coefficient of 0.6, the countries with a high share of agricultural population 
and low to medium levels of food availability can still resolve the problem of food 
insecurity. If these countries subsequently (or simultaneously) pursue policies to 
increase industrialization and food availability, they can move to very low levels of 
(or no) food insecurity. However, land reform alone will not allow them to achieve 
this goal.  
The second modification relates to the vast areas of idle land that can often be 
found in countries with high levels of land concentration (especially in some Latin 
American countries). In these countries, land and labor productivity will probably 
increase after partial land reform, as more land will be brought into productive use. 
As the potential to increase agricultural labor productivity by utilizing previously idle 
land is not captured by the variables included in this study, land reform may reduce 
food insecurity in more of these countries than the model in Figure 8.1 predicts.       
8.4 Further Research 
For most countries, land reform will not bring about the desired reduction in food 
insecurity. While there may be other motivations for land reform (e.g., redistributive 
justice), policymakers should be aware that land reform might actually decrease food 
security in the country. The more equally land is distributed (below a gini coefficient 
of about 0.6), the higher the level of food insecurity the country may be trapped 
with—even if that country increases food availability and industrialization to the 
highest levels.  
Thus, it is worrisome that a whole range of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South East Asia (about 60 percent of the countries in this sample) have low 
levels of land concentration (below the approximate border line of 0.6) combined 
with medium levels of food insecurity. Future research should be aimed at 
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understanding how these countries can get out of the low land concentration trap and 
(more specifically) whether another Green Revolution could provide solutions.  
In addition, I was unable to test all of the theoretical links between land 
concentration, food availability and food insecurity in the conceptual scheme 
(described in Chapter 5). This test could not be implemented because of the lack of 
data on enough cases to perform a cross-country, multivariate test. However, it is 
likely that indicators for all (or most) of these relations can be found for one or a few 
countries. Thus, case studies could be used to investigate more closely the supposed 
causal relationships between several important variables: land concentration, the 
land/labor ratio, agricultural land and labor productivity, the agricultural surplus, 
industrial labor absorption, and food insecurity.  
More information could also be gathered on food security among the 
agricultural and the non-agricultural populations, to see whether a high level of land 
concentration leads to a high level of food insecurity among the agricultural 
population, and a low level of food insecurity among the non-agricultural population, 
as the results of this analysis indicate. Such data could also propel a comparative case 
study on the effect of land reforms on food insecurity in these two populations. It 
may also be possible to study the short- and long-term changes in food insecurity, in 
both the agricultural and the non-agricultural population, in countries that have 
pursued different routes to food security (the food availability route, the land reform 
route, or the industrial labor absorption route). 
Finally, another possible path to pursue concerns the finding that a high food 
availability ratio contributes to a lower level of food insecurity. In the World Trade 
Organization, efforts are underway to liberalize agricultural trade from the 
developing to the developed world. In this context it is hoped that increased access to 
world markets will increase agricultural exports and encourage growth in the 
agricultural sector of developing countries, giving them access to much-needed 
foreign exchange. However, the increased export of agricultural products will most 
likely reduce the level of food availability in developing countries. There are three 
reasons for this pessimistic conclusion. First, more farmers will probably turn to 
export crops, instead of food crops for the domestic market. Second, farmers with 
large holdings are those with the greatest incentive to take advantage of the new 
export possibilities. Third, it is doubtful, perhaps dubious, to expect that the export 
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revenues generated by these new agricultural exporters will be spent on cheaper food 
imports that could benefit the poor. Thus, increased agricultural exports will 
probably lead to increased food insecurity. In this regard there is a need to find out 
whether developing country agricultural exports are dominated by farmers with large 
holdings (including multinational agribusiness companies) and whether agricultural 
exports from developing countries lead to a net reduction in food availability (or if 
the effect on food availability is neutralized by food imports). 
Millions of people in the developing world are still tormented by food 
insecurity. The suffering of each and every one of them shouts out for a solution. To 
date, progress is all too slow. Even if the relatively optimistic goal of the “World 
Food Summit” (to (only) halve the prevalence of food insecurity in the developing 
countries by 2015) is to have any chance of realization, we need the results of more 
research to understand which policies work best, in different contexts. Unfortunately, 
research alone cannot solve this enormous problem. More than anything else, 
solutions require will and determination. These factors are not the direct result of 
research itself, but research can help the willing and the determined to alleviate food 
insecurity more effectively.   
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Appendix A: Data 
Country Stunting 
%
Gini coef. 
landholdings 
Agricultural 
population 
%
Food 
Availability 
Ratio 
Regime 
type 
Immuni- 
zation 
%
Civil 
War 
Cameroon         30.8 .42 63 90 -8 36.0 0
Cote d'Ivoire     20.8 .36 58 100 -8 18.5 0
Ethiopia         64.2 .32 76 73 -8 9.0 1
Ghana            26.1 .44 51 78 -7 21.5 0
Kenya            33.3 .77 78 95 -6 66.5 0
Lesotho          37.0 .47 81 101 -7 77.5 0
Madagascar       33.8 .80 77 108 -6 14.5 0
Malawi           52.8 .36 77 104 -9 52.0 0
Mauritania       34.0 .36 65 90 -7 34.0 1
Niger            37.7 .35 82 97 -7 15.5 0
Rwanda           42.7 .39 92 83 -7 51.0 0
Sierra Leone     35.2 .44 64 78 -7 -- 0
Uganda           42.2 .62 82 107 -7 15.5 1
Brazil           15.4 .86 26 111 2 71.5 0
Chile            9.6 .64 14 104 -6 91.0 0
Colombia         24.9 .71 29 112 8 56.0 1
Costa Rica       7.6 .67 26 125 10 84.0 0
Dominican Rep.      20.6 .70 38 112 6 46.5 0
El Salvador      29.9 .57 39 94 6 74.0 1
Guatemala        57.0 .72 52 107 -1 23.5 1
Honduras         37.2 .73 58 98 6 55.5 0
Panama           15.5 .88 26 105 -1 78.5 0
Paraguay         13.5 .91 48 124 -3 52.5 0
Peru             37.8 .61 38 90 7 50.5 1
Trinidad & Tobago 4.8 .61 8 120 9 54.5 0
Uruguay          15.9 .84 14 105 1 61.0 0
Egypt            30.7 .35 62 130 -5 79.0 0
Jordan           15.8 .57 7 121 -7 79.0 0
Morocco          22.6 .47 38 113 -8 48.0 1
Tunisia          17.5 .58 26 117 -7 67.5 0
Turkey           20.5 .40 46 85 6 58.0 1
Yemen            44.1 .64 -- 94 -6 12.5 0
Bangladesh       67.5 .50 70 78 -6 1.5 1
Bhutan 56.1 .57 91 107 -8 42.5 0
India            51.8 .43 63 96 8 9.5 1
Myanmar          49.7 .44 48 116 -7 12.0 1
Nepal            62.0 .33 92 91 3 33.0 0
Pakistan         57.9 .37 54 94 5 34.0 0
Philippines      42.8 .53 47 100 -9 54.0 1
Sri Lanka        27.2 .62 52 112 6 45.0 1
Thailand         21.5 .36 62 108 6 44.0 0
Mean value 33.4 .55 53 102 -1.9 45.8 .34 
Minimum 4.8 .32 7 73 -9 1.5 0
Maximum 67.5 .91 92 130 10 91 1
Standard dev.       16.5 .17 23.7 13.9 6.39 24.3 .48
Number of cases 41 41 40 41 41 40 41
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Country Land
Productivity 
Land
/Labor 
ratio 
Agric. Labor 
Productivity 
GDP
per 
capita 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
dummy 
Near East 
& North 
Africa
dummy 
Cameroon         305 3.10 936 730 69.5 1 0
Cote d'Ivoire     103 7.06 783 820 56.5 1 0
Ethiopia         -- -- -- 84 17.5 1 0
Ghana            151 3.38 552 345 58.0 1 0
Kenya            75 7.94 256 337 62.0 1 0
Lesotho          36 9.00 504 461 -- 1 0
Madagascar       29 6.63 191 282 40.0 1 0
Malawi           89 1.10 94 147 61.0 1 0
Mauritania       4 77.11 328 458 33.5 1 0
Niger            43 4.39 183 242 34.0 1 0
Rwanda           433 1.31 331 309 -- 1 0
Sierra Leone     145 2.88 508 273 -- 1 0
Uganda           210 1.29 273 237 64.0 1 0
Brazil           189 27.07 2580 3915 77.0 0 0
Chile            139 18.96 3677 2678 93.5 0 0
Colombia         161 12.15 3212 2049 84.5 0 0
Costa Rica       331 9.67 3177 2637 -- 0 0
Dominican R      392 5.13 1577 1345 69.0 0 0
El Salvador      869 1.96 1686 1346 -- 0 0
Guatemala        694 2.68 1892 1312 77.5 0 0
Honduras         158 4.76 743 682 -- 0 0
Panama           260 9.07 2360 2393 -- 0 0
Paraguay         80 36.03 2910 1822 76.0 0 0
Peru             105 12.89 1300 2305 68.0 0 0
Trinidad & Tobago 622 2.63 1850 5146 -- 0 0
Uruguay          89 77.16 6537 4832 -- 0 0
Egypt            2896 .30 853 857 90.5 0 1
Jordan           153 10.50 1317 1520 97.5 0 1
Morocco          183 7.37 1333 1186 68.5 0 1
Tunisia          235 9.97 2290 1722 78.0 0 1
Turkey           567 3.13 1780 -- 83.5 0 1
Yemen            -- 9.10 -- 277 52.5 0 1
Bangladesh       685 .30 246 246 64.0 0 0
Bhutan 685 .55 126 364 -- 0 0
India            376 .83 304 313 49.5 0 0
Myanmar          -- .73 -- -- 54.5 0 0
Nepal            303 .97 177 206 43.5 0 0
Pakistan         366 2.45 455 430 59.0 0 0
Philippines      1290 1.06 1232 1183 80.5 0 0
Sri Lanka        977 .74 731 461 74.0 0 0
Thailand         652 1.89 713 2002 78.5 0 0
Mean value 396.8 9.9 1315.7 1229.6 65 .32 .15 
Minimum 4 .3 94 84 17.5 0 0
Maximum 2896 77.1 6537 5146 97.5 1 1
Standard deviation        511.17 17.3 1320.4 1262.5 18.601 .47 .36
Number of cases 38 40 38 39 31 41 41
-- means missing 
Appendix B: Regression Results 
This appendix shows the step-wise removal of variables in Section 5.1 from the first 
model of direct effects on food insecurity (in Table B.1) to the final model (of the direct 
effect on food insecurity) in Table B.9. The variables were removed step-wise from the 
model according to the strength of the standardized coefficient, the p-value, and the 
changes in R2. I have used +/- 0.200 as an approximate lower-limit for the standardized 
coefficient, and 0.05 as the significance level. There are twelve variables in the first 
model and only 27 cases (because of missing variables), which means that the model has 
very low degrees of freedom. When there are low degrees of freedom, it is difficult to 
obtain significant parameters. Thus, in the first rounds of re-specification, I mainly study 
the standardized regression coefficients. As the number of variables decrease, and the 
degrees of freedom increase, I will also consider the p-value of the coefficients, and 
changes in R2.
After each step of variable-removal, the previously removed variables were included 
again, one by one. The only variable that had an acceptable effect when reintroduced 
was Immunization (it became relatively strong and significant again after the removal of 
Agricultural Labor Productivity). This is why Immunization appears in the final model 
of direct effects in Table B.9, despite being removed in the seventh re-specification 
round.
The results of the re-specification rounds are shown in Tables B.1 to B.9. I have only 
showed the reintroduction step for immunization, as the other variables did not have an 
effect when reintroduced. 
Continued
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Table B.1: First Model of Direct Effects on Food Insecurity 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients (B) 
Standardized Coefficients 
(Beta)
P-value
(Constant) 69.304  .458 
Gini coefficient for landholdings  - 21.466 - .234 .915 
Interaction gini landholdings and 
agricultural population 
.776 .673 .129 
Food availability ratio - .176 - .141 .863 
Interaction gini landholdings and food 
availability ratio 
- .310 - .429 .858 
Agricultural labor productivity  -1.919E-03 - .122 .704 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 22.596 - .678 .022 
Near East and North Africa - 8.133 - .184 .495 
GDP per capita  - 1.217E-03 - .071 .835 
Civil war  2.855 .088 .594 
Regime type - .357 - .137 .569 
Immunization - 5.444E-02 - .080 .748 
Water and sanitation 4.782E-02 .050 .863 
Note:  R2 = 0.772, N = 27 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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Table B.2: First Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 68.695  .227 
Gini coefficient for landholdings  -21.253 -.221 .842 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.694 .594 .017 
Food availability ratio -.142 -.112 .801 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.283 -.374 .777 
Labor productivity -1.779E-03 -.112 .612 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -20.956 -.604 .000 
Near East and North Africa -8.320 -.164 .307 
GDP per capita  -1.197E-03 -.084 .670 
Civil war  3.162 .091 .407 
Regime type -.400 -.160 .269 
Immunization  -5.822E-02 -.084 .558 
Note: R2 = 0.821, N = 35 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
APPENDIX B 
204
Table B.3: Second Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 48.412  .346 
Gini coefficient for landholdings  3.410 .036 .972 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.678 .580 .002 
Food availability ratio 6.820E-02 .055 .892 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.520 -.695 .586 
Labor productivity -2.962E-03 -.185 .380 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -22.256 -.641 .000 
Near East and North Africa -13.525 -.292 .021 
Civil war  3.084 .091 .410 
Regime type -.625 -.253 .050 
Immunization  -6.922E-02 -.099 .482 
Note: R2 = 0.811, N = 36 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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Table B.4: Third Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 50.068  .005 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.678 .580 .001 
Food availability ratio 5.200E-02 .042 .772 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.488 -.652 .005 
Labor productivity -3.006E-03 -.188 .327 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -22.279 -.641 .000 
Near East and North Africa -13.530 -.292 .019 
Civil war  3.119 .092 .377 
Regime type -.626 -.253 .044 
Immunization  -6.767E-02 -.097 .431 
Note: R2 = 0.811, N = 36 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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Table B.5: Fourth Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 54.486  .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.658 .563 .001 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.458 -.613 .001 
Labor productivity -3.248E-03 -.203 .263 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -22.317 -.642 .000 
Near East and North Africa -12.988 -.281 .015 
Civil war  2.940 .087 .389 
Regime type -.627 -.254 .040 
Immunization  -6.635E-02 -.095 .431 
Note: R2 = 0.810, N = 36 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
Table B.6: Fifth Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 56.751  .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.699 .598 .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.489 -.654 .000 
Labor productivity -2.523E-03 -.158 .360 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -23.129 -.666 .000 
Near East and North Africa -12.225 -.264 .018 
Regime type -.593 -.240 .048 
Immunization  -9.298E-02 -.134 .236 
Note: R2 = 0.805, N = 36 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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Table B.7: Sixth Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 54.042  .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.722 .618 .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.507 -.688 .000 
Labor productivity -3.452E-03 -.217 .190 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -23.493 -.696 .000 
Near East and North Africa -13.677 -.296 .007 
Regime type -.588 -.240 .047 
Note: R2 = 0.795, N = 37 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
Table B.8: Seventh Respesification
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 55.914  .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.801 .647 .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
-.636 -.847 .000 
Sun-Saharan Africa  -22.677 -.647 .000 
Near East and North Africa -15.486 -.312 .003 
Regime type -.694 -.268 .024 
Note: R2 = 0.760, N = 40 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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Table B.9: Eighth Respesification = Final Model of Direct 
Effects on Food Insecurity
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
(B)
Standardized 
Coefficients
(Beta)
P-value
Constant 60.046  .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
    and agricultural population 
.711 .574 .000 
Interaction gini for landholdings 
   and food availability ratio 
- .552 - .725 .000 
Sun-Saharan Africa  - 21.549 - .598 .000 
Near East and North Africa - 12.419 - .250 .018 
Regime type - .648 - .248 .030 
Immunization - .153 - .218 .044 
Note: R2 = 0.790, N= 39 
Operationalization and Sources: See Section 6.2 
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